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Welcome to CULTURAL ANALYSIS!

Welcome to the first volume of Cultural Analysis: An Interdisciplinary Forum on Folklore and Popular Culture. Between and beyond disciplines, Cultural Analysis is global in scope and dialogic in form; it's distributed through the Internet, free of charge, with articles and reviews published on an on-going basis rather than periodically.

Cultural Analysis is a forum for the international scholarly community to exchange ideas and develop new lines of thinking about cultural forms, and to work with the ways in which these forms inform our daily lives while serving as resources for individual, group, and institutional expression. Cultural Analysis is dedicated to new ways of discussing, theorizing, and analyzing these cultural forms, their meanings, uses, and their relations to larger social structures. As we see it, the journal is post-disciplinary; challenging hardened boundaries and exploring neglected gaps and interstices between and within disciplines.

While Cultural Analysis is distributed on the Internet, the journal adheres to strict standards of scholarship and is fully peer-reviewed. The board of editors is a select international group of scholars representing a wide array of approaches and specializations. Uniting them, however, is a common concern with expressive and everyday culture, and the imperative to engage it analytically, by any means necessary – through theory, fieldwork, and/or text-criticism. We also share the conviction that dialogue across disciplines is essential to our intellectual enterprise.

Current conditions of knowledge call for new forms of scholarly communication, and Cultural Analysis is structured to induce discussion and fertilization across the disciplines. In addition to articles and reviews, each article is followed by two responses by scholars from outside the immediate field of the author, who nonetheless cover similar topics in their research. These responses suggest alternative analyses or expand on ideas put forth in the articles. Furthermore, after this inaugural volume, the posting of articles and reviews will be on-going, eliminating the time lag between periodic publications. In other words, one can access the scholarship and the critical response as they appear. However, we will close each volume at year’s end so it can be printed and bound as a whole, in fixed-page format allowing for full citation. Thus Cultural Analysis offers the best of both worlds, the new and the conventional.

Response to Cultural Analysis has been extensive and enthusiastic, and we would like to thank in particular our colleagues from across the world who have joined our editorial board. Thanks also to the generous support of the Doreen B. Townsend Center for the Humanities and the Graduate Assembly at the University of California at Berkeley, whose contributions to Cultural Analysis have allowed us to bring an idea to material reality.

This first volume embodies the intent of the journal’s charter. The contributors represent a wide international and disciplinary range, while the individual articles are quite interdisciplinary in content. Some, such as Francisco Vaz da Silva, revisit established canon, interrogating, challenging, and exploring new interpretations and readings. Others, such as David Hyndman, expand on previous analytical works, extending their application, whereas the article by Regina Bendix opens up brand-new theoretical terrain.

Vaz da Silva’s trenchant reexamination of Bengt Holbek’s Interpretation of Fairy Tales, questioning many of his by-now standard interpretations and exposing
these to new analysis, provides new avenues for interrogating familiar territory, and shows us, again, that analyses as well as data are situated. The articles by David Hyndman and Ray Cashman work nicely as discrete analyses of the politics of culture and the overlay of global consumer culture on the local. In “Dominant Discourses of Power Relations and the Melanesian Other,” Hyndman applies the insights of Lutz and Collins’ 1993 *Reading National Geographic* to the specific context of Melanesia. In closely scrutinizing representations of Melanesians in *National Geographic* over a 15-year period, he illustrates how these mediated views of postcolonial landscapes and subjects are anything but “natural,” and how they serve to reinscribe existing (imperial) power relations through a series of subtle and not-so-subtle techniques. Ray Cashman’s “‘Young Ned of the Hill’ and the Reemergence of the Irish Rapparee” traces the “resurrection” of the legendary Irish hero in a song by the 1980s Irish rock band, the Pogues. Cashman argues that this internationally distributed song had particular resonance at home, in the context of the contemporary political and military situation in Northern Ireland. But Cashman’s analysis reminds us again of the new conditions that mitigate our analyses of such adaptations of traditional genres or themes – local resistance and empowerment is made possible, in part, by a global consumerist enterprise.

Regina Bendix’s “The Pleasures of the Ear” expands the emphasis on the aural over the visual by arguing for an “Ethnography of Listening,” an enterprise that clearly challenges not only disciplinary practice but suggests an alternate ecology of the mind, which, if explored, might provide a richer understanding of cultural practices. Finally, Rob Baum’s playful re-evaluation of the Cinderella tale offers a truly extra-disciplinary excursion into the many relays between folklore, popular culture, the “culture industry,” and also social expectations of gender. Her feminist reading of the historical appropriations of Cinderella indicate to her a generalized “absenting” of women from society.

