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"Personal Identity", in Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2011), 337-349.
"Why Do Language Use and Tool Use Both Count as Manifestations of Intelligence?".  In Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl and Stephen Butterfill (eds.), Tool Use and Causal Cognition (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2011), 169-182.
"Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness".  In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies and Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2011), 323-341.
‘Review Essay on Tyler Burge, Origins of Objectivity’, Journal of Philosophy, CVIII (2011), 269-285
"Relational vs. Kantian Responses to Berkeley's Puzzle", in Naomi Eilan, Hemdat Lerman and Johannes Roessler (eds.), Perception, Objectivity and Causation (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2011), 35-50.
"Intelligible Causation", in Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding:  Essays for Barry Stroud (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2011), 232-248.
"An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint Attention".  In Axel Seeman (ed.), Joint Attention:  New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind and Social Neuroscience (Cambridge, Mass.:  MIT Press, 2011), 415-430.
"Does Perception Do Any Work In an Understanding of the First Person?".  In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), The Self and Self-Knowledge (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2012), 102-119.
"Inductions about Attention and Consciousness:  Comments on Carolyn Suchy-Dicey, 'Inductive Scepticism and the Methodological Argument'".  Consciousness and Cognition, 21 (2012) 610–612.
"Is Spatial Awareness Required for Object Perception?".  In Roxana Baiasu, Adrian Moore and Graham Bird (eds.), Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Space and Time (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

"On the Thesis that 'I' is Not a Referring Term".  In Simon Prosser and François Recanti (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification:  New Essays  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-21.

‘A Straightforward Solution to Berkeley’s Puzzle’, Harvard Review of Philosophy, 18 (2012).
"Perceiving the Intended Model".  In Peter Machamer and Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2012), 96-122.
"Wittgenstein on the Role of Perception in an Understanding of Language", in Daniel Guevara and Jonathan Ellis (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2012), 61-72.
"Lichtenberg and the Cogito", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society112 (2012), 361-378.

"George Berkeley’s Puzzle", in David Edmonds and Nigel Warburton (eds.), Philosophy Bites Back (Oxford:  Oxford University Press 2012).

"Causation and Mechanisms in Psychiatry", in Fulford, K. W. M., Martin Davies, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini and Tim Thornton (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2013), 935-949.

"Susanna Siegel's The Contents of Visual Experience", Philosophical Studies 163 (2013), 819-826.

(With Kenneth S. Kendler) “Expanding the Domain of the Understandable in Psychiatric Illness: An Updating of the Jasperian Framework of Explanation and Understanding”.  Psychological Medicine 44 (2014), 1-9.


“Why Is Perceptual Attention Philosophically Interesting?”, in Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, in press).

'Laurie Paul's Transformative Experience', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, in press.