Towards an Expressivist Theory of the Affects

Charles Altieri
Department of English
UC Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720-1030

"For a year I could not get him to talk about emotions; now people won't let me stop talking about them." Monica Lewinsky

I want today to give you the overall shape of a book on the aesthetics of the affects that I have just finished. Then I will try two directions for showing how this book might matter. I will present its basic map for dealing specifically with aspects of feeling in visual art and in literature; then I will turn from the concrete to the general by summarizing how I see the emotions constituting values in ways that often prove incommensurable with modes of judgment basic to our investments in rationality. My overall claims derive from my antipathy to what remain dominant tendencies in my field of literary criticism. I love expressive particularity and so have little sympathy with criticism that seeks to make texts instances of generalizations—either in relation to socio-political interests or in service of abstract claims about the ethical. Therefore I turned to theory in order to lay the groundwork for what might be called an “exponential” ideal of reading. As Wallace Stevens uses the concept, exponents matter because they simultaneously provide us with new names and establish incremental leaps in the degrees of power made realizable by those names. Exponential reading concentrates on how the work of articulation brings aspects of experience into the kind of focus that maximizes the self-reflexive affective intensities brought into play.

I use the term “affect” as my umbrella term so that one discourse can engage the entire range of states that are bounded on one side by pure sensation and on the other by thoughts that have no visible or tangible impact on bodily states. Affects are those states that combine corporeal responsiveness with a corresponding imaginative dimension or aspect of “asness” that brings distinctive qualitative aspects to the sensation. I doubt that this theorizing has a natural kind as its object, or even that subcategories of affect involve natural kinds. But there seem to me sufficient links by family resemblance and by social practices to warrant seeking conceptual terms that apply to the full range of relevant states. Pain is usually a sensation; the assertion that someone else is in pain constitutes a proposition. But pain becomes an affect when its distinctive qualities matter or when it opens into psychological contexts that range from a tinge of irritation to a massive sense of loss.

Then one can go on divide affects into four basic categories—each with an occurrent and a dispositional aspect. Feelings are elemental affective states where the relevant imaginative engagement seems continuous with the immediate processes of sensation. Think of how sandpipers take on human qualities as they bustle about or think of Gary Snyder’s line about tracing on a lover’s back the outline of the snowy
Uintah Mountains. Moods are modes of feeling where the sense of subjectivity becomes diffuse and sensation merges into something close to atmosphere, something that seems to pervade an entire scene or situation. Emotions are affects involving the projection of attitudes that typically establish a particular cause and so situate the agent within a narrative and generate an interest in some kind of action or identification. Think of standard jealousy plots. Finally, passions are emotions within which we establish significant stakes for the identity that they make possible—mourner, lover, avenger. We can summarize the four states by this sequence: particular details can elicit momentary sensations tinged with longing. Those sensations can spread out into a more general sense that one’s world seems somewhat heavy and without pleasure. Or one might come to stage the longing as produced by a particular memory or need. Then longing becomes an emotion, a means of representing one’s situation and establishing a direction for some kind of action. Finally longing becomes a passion when it seems especially absorbing, as if one were compelled to make it a primary aspect of one’s identity. Think Freud’s melancholia.1

Armed with distinctions like these, I thought I could pursue a straightforward research project bringing to literary studies the best that philosophers had thought and said on the affects. However as I started to read these philosophers carefully, the situation got much more complicated, and much more interesting. I discovered in philosophy many of the same problems that in criticism had driven me to seek out the alternatives I thought I would find in working on the affects. Theorists of the emotions proved even more eager than literary critics are to stress cognitive and moral dimensions of the topic, in the process blinding themselves to phenomenological considerations that might help explain why we affects take on value for us as specific modes of being in the world.2 This realization provided a challenging opportunity, even though it would make for a much stranger book than I had planned. I became convinced that I could use the frameworks theorists construct as a context for clarifying how we might engage the affective dimension of works of art and how we might articulate values for those works without collapsing them into either the ethical or the cognitive. But then I realized that I would have to use what the philosophers enabled me to see about the art against the philosophers. For the thick descriptions enabled by focusing on affects and relations among affects within works of art provided very different images of both human activity and human investments from the ones shaping the philosophical work. I became fascinated by the degree to which using theoretical concerns about the affects to respond to the arts brought out an aesthetic dimension to our concern with the affects in all areas of our lives.3

This dissatisfaction with philosophy took two basic forms. First, my work in the arts made it impossible to accept what seemed to me the prevailing psychological descriptions provided by the once dominant cognitivist views of emotion (which I will soon engage). Patricia Greenspan, for example, identifies cognitivism as an emphasis on two basic “compounds”—affective states of comfort and discomfort and evaluative propositions spelling out their intentional content” (Emotions & Reasons, p. 4). Jealousy is discomfort accompanied by a belief that an affection one desires is turned elsewhere. But this model of states of comfort and discomfort will not get us very far toward characterizing what happens at end of King Lear. And while I have
to agree that evaluative propositions often play significant roles in how we cast emotions, there seem to me also quite different versions of intentionality that come into play, especially modes of intentionality connected to values like intensity and connectedness rather than to discursive propositions that evaluate possible actions.\footnote{I think it is crucial to concentrate on questions about intentionality because they reveal the limitations of most epistemic attitudes toward the affects while also dramatizing why the arts can matter for philosophical reflection. Cognitivist theory equates intentionality with belief because intension is sharply opposed to extension. And since extension can be secured within a theory of descriptions, intension and intention get relegated to the domain where extension is necessarily opaque. Take for example Bertrand Russell’s theory of description. For descriptions to have truth value their purported link to the world has to be established without invoking what particular agents think is the case. Beliefs, on the other hand, are those assertions whose truth conditions depend on what the agent has in mind. Descriptions of the morning star will be identical to those of the evening star, but if one believes the two are different then all we can deal with is what the belief projects. Speaking more abstractly, we might say that equating intention with belief provides a stable way of showing why many purported descriptions are in fact opaque. But one can still ask whether intentionality ought be confined entirely to these binary oppositions. The opposition is very useful for epistemic projects, but perhaps very limiting for philosophical psychology. Phenomenological traditions help us right the balance because they link intentionality to the many ways that individuals find themselves attached to the world. Intentionality simply is our sense of how consciousness is directly engaged with phenomena. On the most elemental level, intentionality is whatever allows the mind to treat a “that” as a “this.” So in many cases making affects articulate can also be considered a way of specifying how intentionality is structured in individual cases. We can then say that being moved takes many forms, some of which do not involve conceptual formulations of any kind, and there are many modes of expressive activity that involve attunements with others not available when we think in terms of beliefs.\footnote{That is why the arts help us appreciate this variety in intentional stances. Iago has to invent beliefs for a jealousy that goes much deeper than belief and has to be considered part of his orientation toward the world.} For a while I thought this way of opposing cognitivist values would allow me to revolutionize the study of emotions. Then it began to dawn on me that I was not the only one dissatisfied with cognitivism. Several significant criticisms had emerged. But while my ambition dimmed, my dissatisfaction intensified. For even when philosophers provided substantial alternatives to the core cognitivist position, I found them not coming much closer to the affective qualities that engaged me in the arts. These philosophers restored a sense of why specific feelings might matter and why expression can be a central value. But in my view they still tended to assimilate affective states too quickly into models of reflective judgment that subordinated the phenomenology of the affects to the perspectives we bring to bear in orienting and in assessing actions.\footnote{To be adequate to our aesthetic experience of these affects, philosophy would have to pay considerably more attention to how aspects of our mental lives take on distinctive vividness for us and invite our seeking satisfaction}
simply in how that mental life finds means of expression. In effect, the arts inspire accounts that make affective experience not just something we understand, but something that we pursue as a fundamental value. And in articulating such possibilities the arts seem to require our developing a fairly tight connection between our aesthetic interests and what Baruch Spinoza elaborated as our conative drives.