The range of scholarship, themes, disciplines, and styles represented in this first issue’s collection of articles is very exciting. We hope that these articles are just the beginning, and that *Cultural Analysis* fulfills its goal, through the discussion that flows from these articles, of being “An Interdisciplinary Forum” dedicated to investigating expressive and everyday culture.

JoAnn Conrad
Editor, *Cultural Analysis*
This paper argues that Bengt Holbek’s attempt to reduce all “marvelous” elements in fairy tales to real-world referents drastically conceals the dynamics of traditional symbolic representations underlying this narrative genre.

Bengt Holbek is unusual among folklorists in that his Interpretation of Fairy Tales is uncompromisingly set on a theoretical level. After summarizing virtually all preceding scholarship on fairy tales, the Danish author proposes a comprehensive theory the basis for which is the clear assessment that all problems in the realm of “oral verbal art” have “to be seen as being dependent upon that of meaning” (8). After Holbek’s magnum opus it is simply not possible to disregard the symbolic aspect of fairy tales. I thus concur with Alan Dundes in seeing in Interpretation of Fairy Tales “a seminal work, a veritable landmark” (203). Now this entails, for those of us who would profit from this heritage, an obligation of close readings.

Misgivings on Symbols and Context

In the field of fairy-tale studies nothing is of course simple, let alone self-evident. What one means by “meanings” must, therefore, be clarified. According to Holbek the “marvelous” elements in fairy tales are “symbolic,” meaning they “convey feelings rather than thoughts.” Moreover, such “vivid emotional impressions” are deemed to “refer to beings, events and phenomena of the real world” (409). Since fairy tales supposedly express emotional impressions (435), interpretation consists in retracing all “marvelous” elements back to the real-world referents of such impressions (409).

Holbek uses a system of seven rules for reverting symbolic expressions to their corresponding emotional impressions. In so doing he focuses on three thematic oppositions, namely young versus adult, male versus female, and low versus high. According to him these “define the three categories of crises which occur in fairy tales,” all of which are in turn “real or possible events in the storytelling community” (416-8). Holbek thus surmises that the thematic axes of fairy tales express “sensitive, even painful” problems of rural communities. Such concerns are, in a nutshell, the youths’ rebellion and incestuous attractions to parents, sexual maturation and the meeting of the sexes, and the tensions between “haves” and “have-nots.” It follows that, ideally, “every element [in a fairy tale] may be read as pertaining to real life” (439, cf. 428).

This leaves of course “no room at all for the so-called supernatural beings, the witches, fairies, dragons, ogres, etc.,” since – as Holbek stresses – “they represent aspects of real persons” (418). “Interpretation” therefore appears as the systematic reduction of unknown elements in fairy tales to the familiar psychological predicaments of average people in rather vague socio-cultural settings. For example, the glass mountain that the hero must sometimes overcome is to be read as “a symbolic expression of the distance between the princess and her lover” (424). The heroine’s “guarding monster, ogre, dragon, troll, devil or whatever he may be named ... is the girl’s father seen as the hero’s adversary” (425). In the same vein, the heroine who kills her guardian by breaking the egg that contains his heart “literally breaks her father’s heart when she turns to her lover” (426).

I find the association of the dragon to the heroine’s father very interesting, as well as the idea that the Dragon Slayer overcomes “the father in his daughter”
These insights, taken together and considered along with the well-known secret that in many traditions the Dragon Slayer kills his own father, suggest however that the issue at stake is somewhat more complex than Holbek acknowledges. The dragon, which anthropologist Chris Knight defines as paradoxical to the core worldwide – uniting in itself high and low, death and life, animal and human, water and fire, dark and light (8) – is certainly more than the bride’s father as seen by her wooer. Likewise, all over Europe the crystal mountain is very clearly the realm of the dead, where the means to immortality may be sought when it opens up periodically – and, as Propp shows, its crystal is related to the dragon inhabiting it (1983:82-4; cf. Belmont 63-5). In the same vein, Claude Gaigebet points out that the green color often ascribed to this mountain is traditionally linked to death and resurrection and is, moreover, emblematised by the curled-up serpent that delimitates a realm immune to death and corruption (1974:12). Finally, James Frazer’s demonstration that the external heart or soul motif in European fairy tales (and elsewhere) relates to the idea of immortality must be taken into account (668).

Even a cursory consideration of fairy-tales motifs thus suggests that Holbek’s readings are severely restrictive. The point here is that his “real-world” perspective conceals a complex underlying system of metaphysical representations, which an interpretation of fairy tales ought to address. Now the Danish author agrees with this in principle. Indeed he recognizes that Jakobson and Bogatyrev’s notion of folklore as a specific mode of creation, which he claims to endorse (39-40, 256-7), leads to “transcendent’ interpretation” of an underlying system that is coterminous to Lévi-Strauss’s “later notion of a (mythical) meta-language” (43). Thus, Holbek acknowledges “a system or ‘meta-language’ which is common to several tales, maybe the entire fairy-tale tradition of a given area or group of people” (601-2). Yet, he inflects Jakobson and Bogatyrev’s specific use of the Saussurian notion of langue – an unconscious semiotic system expressing ideas (Saussure 30, 33, 107) – as he redefines it as a set of rules of oral craftsmanship for the conscious expression of feelings (39-41, 406-8).

Dundes’ “plea for psychoanalytical semiotics” (1980), which Holbek explicitly supports (407), may be the key issue here. In general terms, Dundes is concerned both with showing that “psychoanalytic theory can greatly illuminate folklore” and that folklore may be of service to psychoanalytic theory. The two purposes involve distinct analytical procedures, namely “the crucial device of projection” and “allomotific equivalence” (1980:36-8; 1987a:36-40). Methodological use of projection goes of course with a psychoanalytically inspired reading, whereas, according to Dundes, allomotifs are symbolic equations “made with no help from any a priori theory, psychoanalytic or otherwise” (1987a:40; cf. 1987b:168, 176). In good method the two procedures should then be used in succession – one in identifying symbolic equations, the other in interpreting them. However, although Holbek makes a point of using allomotific equivalence to test his thesis on symbol formation, I find, in the whole Interpretation of Fairy Tales, only one unmistakable use of the allomotific method (425, 457). Note that Holbek’s basic idea that symbols convey emotional impressions implies projection. Moreover, as I will show, the author really uses the projective device – not allomotific equivalence – to bring forth his point even as he analyses several versions of one tale type. For this reason, I shall argue that Holbek’s interpretations consistently ignore the cultural representations Propp intuits as “abstract notions,” Jakobson and Bogatyrev define as a “canvas of actual tradition” (63-4), and Lévi-Strauss describes as the “crystalline parts of discourse,” set on “shared foundations,” that emerge through the workings of variation in oral tradition (560).

A Case Study

I will briefly substantiate these claims by examining Holbek’s analysis of several versions of a particular tale: King Wivern (AT 433B). Here is an outline of the plot. An old hag advises a queen with no children to eat either a red or a white rose, but not both (or two not three apples, or two skinned red onions out of three). She disobeys and gives birth to a subterranean serpent called lindorm (or a
princess and a snake; or two princes, one of which is a snake). The snake repeatedly demands to marry, but kills each of his brides on their wedding nights. Then the last bride, advised by an old hag (or her dead mother, or her father), causes the serpent to shed its multiple sloughs by shedding, herself, the multiple "shifts" she had donned for the purpose. Moreover, she applies to the serpent vinegar (or wine, or brine, or blood) then milk (and/or linen, or her own "shifts") – or else throws the lindorm into the fire. The monster turns into a prince and marriage is celebrated. Shortly after, the heroine bears twins (or a single son) while her husband is at war. Through deceit the young queen is expelled and subsequently disenchants aquatic birds and an ass into princes (or gets a contract and frees either an old woman or a man, or feeds doves).4

As I noted before, Holbek proposes to use Dundes' notion of allomotif – the idea that if two elements in a tale fill the same structural position they are both functionally and symbolically equivalent – to test whether his own model can account for such equivalences (457). Now the first set of allomotifs in the story concerns the queen eating a red and a white rose, or three apples, or two red onions, one of which not peeled. Holbek's comment is, "It makes no difference whether the queen is eating roses, onions or apples. The only point of importance is her disobedience." The second set of allomotifs regards two twins, or a girl and a serpent, or just a serpent being born. Again, the Danish author states, "it makes no difference whether the queen bears a wivern only or a wivern and a normal child" (495). Now to say "it makes no difference" is the proper thing when one wants to ascertain functional equivalencies in Propp's abstract sense – but this is not the same thing as using the notion of allomotif to discover symbolic equivalences in fairy tales.