Let me be more concrete. For the past three decades philosophers have been attempting to reverse a longstanding cultural bias that set irrational, seething emotions against the cool, analytic operations of reason. This work has made us aware of the many ways in which the emotions, if not all of the affects, complement reason by establishing salience and by constituting versions of value that ground private interests in shared cultural concerns. However this work now seems to me to be fostering an intellectual culture where this new love affair between the passions and reason produces as part of love's blindness an inability to appreciate the differences that attracted them to one another in the first place. Most American philosophers and social theorists tend to dwell only on those aspects of our affective lives that complement reason or submit to its authority. This tendency risks making us dependent on concepts of agency that severely reduce the many channels of mental activity fundamental to subjective life while eliminating even the possibility that affective states can generate values worth honoring even though they resist to reason's authority.

I am of course generalizing about contemporary philosophy in a most unphilosophical way. But I see no alternative in this introduction to lumping within one philosophical attitude both the emphasis on adjudicating beliefs in traditional cognitivist accounts of the emotions and the more fluid treatments of judgment emerging in work critical of that position. For my primary concern is simply that there are severe limitations to the fundamental model of mind informing how this work identifies particular affects and elaborates the possible values that such affects might have in our lives. And if recent philosophical treatments of the emotions have made my target less clear, they have also made it seem more urgent that I come close to hitting the mark. For we have to realize how difficult it is to develop philosophical positions sufficiently critical of cognitivist values, especially in an intellectual culture eager to defend versions of realism able to resist cultural relativism. And I hope we will also come to appreciate why it may be time to use the arts for exploring a quite different conceptual orientation toward affective experience.

My book bases these explorations on two fundamental aspects of aesthetic experience. The first aspect is descriptive. I think the arts' insistence on exemplary concrete particularity provides a vital arena for specifying how we in modern Western society might best characterize various kinds of affects. The second aspect is more abstract--concerned not with how we engage the world but with how we reflect upon the values involved in our various ways of experiencing the world. For I want to use aesthetic models to foreground conative experiences of affective states as ends in themselves, experiences quite at odds with the philosophical tendency to treat affects primarily as means for generating actions and attitudes. An aesthetic perspective invites us to ask what states, roles, identifications, and social bonds become possible by virtue of our efforts to dwell fully within these dispositions of affective energies and the modes of self-reflection they sustain? Rather than asking what we can know
about the affects, or how they contribute to the work of knowing, we begin to ask
who we can be by virtue of how we dispose our self-consciousness in relation to
affective experience. How are we changed by what we feel, and by our adapting
different ways of engaging what we feel? What needs get expressed, desires
articulated, and modes of satisfaction elaborated because of how we engage ourselves
in these processes, and because of how we see one another engaging in these
processes?

This shift in focus can lead beyond the affects to more general questions about
the roles in our lives of complexes of values that are very difficult for reason either to
grasp or to assess. For the self-reflexive immediacy cultivated by an aesthetic
orientation attunes us to values that are difficult to correlate with the impartiality and
responsibility to specifiable criteria that we expect of rational judgments. How do we
reason about intensity or about degrees of involvedness with other persons or about
values that become constitutive for an agent like Medea’s rage or the sanctity of
Dostoyevsky’s idiot? Such cases require much more complex notions of satisfaction
and dissatisfaction than are needed when we rely on any form of reason: when value
is immanent to a situation yet central to our lives we have to be able to clarify what
aspects of the psyche come into play. And that complexity in turn may require our
accepting the possibility that we have to treat many basic modes of assessing values
as often incommensurable. That is, there will often be cases where we cannot
determine on conceptual grounds whether we ought base judgments on the qualities
of feeling or on the results reason can specify likely to result from indulging the
feeling.

Noting this possibility is extremely important because it challenges the benign
imperialism informing philosophy’s reaching out to the affects so long as the affects
turn out to sustain the hegemony of its modes of reflection. And by showing that the
values that the affects sustain are often not easily reconciled with those assessed by
moral reason, we also establish a position from which we can claim that the current
emphasis in the academy on the sociological and political dimensions of the arts may
be only the flip, socially active side of the philosopher’s narrow reduction of all
expressive energies to concerns for how truths can be established. Both perspectives
seem incapable of dealing adequately with the kinds of experiences made sharply
articulate in how specific works of art structure reflexive consciousness.

II

I think I can establish a level of analysis where we can see that most
contemporary philosophy on the emotions shares five basic topoi. Then I will try to
clarify what seem to me two basic limitations in this approach, limitations that have
significant consequences for turning from the emotions to the feelings and specifying
the difference that makes in our approach to practical situations.

First, our philosophers would insist on characterizing the specific beliefs and
desires that constitute the “intentional” component of the emotion. This move is
absolutely central to contemporary thinking because it affords a sharp distinction
between mere behavior and the presence of determinate and determinable emotions.
Suppose we see John acting out a barely suppressed rage as he observes his partner
Jane “flirting” with their mutual friend Bill. We conclude that he is jealous because
we assume that these physical signs are connected to specific beliefs about what Jane and Bill are doing.\textsuperscript{11}

The second topos brings out one practical consequence of having formed an intentional perspective on the scene. For as intentions construct scenarios they organize how attention is deployed and they allow the subject to take in modes of information not likely to arise without the distinctive distribution of affective energies. Holding the beliefs he does, John finds himself disposed to watch Bill and Jane very carefully and to notice every sign that either confirms or disconfirms his suspicions.

My third topos consists of the various ways that philosophers connect bodily states to intentions.\textsuperscript{12} Cognitivists are especially wary on this point because they adamantly resist any Jamesian account of physical causality. Bodily states have to be rendered as accompanying and even complementing intentionality, but they cannot be cast as producing it.

Jealousy is also an especially rich example of a fourth topos, one that introduces complex philosophical questions about the nature of agency. Because many emotions show themselves even when we try to conceal them, there is good reason to raise questions about dimensions of behavior that are passive or driven and those that are active or willed as expressions for which one wants to take responsibility. Several distinctions then become necessary. Emotions have different qualities depending on how closely they can be woven into the agent’s own sense of active powers: is the jealousy imposed or is it almost chosen or stylized as a way of accommodating oneself to a situation? Correspondingly we have to distinguish between expressions of emotion that may be seen as fundamentally symptomatic and those that are deliberately communicative.

My final topos emerges because no account of the emotions can be complete without addressing what Keith Oatley calls the roles the emotions play in "making action possible" (12). Traditional Western thinking stressed the danger of emotion’s influence on action, since all the affects introduce irrational factors blurring judgment and subjecting us to all kinds of seduction. Contemporary theories, especially cognitivist ones, then have a substantial task facing them because they want to develop a very different practical story, with at least two important motifs. First, emotions influence action because they shape and reinforce motives. They establish salience among the details we observe and so organize situations in accord with specific values. (See for example Tangney and Fisher, 67). An initial angry reaction reorganizes how I perceive my situation. And it brings to bear an entire framework of values—negatively by recalling how much it matters to me that certain expectations or principles were violated by the object of my anger, and positively by producing specific projected satisfactions that I associate with justice and with revenge. And as I come to rely on these values, I also perforce strengthen the bonds I have to the social grammars that I learned when I established my ability to negotiate the culture I inhabit. Emotions generate actions because they bring into play learned scenarios and modes of appraisal that indicate what the likely outcome is of a particular self-representation. I do not have to do much figuring to understand where my jealousy is leading me.
The second motif shifts the focus from understanding how emotions influence actions to understanding how observers can modify the patterns of behavior governing individual lives. Here cognitivist theory provides an impressively tight case. Because emotions depend on beliefs and generate appraisals of how action might be possible, they involve a kind of reasoning. We can test the appraisals individuals make against what a more objective perspective might conclude if it were given this kind of person in this kind of situation. The observers have to be sensitive to individual differences, but they still might have cause to intervene if a person's emotional appraisals seem cognitively bizarre or strangely overwrought. For the fact that emotions shape salience is not always in our interest. The very fact that the emotions help us notice some things means they also are likely to blind us to other features of the situations.

So the more one can treat our motives in propositional form, the stronger the basis for intervening when we think the blindness is debilitating. We can point out discrepancies between the behavior and the agent's interpretation of it, or we can ask the agent to reflect on why the action pursued seems so different from how most other people experience the emotions in question. Treating motivation as appraisal enables us to ask whether the emotion sorts events in ways that enable us to act in accord with our own best interests or potentials? And if agents seem to be working at odds with those interests or potentials, we can try to clarify the apparent distance between what they seem to want and how they go about pursuing it. With jealousy, for example, cognitivist theorists would point out how we make two kinds of judgments. Does the interpretation of the person toward whom we are jealous fit the facts of the case? And are there features of the subject’s past experience that indicate he or she is prone to suspicion and hence ought to be aware of tendencies toward making errors in this regard? As the emotion plays itself out in action, it may provide ample materials for pointing out how much blindness comes with its insights.

III

There are at least two basic problems with the cognitivist orientation on emotions and the work it has influenced. This orientation will not prove at all helpful in dealing with the range of affects that do not take form as emotions, and so it is likely to treat them as relatively insignificant. And emphasizing what we might call the belief-judgment nexus produces a reductive understanding of human agency, especially in terms of the ways values permeate our lives. I hope to clear an alternative theoretical path by making a sharp distinction between adjectival and adverbial models of how we engage affects. Identifying affects in terms of beliefs tempts us to treat the emotions as if they were instantly recognized objective states. So it is easy to be content with standard adjectival terms like "jealous," or "sad," or "angry" when we describe the agent. There is very little sense of the agent as conflicted or even as attempting to develop a specific version of the emotion allowing satisfying self-representations on levels that go well beyond belief. Being hesitant in one’s jealousy need not be just having weak beliefs; it can be a distinctive intentional state shaping an emotional attitude and establishing distinctive ways of relating to other persons.

We best engage those difficulties by giving our interests in expressive processes a much more central role in our psychology and ultimately in our
understanding of ethics. As Sue Campbell suggests, rather than dismiss what seems inchoate or indefinite, we may have to treat these qualities as fundamental features constantly modifying our affective lives. But how do we foreground that modification process? I propose we supplement adjectival formulations of the affects by recognizing that on many occasions we are better off with Richard Moran's suggestion that we treat the affects along adverbial lines. Taken as adverbs, the affects are not states that agents enter but qualities of actions that agents produce in exercising their capacities as distinct subjects. By emphasizing how performing our affects qualifies our understanding of those states, we can shift from an epistemological model of representation to a quasi-political one. Expression need not be a matter of finding more accurate ways of actually picturing the state of one’s psyche. Its orientation is toward identification rather than description. So an adequate self-expression is less a picture of one’s psyche than the capacity to perform a range of functions that enable us to enter into communication about what in fact remains fluid and fleeting. The mark of expressive success is the psyche’s willingness to keep the representative in office rather than seeking new allegiances.

Criticism can best serve this program by asking three questions about affects. 1) How is an expression the manifestation of some way of being moved? 2) How does the being moved modify the situation that gets established for intentionality — how is the agent positioned by what moves it? And 3) what kinds of investments can we locate in the modes of activity that follow upon being moved? Agents manifest evaluative investments within such experiences in a variety of ways — by modulating intensities, by projecting or resisting identification, and by developing various boundary conditions and passages among such conditions. By exploring this register we position ourselves to characterize values and valuings and projections of identity within which belief is often only a minor component.

And that in turn helps explain why these values may prove incommensurable with the assessments reason has to offer. Think for example of how Proust treats Swann’s investments in jealousy as a fundamental feature of his erotic connection to Odette. Few of us would consider this “rational,” except in the most instrumental sense of “rational.” Yet it would be short-sighted to try to convince Swann that this emotion miscognizes its object and should be expunged. What matters is how he uses the affect to allow himself particular ways of experiencing Odette and staging his own sense of pathos. What matters is how he adverbializes jealousy. There still might be conditions where reason has a strong claim to prevail. Suppose the jealousy leads to violence or to substantial wasting of material goods or social capital. But when the actions are not obviously destructive or costly, there is a good case to be made that the assessment has to concentrate on what Swan makes out of his passion. Clearly reason will still be in the background. But the test of what framework best applies will usually involve not what reason says but how we can envision the agent fleshing out his situation so that we decide whether ultimately we can continue to give him a significant place in our social world even if we can’t share his passion.
So much work is done on the emotions per se that were I to engage it here, I would have to spend most of my time just opening a space for my own arguments. It is far better then to take the road less traveled and turn to the feelings as an arena within which to test the value of my adverbial approach. And this emphasis has the additional advantage of demonstrating how an aesthetic approach broadens the field of philosophical inquiry, while it also provides a framework for approaching the arts sharply in conflict with the dominant allegorizing modes. If we are to appreciate the force of feeling we simply have to turn to models of intentionality in which the forming of beliefs does not take central stage.

William Carlos William’s short lyric “The Young Housewife” provides a strong example of how poets could develop significant affective force by contrasting what feeling allows to the narrative and dramatic structures cultivated by the emotions. If we ask about how the agents are moved, how the being moved establishes a situation, and how investments then become possible, we find ourselves first thinking of several standard emotional scenarios but then appreciating why the poem seems to reject them. The drama here is largely in how the lyric event manages to avoid those scenarios so that we keep our attention dancing among the particulars and adjusting to the specific situation they compose:

At ten A.M. the young housewife
moves about in negligee behind
the wooden walls of her husband's house.
I pass solitary in my car.

Then again she comes to the curb
to call the ice-man, fish-man, and stands
shy, uncorseted, tucking in
stray ends of hair, and I compare her
to a fallen leaf.

The noiseless wheels of my car
rush with a crackling sound over
dried leaves as I bow and pass smiling. (Collected Poems, I: p. 57)
The housewife’s basic problem may be how easily she is forgotten or repressed in a world where power and attention go to those who can stage themselves as enacting grand attitudes. The housewife does not emote for us; she is an anti-diva simply carrying out what her day requires of her. Consequently, we are not given any dramatic content that provides access to her emotional life. We have to approach her only in terms of what glimpses provide, and we have to understand her as the kind of person who can offer to others only this access. Only by doing that can the speaker and the audience find a satisfying affective relation to this limited scene.

The speaker pursues this satisfaction in two ways. First, he quickly comes to concentrate entirely on details. He forgoes speculation about her or projection about himself in order to let the details govern his response. Then there is his smile. In my view it is crucial that the smile is not quite ironic, not quite a stateable judgment or emotion of any kind. Rather it is primarily a mode of complicity, a mode of adjusting
to the intriguing limitations of this situation. His smile acknowledges that a fleeting link has been made with the woman, but a link on which nothing can be built or even imaginatively elaborated. And the smile allows him to come to some self-reflexive terms with his own contingent and frustrated freedom. Like the woman, the speaker cannot be said to have a full emotional response to what he sees. In focusing on the scene he also registers his own irreducible distance from the scene as he drives over the leaves that have been associated with the woman. But such adapting is not entirely a surrender to contingency. The speaker can appreciate the pure momentariness of his vision and his ability to accept just passing on, leaving her to her plight. The smile may ultimately constitute a slim bond with the equally slim potential of her uncorseted presence. At the least, he has not substituted metaphor for perception or pity for a more intimate sense of this shared frustrated contingency. “Asness” remains more important than “whatness.”