The indifference of Holbek to actual equivalencies reflects the fact that his interpretation proceeds otherwise. As the author admits, "the nature of the queen's offense does not become clearer by our comparison" (487). This is because there is in fact no comparison. Holbek interprets, from the outset, the mother's act as a psychological projection. The son was born as a serpent because he himself acted wrongly. And, since the mother's act of eating has sexual overtones, the son's hypothetical misdemeanor "has something to do with sexual overindulgence" (481). More precisely, the serpent shape that keeps the young man from marrying is a projection expressing his "unrestrained sexuality coupled with mental immaturity," which comes from being "too closely bound to his mother" (490). Since, however, this interpretation makes no room for the serpent's twin, this is explained away as a split5 – "because," Holbek says, "the fate of the normal child turns out to be unimportant"(487).

However, to say that the serpent's human brother is a split because he is unimportant explains neither the necessity of the split nor the presence of the child. Note moreover that Holbek conceives of the split as a special form of particularization, whereby "aspects of persons, phenomena and events appear as independent symbolic elements" (38, my emphasis). Consequently, use of this notion allows subordinating certain allomotifs to others without ever comparing them. Indeed, since a split entails projection – thus a dragon, split of the father, is actually the daughter's projection (435, 441, 507) – this device actually replaces a search for symbolic equivalencies. Now I am not sure how to understand the idea that a child being born as a serpent is a projection of his own sexual overindulgence – an "externalization" of his own "unrestrained sexuality" (492). Since there cannot of course be such a thing as a projection on the part of a fairy tale character – moreover one yet to be born – the projection is to be ascribed to narrators identifying with the prince. But then one has to contend with the fact that Holbek, who claims that narrators identify with characters according to gender lines, defines this tale as "feminine" (167-8), and indeed takes the heroine's point of view in all other instances of projection he ascertains – namely, in also seeing the lindorm shape as a projection of "the heroine's fear and loathing" (492). Alleged characters' projections being therefore freely ascribable, analysis may smoothly proceed quite apart from the actual contents of tales.6

Alternatively, I will suggest that to take allomotific variation into account permits
retrieving the contents Holbek discards. The author himself points out the way as he notes the connection between an onion not peeled properly and the inception of a serpent, that is a child who “must be ‘peeled’ himself” (478). So the onion engenders the serpent because both have several skins. Furthermore the onion is red, and so are the apples and one of the roses. In the case of roses the woman chooses the white one that would give her a girl, not the red one conducive to a boy bound to die in wars. As it happens she eats both, thinking that to have twins “would not be so bad either” – and the lindorm was born (461, 465). This shows two things. First, eating something endowed with multiple skins and/or a red color that connotes bloodshed engenders the snake. Second, the lindorm is equivalent to twins. There is indeed an overall coherence to the fact that a woman, who eats two items instead of one (or three instead of two), originates a multiple-skinned serpent instead of twins. Note that the lindorm is represented in heraldic as “a winged dragon with two feet like those of an eagle and a serpent-like … tail” (460).7 This ontological complexity (two in one) finds its correlate in twins. Granted that the twin child appearing in some versions is not functionally necessary, it is then symbolically relevant as an explication of the snake’s complex nature.

Let me now develop the relationship between the color red and the snake/dragon. The lindorm, once freed from his sloughs, appears with blood “running off him” (463). The symbolic link of the snake to blood is confirmed by the set of allomotifs regarding the serpent’s turning into human shape. There is first the equivalence between shedding the sloughs and being thrown into the fire, which expresses the pan-European notion that to burn the animal skin of any double-skinned being induces human shape (Bouza-Brey 253; Röhrich 87-8, 241 n. 76; Sébillot 70).8 Afterwards, the heroine treats the bloody lump with vinegar or brine, and then milk (Holbek 463, 465), or else uses wine (467), or simply resorts to vigorous scrubbing (474). The underlying idea is clearly that the blood on the serpent must be removed. One version, in which the shedding phase happens through fire, still manages to present blood – the serpent is here bathed in blood then in milk. This is a happy shortcut for the whole series, as it clearly points out that the metamorphosis from snake to human shape is also a transition from blood to milk. If one takes into account that in European traditional conceptions, as elsewhere, milk is essentially concocted blood (Gélis, Laget, and Morel 109-10, 126; Héritier 222, 280-1; Laqueur 104-6), it may be surmised that the human shape is itself the transformation of an ophidian condition.