Because feelings are so closely woven into sensations, one might almost say that there as many feelings as there are sensations. Or, more accurately, one might have to say there are as many feelings as there are ways of attributing “asness” to sensations. Faced with that diversity it seems ridiculous to attempt any kind of taxonomy. Yet I think it is possible to isolate four basic complexes of sensation that seem especially significant in providing modes of affective investment central to all experience and highlighted in the aesthetic domain. So I am going to spell out these four complexes and then indicate how we can foreground each one in our approach to relevant works of art.

1) Many feelings take on significance because of the attention they bring to bear on qualities that can be attributed directly to how specific sensations occur—for example, color tones or voice tones or the quality of brush strokes or rhythmic shifts or pure aural patterns that become part of the sense of presence we attribute to the artist or to a figure within a work.

Think of how we orient ourselves to subtle changes in hue or in the intensity of brush strokes or the turns of rhythm in poetry or the modulations of tone in speaking voices. The “asness” is there because we align ourselves with an intelligence that has produced the sensations as aspects of an intentional labor. So the sensations are charged with possibility and with a kind of purpose. Yet at the same time they constitute a triumph over our standard desires for treating expressions of will as signs that are to be interpreted in the expressive register we adapt for dealing with human actions. Therefore, if we can make the adjustments that the artists ask, we put ourselves in a position to pursue two basic rewards. We develop an expanded sense of how rich the concrete world can become when intelligence is continually rewarded for not imposing its own interpretive structures on what it encounters. And we develop a feel for how these sensed features of the world can carry expressive energies—in themselves, and as they enter into complex conjunctions with other elements. It is very difficult to find words for characterizing the effects of a Titian brushstroke or a red in Rauschenberg or a cadence in Wordsworth or the lineation in Creeley. But we can begin to establish the expressive force of such materials by surrounding the particular with concrete contrasts, with a brushstroke by Bellini and by Mantegna or cadence in Milton and in Yeats, etc. Criticism of this kind of affect
requires developing practices of concrete comparison that highlight qualities and at least suggest what expressive range might be mobilized in a given use of the medium. We might even try imagining the critic as a speculative eye doctor trying out which lenses are best suited to our vision in particular circumstances.

2) The arts rely heavily on feelings that emphasize the expressive quality of spatial relations. The most obvious of these are feelings organized by a sense of scale. T.J Clark talks about the importance of human scale in Pollock and how the paintings larger in scale, like *Autumn Rhythm*, tend to seem decorative because they lack internal pressure. I think, however, that the break from human scale is part of their sublimity, their sense of painting leading into dispositions of light and energy. At the opposite pole, Vermeer’s *Street in Delft* offers within a condensed space a sense of detail that extends far beyond ordinary perception in order to give an extraordinarily intense presentation of what dwelling can be. For literary examples one might turn to how Yeats “Long-legged Fly” plays three scale frameworks against each other—the local focus on the agent’s body part, the reach out into history, and the even more specific attention evoked in the refrain. Analogously, the ending of “Sunday Morning” moves brilliantly among the expanse of sky, the detail of the pigeon’s wings, and the activity of extended wings that seems to combine both perspectives into a third, encompassing metaphysical perspective. And then there are Shakespeare’s sonnets like “That time of year thou mays’t in me behold,” which often make dazzling moves between registers of scale.

But scale is only one of a range of significant spatial feelings. Even more striking intensities and new possibilities for investment occur in relation our sense of how boundaries and frames work in particular situations. This is partially a matter of how separations can be rendered forcefully. But it also involves the qualities of potential and frustrated transition that circulate around the space charged by forming boundaries in the first place. Boundaries can repel connection or seem invitingly porous. They can activate contact all along the line of division, or they seem continuously on the verge of collapsing—into new unities or into anxious indeterminacy. Here the Williams’ poem is a good example—both as an action and as an example of relation between end-stopped and enjambed lines, poetry’s basic material negotiation of boundaries.

For visual treatments of boundaries and movements one virtually has to turn to how Paul Cézanne handles what he called *passage*. For Cézanne seems fascinated by what happens to paint at the precise moment when two objects come together. Painting has conventions that allow us to treat the objects as independent, with one passing below or above or beside the other even though the painter has to make complex choices about how to create transitions on a flat surface where everything is continuous. But Cézanne refuses to honor those conventions. He has rocks bleed into trees, trees into an atmosphere that suddenly becomes inseparable from other modes of substance, and trunks or branches become continuous with body parts like the legs and shoulders of those who lean against them.

These treatments of transition activate a wide range of affective investments. On the most elemental level, Cézanne wants us to feel what the painter feels as he or she confronts the tension between the two dimensional surface where color and shape create these forms and the illusory third dimension where each individual shape has
its own mass and so sets its own boundary conditions. Even the simplest rendering of
an image involves tensions among the life of sight, which is bound only to how things
appear, the life of painting, which is committed to making visual events out of that
appearance, and the life in the world beyond the painting, where we expect to deal
with mass and so with individuals. Consequently we encounter feelings basic to the
relational processes on which this sense of individuation depends. And we are invited
to feel this individuation as a continual event established by how color and form
migrate, yet also are always on the verge of disappearing as sight turns to new
permutations. Finally, this framing of individuation opens out to bring to self-
consciousness the range of affective investments possible within the process of
representation. If what we see is continually metamorphosing, why should we
assume that what we desire is any more stable? If we let painting show us possible
forms of desire, we have to adapt ourselves to how the psyche might find its own
truth in its power to invest in the distortions passage affords. Rather than locating the
object of desire as a single shape, we might project it in a metamorphic moment when
what we see is still woven into its background. There is no better way to make us
aware of the mobility of desire and the immense suppression that occurs when we
deal only with fixed forms as sufficient causes of our fascination.14

3) Where there is space there will be time. And where there is time there will a range
of qualities of movement that also can take on charged significance within works of
art. If painting provides the basic vocabulary for the spatial relations, dance provides
it for these qualities of movement. The most fundamental affective qualities of
movement seem to me organized around literal and figurative aspects of pacing and
of how gathering and releasing take on presence. Within these general parameters,
many different registers of adjustment take place—for example in terms of specific
lines of flow and the blockages they encounter; in terms of specific qualities of
interaction, coordination, and resistance in relation to an environment or a
collectivity; and in terms of modifications in rhythm, pace, and timing.

Feelings based on movement involve qualities that can be attributed to how
sensations and actions unfold. We make affective investments attached to whether a
movement is fluid or jerky, nervous or assured, self-contained or requiring related
movements before balance or resolution is accomplished. And sensibilities shift
depending on how the movement gravitates toward other elements in its environment
or resists accommodation, whether it shares the rhythms that surround it or
establishes some new sense of tempo within that field, whether movement become
weary or tentative or blocked, or whether the movement speeds up in excitement or
grows anxious in its unstable pushing against the forms giving definition to the path it
is taking? And when there seems to be change in speed or the specific density and
texture of the flow, our response will alter depending on whether the change seems
roughly continuous with previous adjustments or whether there is a struggle for a new
beginning, or even whether the movement can manage a dialectical reinterpretation of
territory it has traversed.

Sylvia Plath’s “Cut” provides a pretty good substitute because the poem
emphasizes several kinds of motion and provides an ending substantially intensified
when we see how it relates to these dynamic processes. When the poem turns to the
stained gauze now on her finger, what began as a series of metaphors enacting and
proclaiming the dispersal of energy and blood is transformed into slow focus on the 
thumb as static object, then on the pressure that this bandage puts on the raw heart 
opened by the cut. The chain of metaphors no longer transforms the wound but 
demands that we focus our attention on it, until by the last stanza the speaker can 
actually address the thumb as a surrogate self.

When we turn to the other arts, we find significant analogies. Speaking arts 
modulate pace and intensity and urgency (or their contraries); narrative arts control 
time by stretching scenes or make them compact; and painting like Jackson Pollock’s 
can give basic expressive force to how line gathers thickness, thins out, takes various 
turns and dalliances in relation to the directions it initiates, and enters into relations 
with the forms that it passes through. Other arts in turn can develop figurative 
parallels to what takes place literally in a Pollock drip painting. One could argue for 
example that the best way to read John Ashbery’s poetry is to follow its thickenings 
and thinnings and wanderings and gatherings much as if one were exploring a 
Pollock.

4) If space and time arts each foreground certain modes of feeling, we ought be able 
to find something paralleling them in verbal art. In lyric at least, the relevant parallel 
occurs in the domain of those fundamentally second-order feelings that involve the 
organism’s self reflexive monitoring of its own investments. The best way to view 
this set of feelings may be to treat them as a broad range of proprioceptive 
adjustments. But proprioception is not just a matter of how the body adjusts to 
particular situations. It involves how all of the instruments the organism employs 
become involved in making the kind of adjustments that produce senses of fittingness 
or belonging or coherence. In other words, proprioception modeled in lyric 
emphasizes the range of feelings of relation isolated in William James’s famous 
argument: “There is not a conjunction or a proposition, and hardly an adverbial 
phrase, syntactic form or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express 
some shading or other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist 
between the larger objects of our thought. … We ought to say a feeling of and, a 
feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling 
of blue or a feeling of cold (Psychology: the Briefer Course, p. 29).”

From James it is not a large leap to Nietzsche on the will as a particular kind of 
sensation.15 So I want to add to this list those feelings that attend to the degree to 
which we can project ourselves as actively taking responsibility for what we are 
doing or expressing. In painting we find Mondrian and Malevich each in his own 
way emphasizing the infinite subtlety of our capacities for registering the sense of fit 
that emerges as we adapt ourselves to the emerging of various kinds of balances. And 
for lyric’s treatment of second order proprioceptive states I call your attention to the 
reading I offered in a previous Soundings of the functions performed by the 
exclamation mark at the end of Elizabeth Bishop’s “Sonnet”:

Caught--the bubble 
in the spirit level, 
a creature divided; 
and the compass needle 
wobbling and wavering, 
undecided.
Freed --the broken thermometer’s mercury
running away;
and the rainbow-bird
from the narrow bevel
of the empty mirror,
fly wherever
it feels like, gay!  (Complete Poems, 192)

The exclamation shifts the poem from commentary on what it might take to be “gay”
to a concrete identification with what the poem proposes in its speculative play. And
that mark allows the poem to register the kind of willing that may be basic to gaiety,
willing based not on acts of judgment but on the expansiveness created by how
intentionality finds itself taking hold in particular situations.

V

The critic in me could go on forever describing intricate aspects of feeling.
But to do so would shortchange the arts. While works obviously matter as individual
articulations of possibilities for affective experience, they also matter collectively as
challenges to standard philosophical accounts of how we develop values and why we
make investments in such particulars. So I want now to address directly the
conference’s concern for the relationship among emotions, values, and reasons? It is
tempting to say that the affects just introduce a different domain of value where it
makes sense to speak of “ends in themselves.” But this expression claims a
metaphysical purity that can obfuscate practical considerations. Certainly the feelings
bring their own rewards. But we still have to ask why these rewards matter for us.
What kinds of satisfactions do the affects afford and how do we best appreciate these
satisfactions?

I think the most prudent way to approach this question is by emphasizing how
these values cannot be adequately characterized or assessed from within any
normative model that relies on the abstract impartiality basic to our reasoning. For
then we can appreciate the urgency of developing aesthetic and expressivist terms for
interpreting significance of these experiences. We need such perspectives because the
values mediated by the affects are often too closely woven into particular
subjective states to be amenable to the modes of generalization reason requires. And
the forms of responsibility the affects involve have much less to do with reasoning
than with how agents place their relevance for specific subjective ends and for
connections with other people that matter because of the immediate satisfactions they
afford.

If we are to transform this negative sense of the limits of rationality into a
positive, we cannot just invoke the notion of aesthetic value. Therefore I will turn to
the dynamic forces emphasized in Kant’s aesthetics in order to suggest how there can
be forms of judgment that do not rely on categories of the understanding but are
responsive to how particular activities unfold and establish a focus for our
investments. Consider for example how Lily Barth in To the Lighthouse finally
manages to draw the line that completes her painting. Or, more generally, consider
how states like intensity, involvedness with others, and responsiveness to distinctive
plasticity within the psyche involve satisfactions and even commitments that cannot
depend on reasoned judgment. Instead the relevant values derive from immediate
states of self-consciousness and the qualities of attunement that these afford in relation to the situations we encounter and the people we engage.

I admit that these values cannot be absolute. In principle they have to be adjudicated, but at times it become impossible to say from the outside what kind of adjudication is appropriate. So the best we can do is rely on what I call expressivist measures. Our assessments have to depend on how agents can present their own interests and satisfactions; and the determining factor becomes the degree of respect we can maintain for those agents when we see their values as expressions of their characters or capacities to respond to their environments. In order to see why there may be no more robust assessment mechanism, I want to show how an aesthetic approach to values requires an expressivist framework for making our fundamental assumptions. This case depends on Kant for its specific framing of the aesthetic because Kant is still our best exemplar for first specifying the limitations of reason and then transforming that negative case into a psychology that opens new ways of thinking about values. He shows that the interpretive frameworks developed by the understanding, since these simply do not hold for those situations where subjects foreground their constitutive powers. Many of the more resonant satisfactions we find in spontaneous subjective acts take place because of the distinctive modes of judgment these states bring to bear.

Kant’s Critique of Judgment posits as its basic antagonist the Enlightenment tendency to rely on forms of reason that sought laws subsuming individuals under the categories enabling hypotheses to be formed and tested. In aesthetics proper he had to deal with Leibnitz’s theory of beauty: if beauty is a kind of perfection, then it is a judgment issuing from the understanding as it exercises its capacity to appreciate essential truths. Appreciating a work of art depends on knowing its relation to the appropriate cognitive categories. Analogously, Kant’s ethical theory had to resist various forms of empirical and prudential judgment that subordinated the subject to the situation, a sense of spontaneity to a sense of abstract justification. In both ethics and aesthetics, then, he confronted a situation where emphasizing objective conditions located all intellectual authority in the disciplines where how we reason lucidly about the object determines what we can say about the subject. But for Kant judging “objects merely in terms of concepts” loses “all presentation of beauty” (59) because such an approach eliminates both the concreteness that imagination produces for its ideas and the spontaneity by which agents are free to specify their own engagement. Correspondingly, in ethics emphasizing the understanding emphasizes maxims and laws with no attention to how agents might act as legislators. So Kant turned to aesthetic experience to develop two major shifts that help us establish richer roles for subjective agency. And in doing that he prepared the way for the range of expressivist theories that were to build on his example.