Indeed this is the nexus of the plot, made clearer when the heroine subsequently disenchants birds into human shape. The relation of this to the previous episode stands out if one remembers that the lindorm is both a serpent and a bird. The homology of the two episodes is furthermore confirmed by another set of allomotifs. The first thing the heroine sees upon arrival at the enchanted castle is twelve bloody shirts, which she proceeds to wash (Holbek 470), or else the man she is to save presents a bloody shirt every night (474). Moreover, the heroine disenchants the birds with milk (464, 466), or else by throwing shirts sewed by her over their heads (467, 471-2). This corresponds of course to the previous act of bathing the serpent in milk and enveloping it in the heroine’s own nine shifts (462), or in linen (463). Indeed, one version presents the heroine bringing the snake into human shape by throwing her own shirt over the monster’s head (471). It is then clear that milk, along with the heroine’s shifts, washed shirts and linen, is on the side of human skin, just as blood is inherent to serpent/bird sloughs.

All this supposes that the metamorphosis consists in changing one type of skin for another. This is in accordance with what Ananda Coomaraswamy called “the traditional doctrine about transformation or shape shifting,” whereby “all changes of appearance are thought of in terms or the putting on or taking off of a skin or cloak” (1945, 398 n. 2). This conception is of course central to fairy tales, but, as Lutz Röhrich rightly notes, goes far beyond the genre (87). Significantly, Holbek ignores it. He states, apropos the metamorphosis of the snake, that it would be “hazardous” to “essay a ‘translation’ motif by motif of this strange scene” and that he prefers to “confine” himself, “as usual” (my emphasis),
to a “comparison of the before and after.” Since before there was a snake and after there is a marriageable man, the snake is seen as both an “externalization of the young man’s unrestrained sexuality” and a “projection of the heroine’s fear and loathing” (492). The symmetrical situation, in which the hero turns a cat into a princess (by beheading it and putting the head where her tail was), Holbek likewise explains as a projection. To the inevitable question, “but why must the hero behead the cat?” he cannot but answer, prosaically, that the hero “learns to treat the cat as a woman” (440). Yet, one version of *King Wivern* provides the traditional conception by stating that the heroine must save a gray ass (the youngest of thirteen enchanted brothers) “by cutting off its head and ‘turning out that which used to be inside’” (471). Likewise (as Röhrich notes, 88), in KHM 57 *The Golden Bird*, the helping fox asks, “Shoot me dead and chop off my head and paws” (Grimm and Grimm) – thus referring to regular preliminaries for skinning a body. Indeed, the essence of metamorphosis is an alternation between the inner and the outer, the hairy and the hairless, the bloody and the milky dimensions of complex beings thus cyclically turned, literally, inside out (see Gaignebet and Lajoux 104). This is, incidentally, the essence of Angela Carter’s penetrating comment – regarding a werewolf in human shape – to the effect that “the worst wolves are hairy on the inside” (117).

**Conclusion**

My point is that the symbolic analysis of fairy tales affords glimpses of a metaphysical ontology of reversibility, involving cyclic processes of metamorphosis, at the core of a complex worldview (cf. Dundes 1995; Erdész). In other words, the cycles of enchantment and disenchantment characteristic of fairy tales – of which the sloughing serpent is one paradigmatic image – spell out the dynamics of a traditional image of release of manifold reality from hidden (ophidian) sources, in alternation with enfoldment back into primordial Unity (see Silva 2000). These are, to be sure, the “abstract representations” Propp recognizes at the core of fairy tales, relates to “the kidnapping of a princess by a dragon” (Propp 1996:89, 114), and specifies as a recurring theme of death and rebirth (1983; cf. Belmont 1996:76-7).

Holbek ignores such “canvas of actual tradition” insofar as he replaces Dundes’ precept of allomotific comparison with projection as an interpretive device. It follows, seemingly, that allomotific comparison is crucial for interpretation of fairy tales, and that methodological use of projection ought to be confined to global systems of representations – not prodigalized on particular *dramatis personae*. This is, incidentally, how I read Dundes as he speaks about “patterning and system in folklore,” and professes that a symbol may be related to “a general system of symbols,” before he quotes Freud to the effect that “a large portion of the mythological conception of the world ... is nothing but psychology projected to the outer world” (1980:37).

Which brings up the fact that Holbek, while attempting to reduce all symbolic expressions to emotional impressions, consistently relies on fairly standard Freudian symbolism. Since at least 1914, Freud professed of course that an understanding of symbolism demands taking into account myths and fairy tales, sayings and songs, colloquial linguistic usage and poetic imagination (1989:186-8, 195, 205; cf. 1998:386). Now he admitted he was an “amateur” in these fields and that “real professionals in mythology, anthropology, philology and folklore” would harvest “much richer and more interesting a collection” than he himself could (1989:203-4). Moreover, Freud allowed that the standard technique in his own field, free associations, leaves him “in a lurch” when it comes to symbols (1998:388). I see therefore no reason why fairy-tale specialists should take for granted as a *matter of principle* the tentative readings of symbols proposed, almost one century ago, by a professed amateur breaking new ground.

Specifically, my point that there is more to a dragon than the expression of a father imago or unrestrained sexuality carries the further implication that statements by Freud such as, “children displace some of their feelings from their father on to an animal” (1990:189), and “wild animals mean people in an excited sensual
state” (1989:195), should not be considered as immutable truths concerning symbolism in fairy tales. Undoubtedly, some of Freud’s insights are remarkable – and they are, moreover, far in advance of the understanding many folklorists have of symbolism even today. However, to take at face value a proclamation like, “the many fairy tales which begin ‘Once upon a time there were a King and Queen’ only mean to say that there was once a father and mother” (Freud 1989:196, my emphasis) entails laying to waste decades of theoretical and methodological findings in fairy-tales scholarship. It amounts, in other words, to self-inflicting theoretical castration, that is – if we follow an inspired Freudian equation – to self-imposing blindness regarding the meanings of fairy tales.

Indeed, for Holbek, “‘enchantment’, ‘magic transformation’ etc.” is a non-issue in a realm he sees as “completely devoid of traces of superhuman or supernatural powers” (450). The Danish author’s decisive step forward in symbolic analysis must therefore be taken onto a different plane. Fairy tales are symbolic – but their meanings are not trivial.

Notes

1 Unless otherwise stated, all italics in quotations are by the quoted authors.


3 Thus, while I am in agreement with Michèle Simonsen in that Holbek’s analysis of King Lindorm “can only skim the detailed richness of the concrete messages,” I disagree when she ascribes this to the supposed fact that Holbek emphasizes “the symbolic equivalence of allomotifs to the expense of their (different) secondary connotations” (1998:213). As Simonsen rightly maintains, “a troll conveys secondary connotations which are different from those conveyed by a father, in addition to the main core of meaning, a hostile father figure … A motif has many connotations … Ignoring them leads to reductionism” (212). But, I would argue, such reductionism comes from implicit use of the notion of projection, as in the preconception that the hostile father figure is the main core of meaning. On the contrary, analysis of allomotific variation aims in principle at integrating all found shades of meaning into an encompassing notion. For instance, Holbek objects to Propp’s idea that “the stepmother is a she-dragon transferred to the beginning of the tale” because, Holbek suggests, “the comparison should take the opposite direction … the witch … is a (step)mother who has taken on some supernatural traits” (435-6). However, to reduce the she-dragon to a stepmother does away with the conceptual reason for the association in the first place – all characteristic supernatural traits being eliminated, not elucidated.

4 One word might be in order on the reason why I do not resort to motif-numbers in the following analysis. The main reason is, I shall be dwelling on interpretation; this requires putting motifs into context; and the motif-index is a masterpiece of de-contextualization. In other words, allomotific comparison entails going beyond superficial traits – but the motif-index is based on precisely such traits. The structural criterium of the former, in short, is not in line with the empiricist outlook of the latter.

5 The notion of “split” denotes, in Holbek’s usage, that “conflicting aspects of a character are distributed upon different figures in the tale.” A split distributes, in other words, opposite aspects of one given tale role between different figures, which “do not interact” (Holbek 435).

6 John Lindow writes, “Holbek’s theoretical stance is to seek meaning from the viewpoint of the narrators and audience.” However, he notes, “the discussion on projection centers on projection of the audience, not the characters, but it is embedded in a section dealing
with the splits of symbols among the characters” (1989:405, 408). In other words: although the discussion on projection should center on projections of “the audience” – itself a rather vague concept in Holbek’s usage – the Danish author does assign projections to characters. But then projections are the analyst’s own, and not ethnographic meanings as elicited from either a comparison of allomotifs or a study of the responses of flesh-and-bone people to the tales. In this light, it seems unwarranted to assume that Holbek’s theory offers “a better grasp of the context in which the symbols are to be seen” (Lindow 1989:407).