First, Kant proposed a sharp distinction between “determinative judgment” and “reflective judgment” because he wanted a domain where the subject’s self-awareness might be granted powers not subordinated to practical rationality. Determinative judgments operate under the “laws given by the understanding” and so are “only subsumptive.” They make decisions by bringing a particular under the rubric provided by some kind of generalization. One determines what is true by including a specific event under a rule, and one determines what is good by showing...
that a particular universal applies to this situation. Reflective judgments are quite different because they do not depend on generalizations. Rather, they operate by bringing unity to particular cases even when we cannot know the relevant principle. Imagine being lost in a dark wood and having no map. One organizes the space in whatever provisional way enables one to feel one is moving forward. Or imagine what artists do in creating characters we take as significant individuals. In such cases, it makes sense to say that with reflective judgment we do not derive law from experience; rather we elaborate imaginative models and explore them as if they were maps of possibility.

In order to put this distinction between kinds of judgment to work, Kant then proposes a second contrast between the attribution of purposes and the attribution of purposiveness: “Now insofar as the concept of an object also contains the basis for the object’s actuality, the concept is called the thing’s purpose, and a thing’s harmony with the character of things which is possible only through purposes is called the purposiveness of its form.” When we treat an object or an act in terms of the relevant purposes, we see how general laws take on practical applications. Chairs have actuality for us because the concept of chair tells us what roles are relevant for it. And food has actuality because it is brought under the concept of the needs that the body has to sustain itself. But there is no purpose that establishes our sense of how the chair or the food might be “in harmony with the character of things.” For there is no determinate concept that would enable us to specify what this harmony might be. We are dealing with the projection of possible unities among “what is diverse in nature’s empirical laws.” Consequently, we are not instantiating laws that unify various particular instances but we are producing a sense of relationship specific to the occasion.

For Kant the ultimate such occasion is our sense of a harmony enabling us to see all of creation as having purposive unity even though reason cannot produce the laws responsible for that unity. For me such observations matter less for their metaphysics than for the psychology they introduce. Kant helps us show how art works can be exemplary for providing a sense of visible purposive unity that we cannot adequately characterize in the terms either the reason or the understanding provide. The purposiveness has no objective existence apart from the audience’s sense that it is engaging many possible ideas that interact powerfully but cannot be characterized in conceptual terms. But this audience engagement in the intricate play of internal relations proves for Kant sufficient grounds for attributing to the maker a power of genius that composes as if it were producing laws for nature rather than imitating them or instantiating them.

“Genius” is reserved by Kant for those who produce works of art. But I think the same principles of activity can be attributed to any kind of expressive activity that we take as warranting talk about purposiveness. On the most fundamental level, Kant helps us see how we might attribute specific intentional qualities to certain aspects of conative behavior without our having to project the agent as acting in accord with specific reasons. Conative activities take on purposiveness when concerns for unity and for the manner of acting make the kind of impression that cannot be reduced to irrationality, even though the activity also cannot be subsumed under rationality. One might even say that this sense of purposiveness also
characterizes our own sense of direction as subjective agents. Expressive behavior then is the fleshing out of such agency by giving qualities to the unities we establish without subsuming them under the forms of articulation and assessment that reason provides. Some of these qualities will be immediate to the manner of acting. Others will involve second-order aspects of these activities. So we can see how concerns for satisfaction and for responsibility can become aspects of this expressive purposiveness—as William’s rendered in having the man smile at the housewife. Taking responsibility is a form of identification and a bid for recognition marking one’s investment in what the expression makes articulate. The very fact that such purposiveness can produce recognitions indicates how there are aspects of public judgment that do not depend on concepts deployed by practical understanding.

Taking responsibility is a form of identification and a bid for recognition marking one’s investment in what the expression makes articulate. The very fact that such purposiveness can produce recognitions indicates how there are aspects of public judgment that do not depend on concepts deployed by practical understanding.

Opening a space for subjective determination does not entail treating all value judgments in subjectivist terms. When values are clearly matters of public decision-making, we have to trust those models of analysis that allow for impartiality and provide grounds for shared assessments. And when values depend on descriptions of situations, we clearly need whatever tools best assure accurate description. But when the primary situation focuses on the state of the agent, we have to honor the possibility that the relevant judgments will be based on appreciating the purposiveness involved and deciding whether the person seems worthy of the efforts it takes to attune to the specific sensibility. Unless significant harm flows from his jealousy, I think we simply have to ask ourselves whether we want Swan in our world. There can be no “method” for such judgments. Nor can there be method for determining whether the claims of public good outweigh the significance of the subject’s own investments. But there is no reason why the theory of value should promise any more stability than life itself.
Endnotes

1 All of these definitions are more or less contested in the literature, as I elaborate in my book *Particulars of Rapture: An Aesthetics of the Affects*. I here deviate from standard practice most drastically in the definition of passion because I want to keep the concept active for contemporary life in a way that cannot be accomplished in Philip Fisher’s *The Vehement Passions*. Fisher’s book is often very suggestive, but by arguing at times passions are a mode of affect displaced by modernity he makes it difficult also to see how they have distinctive force now.

2 For a statement representing the dominant concerns of philosophers in relation to affect in the arts I cite the introduction of Mette Hjort and Sue Laver, eds., *Emotion and the Arts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997): “Although most readers will be inclined to see the contributions to *Emotion and the Arts* as so many exemplifications of the cognitive approach, it is important to note that some of the contributions reveal a social constructivist bent, while others clearly support the idea that constructivist and cognitivist insights can be mutually supportive” (9). For the editors there simply are no other respectable ways of approaching the topic.

3 I also became painfully aware that my talk about the arts would have to be confined to arts with a strong representational dimension—in part because I lack the expertise necessary to talk intelligently about music and in part because it helps to have readily available dramatic contexts for one’s analyses.

4 For a good example of this emphasis on emotions as preparation for action I offer the following passage from Keith Oatley:

> The normal function of an emotion is to change goal priorities and to load into readiness a small suite of plans for action. At the same time information is inserted into consciousness, prompting interpretations of the event that caused the emotion, and sustaining attempts at problem solving in planning. Emotions have a consciousness-raising function in allowing us to infer goals that might have been obscure, and hence to build models of our own goal structures (89).
The person then seems equated with goal structures, to me a highly reductive notion because it ignores manner and style and tentative exploration and immediate desire. Other theorists are less extreme but almost equally reductive. Aaron Ben-Zeev, for example, insists that “Emotions are not theoretical states; they involve a practical concern, associated with a readiness to act” (61). But why is practical concern the only alternative to “theoretical states”? Some emotions do involve that readiness, like anger or fear, but others like love or anxiety are much more connected to self-reflexive states. And even when there is readiness for action there is also a strong propensity to make investments in the attitude the action allows rather than in its practical results. So my argument is not that cognitivism is entirely wrong but that its emphases do not fit important features of the affective lives modeled by the arts. I find useful support for my position in Jon Elster’s argument that there are two major roles the emotions play in our psychological lives: they generate behavior and they generate other mental states (137). And I find substantial sustenance in the criticism of the belief model developed in the first lecture of Richard Wollheim’s On the Emotions. Wollheim shows how the cognitivist account assumes that “what any desire is directed toward is something that can be expressed in a complete sentence,” on the model of propositional attitudes (19). But in fact this emphasis on belief in prepositional form ignores the formative role the imagination plays in our desires, in part because the imagination can take as significant and positive multiple ideas at once, even though for reason these are incompatible. Paul Griffiths also offers a useful critique of the belief model based on processes of modularity and encapsulation driven by evolutionary adoptions. (See pp. 37-41 and chapter 4.) But these thinkers do not provide adequate alternative ways for characterizing the mental aspect of affective experience.

At the risk of one more lengthy footnote fleshing out these introductory remarks, I want to take a few moments to distinguish my approach from two contemporary theorists whose work explicitly offers a parallel concern for treating affects aesthetically. In many respects I share the basic commitments of Robert Solomon's The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion, but these similarities intensify my sense of our differences. Solomon seems to me importantly right in his insistence that what matters most about the emotions is the sense of self-reflexive agency that they establish. Solomon conceives
emotions as "our own judgments, with which we structure the world to our purposes, carve out a universe in our own terms, measure the facts of Reality, and ultimately 'constitute' not only our world but ourselves" (xix). Correspondingly our interest in the emotions is their capacity to maximize "personal dignity and self-esteem." And "self-esteem is often better served through the retention and intensification of an emotion rather than its satisfaction" (279). Self-esteem derives from the capacity of emotions to "bestow meaning to the circumstances of our lives" (133), a process that makes them "welded together into a single unit" with reason (14). Emotions are our best vehicles for those comprehensive judgments that make possible self-esteem.

I have three basic objections to Solomon’s arguments. First, Solomon remains concerned primarily with the meanings emotions produce rather than with the qualities of experience they make possible. Feeling is prelude to thinking and the world prelude to a kind of self-knowledge. Second, because he deals only with meanings, the only state of the self that Solomon can fully honor is one of self-esteem, that is of the self’s reflection on itself as a bestower of meanings. I will argue later that we do much better to treat the self's interest in its affective states in terms of the power and disposition frameworks made possible by Spinoza’s treatment of conative energies. Value lies in how selves inhabit the affects more than in how they interpret them. Finally, Solomon is so thoroughly a cultural constructivist that for him we are always the creator of our emotions, so that all claims about passivity are acts of Sartrean bad faith (e.g. 430). Analogously, Solomon insists that subjectivity is "always a projection into the future" (71) because the facts of reality are never enough for it. This cultural constructivism weakens the dramatic challenges posed by the emotions because it evades the kinds of experiences where we are mastered or moved and have to adapt ourselves to compelling forces. For example, Solomon takes guilt as "extreme self-indulgence" because it maximizes self-esteem (321). Guilt is a creative solution, not a curse. Would that this were always the case, or blessed is the person who can always get guilt to produce self-esteem because it produces excessive self-consciousness. More important, Solomon’s emphasis on the future ignores his master Nietzsche’s insistence that letting subjectivity dwell in futurity is a sign of ultimate spiritual weakness because in so doing one avoids one's own relation to the eternal return.
Jack Katz's superb *How Emotions Work* offers a sharply opposed treatment of the aesthetic dimension of emotions. Katz's commitment to sociology leads him to base his entire account on the forces and pressures from beyond the self that Solomon minimizes: "The self in emotions is not only seen as an object from the standpoint of another, it is also experienced as being objectified: the self is sensed as taken by and as part of forces that are beyond one's subjective control. This the active voice fails to capture" (143).

Because he is so attentive to "experiences of being pushed and pulled by the world" (89), Katz can develop an engaging dramatistic account of how agents push back against those pressures by finding ways of "reflexively amplifying and giving added resonance to the transcendent meanings of situated action" (332). By the "close study of the emotions in everyday social life" he seeks to "bring out the artful elaboration of the self" that occurs when people exercise "a nuanced sensitivity to the aesthetic possibilities in their bodily resources" (341-2).

Katz's analyses are obviously very useful for the arts, since they call attention to what agents make of what they are given. But in my view they ignore other equally important aspects of the affects. On the most concrete level this emphasis on agents as creators runs the risk of turning all emotions into "emotional effects" produced by aesthetic genius (343). Then what begins as a general account of the emotions becomes an account only of those emotions which invite staging for public consumption. Katz does offer brilliant analyses of two such emotions--the producing of tears in public situations and the negotiating of shame. But it seems to me a mistake to treat all instances of crying as if the crying were primarily for a public, or even for the self as an imaginary construct. Some crying is directly elicited from us because of what we encounter rather than because of how we are trying to stage ourselves. More important, Katz's general claims do not even handle well the other kinds of emotions he analyzes, especially road rage which depends for its intensity on the impossibility of staging one's reactions for a public to whom one is visible. Katz is right to see the frustration of the performative self as creating much of the intensity in road rage, but that intensity is not the result of performance. And even if we grant Katz his claims I think it is clear that there are other aspects of our affective lives like feelings and moods which are much harder to put into his dramatistic model.
First, The aim of invention need not be stylization. There are many forms of affectively attuning the self to the world and to other people that require all the complex mental activity we can muster. Second, the self’s imaginative activity need not be opposed so sharply to passive submission to the pressures of the world. A major component of an aesthetics of the affects is attention not so much to what agents make as to how they contour themselves to follow where the emotions might lead. To stylize affect risks destroying why we got engaged in the first place. For it is often possible to prefer where the emotion puts us to what we can make of it. And by dwelling on those aspects of the affects we can develop value stories very different from those elicited by Katz’s attention to how the "I" stages itself for a "You." These other stories show the “I” discovering conditions that modify self-understanding and at times change the very boundaries of subjectivity so that one sees oneself participating directly in some form of shared affective state.

I can illustrate the insidious power of the cognitivist perspective, or, better, of the ideals of philosophy that generated the cognitivist perspective, by pointing to two examples of how its fundamentally epistemic values take over despite the author's stated commitments to provide a more complex story. Consider first the opening chapter of Ronald de Sousa’s *The Rationality of Emotions*. There we find a powerful rendering of seven antinomies that occur when philosophy tries to get a grasp on the affective dimension of life. But then de Sousa’s individual chapters resolve all the antinomies by praising the capacity of our emotions to play the roles of helpful spouse to reason's powers for pursuing human welfare, despite the fact that one of his seven antinomies is their relation to rationality. My second example occurs at the conclusion of Paul Griffith’s very useful *What Emotions Really Are*. After providing in his second chapter a telling critique of cognitivism, Griffiths eventually bases his claims on a sharp distinction between "affect programs" and "higher cognitive emotions," each requiring quite different modes of analysis. Where affect programs are driven by basic psychological mechanisms that depend very little on the agent's distinguishing input, the higher emotions do depend on specific self-reflexive processing that involves correlating beliefs and desires. For Griffiths, then, it is a mistake to treat "emotion" as a workable category since it contains these incompatible processes. He may well be right in this
conclusion. But I think his formulation of the differences is flawed because it relies on such sharp dichotomies between kinds of emotion, rather than between kinds of activities possible in relation to most emotions. What he calls mechanical emotions like anger or fear can be stylized and engaged by consciousness, while higher order states can involve all kinds of dialogical relations with other people and so ought not be reduced to cognitive functioning. Yet for Griffiths, as for most Anglo-American philosophy, "higher" and "cognitive" seem necessary cognates. These philosophers continue to treat the person having the emotion as concerned primarily with understanding and judging how he or she is placed within an ongoing narrative. There is almost no attention paid to the strange identifications and disruptions or extensions of what we mean by person that can occur if we attune ourselves to the intricate contours of affective situations within which consciousness comes to awareness of its own possibilities.

After such examples it may come as no surprise that with the exception of Sue Campbell and Richard Moran (as well as the sociologist Jack Katz), the only influential American philosophers I know who fully repudiate cognitivism are those with psychoanalytic orientations like John Deigh and Richard Wollheim. And Moran is the only one of the philosophers who does not go on to bring to bear a somewhat different epistemic regime. Wollheim for example is bound by his psychoanalytic perspective to connect the emotions intimately to fantasy and to repudiate their cognitive functions in the name of psychoanalytic knowledge about the psyche. And when Campbell stresses expression rather than belief, she nonetheless remains concerned primarily with determining what is expressed and what kind of knowledge is possible in relation to the expression. (I will argue that how the expression occurs and allows identifications is a more useful question than “what does the expression mean or communicate.”) There are other philosophers, like Sue Cataldi and Quentin Smith, who work directly on the affects rather than the emotions and hence are not at all cognitivist. But their work is very rarely cited, probably for the obvious reason that such work has no role to play in enterprises shaped by cognitivist ideals.