7 Characteristically Holbek adds, “but folktales are not concerned with such detailed descriptions. In our fairy tale ... the lindorm is a young man transformed into a monster” (460). This is of course to be understood in the context of the author’s improbable effort to unlink the symbolism in fairy tales from its wider folkloristic context. However, one text’s description of the “large serpent” as a “worm who flies out the window” (470) clearly fits with current representations in heraldry (cf. Lindow 1993:63-6).

8 Two qualifications are in order here. First, as in Portugal, the burning of discarded clothes also brings the animal werewolf back into human shape. This variation builds on a general equivalence between clothes and skins as shifts, removal and donning of which triggers metamorphosis (see Silva 1995:199-200). The second qualification refers to the fact that – as in Hungarian variants of “Cupid and Psyche” – the prince often retreats into an enchanted realm after the burning of his snakeskin (Dégh 140-9). I cannot go, in this brief note, into this theme of falling back into temporary enchantment. Let me simply note that the value of the skin-burning motif remains unaltered even in such cases – as one Hungarian teller makes explicit, “the burning of the snakeskin is a must so that an open wedding can be held” (Dégh 147).

9 Freud’s discussion of symbolism in his Interpretation of Dreams (Chapter VI, Section E) was introduced only as late as the fourth (1914) edition of the book.

10 Seemingly, Holbek does take them as such. As Lindow rightly notes, “Holbek inclines toward the notion of universals when symbols relate to sex” (1989:407; cf. Holbek 446) – in other words, when symbols are Freudian (cf. Freud 1989:189).

11 Note that this objection concerns the drastic restriction rather than the statement itself. The problem is, again, that alluded to in n. \h 3 above.

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In my review article on Holbek’s book (Lindow, 1989), I predicted that the work would inspire debate and included a list of items that I felt might profitably be discussed. One of them was the issue of projection, and I am therefore especially pleased to read the thoughtful analysis of Francisco Vaz da Silva, which takes up projection and related aspects of Holbek’s method of reading fairy tales symbolically.

As Vaz da Silva recognizes, there is a double aspect to Holbek’s notion of projection. Holbek thought that the narrator and audience of fairy tales in late nineteenth-century Jutland engaged in “collective daydreaming,” including both men and women, and in so doing projected onto the characters in the stories their own concerns about growing up, getting married, and establishing a social position. The projection is doubled, however, when Holbek argues that certain of the symbolic actions within the stories themselves involve projection on the part, not of the audience, but of the characters in the stories. Thus, in King Wivern, as Holbek and Vaz da Silva call Kong Lindorm (AT 433B), Holbek reads the initial disruption in the story, caused when the queen violates an interdiction about eating certain things to grow pregnant and as a result gives birth to a monster, a wivern prince, as a projection of the prince’s own sexual overindulgence. The prince is a wivern because he cannot control his own sexuality. As Vaz da Silva dryly notes, “since there cannot of course be such a thing as a projection on the part of a fairy-tale character – moreover one yet to be born – the projection is to be ascribed to narrators identifying with the prince.” That is certainly true, but it is also true that there is something a bit off about a new husband whose brides emerge dead after the bridal night, and as Holbek noted, the verb used for what the wivern does to his wives, splitte ad, seems to have social overtones. So if we drop the notion of projection here, which I am quite prepared to do, we do not have to abandon Holbek’s intuition about King Wivern’s essential problem. I argued in my own analysis of the story (Lindow, 1993) that there were also some noticeable reversals of normal gender roles in the story up to the point when the girl disenchants King Wivern: in overcoming a lindorm, she plays a role in legend tradition always played by men, and King Wivern himself does not go out to court her but waits at home.