7 In focusing on work in Anglo-American philosophical traditions I will for the most part ignore discourse on the emotions developed in poststructuralist theory.
When dealing with that work I find myself either intimidated, as is the case with the work of Gilles Deleuze, or underwhelmed, as is the case for me with Derrida on this topic. Analogously, I simply cannot engage the neo-Heideggereans who develop various aspects of Derrida’s emphasis on the event qualities of the affects that keep them distinguished from any concept or from any clear lines of identification. This work leaps much too quickly to the ontological level and its emphasis on what cannot be conceptualized prevents it from developing usable models for interpreting and evaluating specific emotions. There is one quite fine and intricately concrete adaption of poststructural theory on this topic--Rei Terrada’s *Feeling in Theory: Emotion After the Death of the Subject*. But rather than attempt to engage this book here, I have to hope the reader will consult my review of it in *Contemporary Literature* (forthcoming). My basic argument is that Terada’s superb emphasis on the event qualities of emotions has to be connected to the roles they play as aspects of articulate attitudes.

I am painfully aware of the problem of writing about affects as if they could be treated as universals even though the author is obviously bound to quite limited social contexts. I can only say in my defense that for me the best heuristic strategy is to seek as much generalization as possible because then there will be a clear target for working out how individual cultures might differ from the models I propose. Getting straight on what one can say on the basis of various Western examples should help prepare the way for decent comparative analysis, and it may even produce some theoretical terms that might apply to a wide variety of cultural formations.

Ronald de Sousa isolates seven aspects basic to describing an emotion, as does Jon Elster, albeit a different seven. Paul Griffiths proposes 6 aspects, Aaron Ben-Ze’ev four, and the list could obviously go on. Other theorists like Herman Parret and Robert Plutchik provide highly suggestive but somewhat arbitrary intricate maps of relations among emotion types.

I will take “intentionality” to refer to those orientations of consciousness that give it directedness and so make it possible for the activity of mind to engage a concrete world. Intentional states are those through which we make possible the offering of descriptions and the motivating of actions. For a clear treatment of some of the complexities that I evade, see Richard Wollheim’s contrast in *On the Emotions* between his own position
and the traditional one most fully formulated by Franz Brentano. For Wollheim, “Intentionality is the thought-content of a mental phenomenon, and it is intentionality that secures the directedness alike of mental states and mental dispositions” (6). ”Brentano, on the other hand, treats intentionality as the “directedness of mental phenomena,” which then requires an additional claim about the contents developed by that directedness (7). Wollheim also makes two very useful complementary distinctions. “Subjectivity” differs from “intentionality” because subjectivity is a property of mental states but not of dispositions. Subjectivity is “the feel of a mental state,” or it is what it is like “for the person whose state it is to be in that state”(6-7) “Phenomenology” then is the “fusion of intentionality and subjectivity,” and so it “attaches only to mental states.

11 See for example Keith Oatley, who argues that jealousy is an example of a complex emotion that denotes a mental state and implies a context including the self in which the emotion arose: "It is anomalous to say 'I feel jealous, but I do not know why,' … To talk of being jealous refers to a control state in relation to a sense of outrage for the self because of a second person on whom one has some claim and in relation to a third person who could supplant one in the affections of that second person" (pp. 76-77). If I may anticipate my critical account I want to point out how this reasoning affords a perfect example of how philosophy can produce an appropriate definition that nonetheless simply ignores how agents might configure this awareness in distinctive and expressive ways.

12 Antonio Damasio’s *Descartes’ Error* and *The Feeling of What Happens* offer the most influential concrete scientific account of these bodily dimensions, and Jack Katz provides probably the richest access to how the emotions take on performative complexity as conscious enactments through our bodies.

13 Jon Elster, p. 56 notices this close relation between cognitivist accounts of emotions and the promise of making available a powerful perspective from which therapeutic efforts can be organized.

14 T.J. Clark offers brilliant connections between the use of *passage* in Cézanne’s late Bather paintings to Freud and to Lacan. The core of his argument is that Freud and Cézanne seek “a fully and simply physical account of the imagination.” So they show bodies “thoroughly subject … to the play of fantasy,” then let them “appear as they would
in a world where all the key terms of our endless debate—imagination, body, mind, phantasy, and so on—would be grasped, by the bodies and imaginations themselves, as descriptions of matter in various states” (147). Then Clark goes on to tell an elaborate tale of “imagining the imagining” of a phallic scenario in material terms (151).

The best statement I know of in Nietzsche about will as sensation is in section 19 of *Beyond Good and Evil*.

If my anger at John can be seen as a proposition about John’s place in my life, I ought be able to judge accurately what my options are and adjust my attitude accordingly. The adjustment may entail overriding the emotion so that judgment can prevail, or it may entail pursuing a richer version of the emotion because I come to appreciate its normative possibilities. In either case, the crucial factor is that we call upon judgment to stand apart from the specific intensities and felt contradictions within the experience of anger. If we can establish the appropriate proposition, we do not have to worry about other aspects of the immediate intentional state. But in pursuing this line of thinking we can also see what is involved when we do not establish the appropriate proposition or are not satisfied by it. Then the intentionality itself becomes the focus of attention. We shift from dealing with values as depending on specific judgments about objects to dealing with valuing as a subjective process whose significance resides in how the subject deploys its energies.

I find contemporary support for my effort to resist reason-based accounts of the values in the exemplary analyses developed by Simon Blackburn in his *Ruling Passions*. Inspired by Hume, Blackburn seeks an ethics fully responsive to “the polymorphous nature of our emotional and motivational natures” (14). Therefore rather than elaborating principles, he concentrates on practices, or, more precisely, on what we can say the moral capacities are that we bring to attributing ethical praise and ethical blame in specific situations:

Amongst the activities involved in ethics are these: valuing, grading, forbidding, permitting, forming resolves, backing off, communicating emotion such as anger or resentment, embarrassment or shame, voicing attitudes such as admiration, or disdain, or contempt, or even disgust, querying conduct, pressing attack, warding it off. When I say that these are involved in ethics, I mean … that by describing the
contours of a character in terms of doings like these, a narrator can tell us all that is important about a character’s ethics, regardless of the words said. (51)\textsuperscript{17}

Values then can be seen as depending on “the full dynamic range of our practical natures” (13). And moral analysis becomes the effort to find out how we can reach agreement on approving or disapproving how these natures put those natures into action in particular circumstances. Rather than seek agreement in terms of general principles and propositions, we work “within a moral scheme,” connecting what people accept with how they behave (302).\textsuperscript{17}

My concern is with conative capacities rather than ethical ones. Yet I can develop clear analogues with Blackburn’s emphases—both in terms of clarifying what behaviors involve and in terms of specifying how judgments remain sensitive to particular agent situations. His emphasis on capacities for participating in value-laden activities leads me to suggest that a conative perspective can help us address three important questions: what forms of behavior characterize my treating an emotion as sustaining some value; what forms of behavior characterize my caring about such caring; and what processes of regulation or adjustment emerge when we do make judgments in relation to these affect-based values.

My comments and citations below pertain to section IV of Kant’s \textit{Critique of Judgment}, pp. 18-20 in the Pluhar translation. My use of this passage depends in part on my treatment of Kantian purposiveness in my \textit{Subjective Agency}.

\textbf{Works Cited}