Vaz da Silva criticizes Holbek for using an essentially Freudian apparatus. As a child of his era, Holbek would have had difficulty looking elsewhere for theories of “daydreaming” about the problems of childhood, marriage, and social status, but in its universalist and reductionist mode, the Freudian theory of Holbek is, I agree, not compelling. However, I still remain convinced that Holbek’s essential insights about the fairy-tale tradition of late nineteenth-century Denmark are essentially correct, that is, that “collective daydreaming” really did occur, and that the concerns of the narrators and audience are what Holbek told us they were. At the same time, I accept that Holbek’s analysis of King Wivern, and of the other tales he takes up in Interpretation of Fairy Tales, are necessarily
incomplete, omitting as they do the “secondary connotations” (Simonsen, 1998). I tried to bring to the discussion a number of these secondary connotations in my 1993 analysis, which takes up the background of the lindorm in legend tradition and some of the motifs (e.g., shedding the shifts) in the ethnographic record. What I see as the value of Vaz da Silva’s article, besides his indictment of Holbek’s Freudian apparatus, is to bring to the discussion a number of the other secondary connotations, not from the relevant legend tradition or ethnography but from the greater European fairy-tale tradition. His association of the multi-skinned onion with the multi-skinned wivern is admirable, and the more general discussion of the transformation scene is quite illuminating, even if one does not agree with every detail.

But playing with fire can get you burned. By presenting his own analysis in the context of a criticism of Holbek’s method, Vaz da Silva invites comment on his own method. It relies no less on intuition than Holbek’s did, and it substitutes some unverifiable hypotheses of symbolic equation for the unverifiable Freudian hypotheses taken up by Holbek. Vaz da Silva talks more than once about European traditional conceptions, but what traditions is he actually talking about? Are all European traditional conceptions identical, and have they always been so? To cite Calvert Watkins (1995) on the slain dragon as the hero’s father is to suggest a time frame from before the oldest European languages were recorded down to some peasant fairy tale narrators in nineteenth-century Jutland, and citing Jane Harrison hardly shortens that time frame. And to take another example: if it is really so that dragons are essentially the same creatures, “paradoxical to the core worldwide,” what can we really learn from a Jutlandic lindorm?

The point about a metaphysical ontology of reversibility deserves ventilation in a larger format than was available here. It is stimulating and may be important, but I do not see that King Wivern shows it all that clearly. Certainly the indications of “cyclic processes of metamorphosis” are ambiguous in the story, since Wivern’s change is one-way. If the story shows “the dynamics of a traditional image of release of manifold reality from hidden (ophidian) sources, in alternation with enfolding back into primordial Unity,” we may fairly ask again: Whose tradition? Where? When? Read against what ethnographic reality? Until we are given the answers to those questions, there is no more compelling reason to accept this notion than to accept the notion that late nineteenth-century Jutlandic peasants worried about such issues as Oedipal urges, castration fears, and penis envy and did so by means of a symbolic system involving such phenomena as projection.

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Reflections on da Silva’s Study of Holbek’s Interpretation of Fairy-Tales

Bengt Holbek’s *magnum opus* (literally, 660 pages) definitely deserves the serious discussion that Francisco Vaz da Silva has opened up in his article. A preliminary problem regarding a discussion about Holbek’s book may, due to its vastness, be a lack of agreement as to which of its multiple perspectives might provide the most worthwhile focus for discussion. Da Silva takes up a central problem that certainly deserves careful consideration, i.e., the way Holbek gears the concept of symbol to his analysis of the meaning of texts. He has also paid attention to the important subtitle of the volume, namely “Danish Folklore in European Perspective,” as his frequent references to studies in European folklore attest.

I fully agree with da Silva’s criticism of the closed system of symbols that is invoked by Holbek’s application of Freudian projection as the main, indeed the only, key to the interpretation of the marvelous in fairy tales. The same criticism has been voiced by Isabel Cardigos who replaced Holbek’s notion of the symbols of fairy tales as a “code” (Holbek 1987:202) with the term “symbolic language” (Cardigos 1996: 14-5, 43). The methodological implication of the term “code,” as shown in Holbek’s work, is his unequivocal position that the code stands for the projection of the narrating individuals’ postulated feelings. Cardigos’s terminological and theoretical choice of “language” enables a more open literary analysis which avoids reduction to one given sign system. Both Holbek’s and da Silva’s approach to the marvelous could be enriched by consulting Todorov on what he prefers to term the fantastic, the generic epitome of which is in fact the fairy tale (esp. 1975, 1982).

Holbek accounts in detail for the masterful works of Max Lüthi on the European folktale but he often rejects their approach. Da Silva has however not included Lüthi as a point of reference in his reading of Holbek. To my mind the advantage of a “softer,” literary, methodology to expound the meaning of folktales or fairy tales, both as a genre and in individual cases, is proven by Lüthi’s work (esp. 1986, 1987).

Holbek quotes Lüthi when he discusses the relationship between fairy tale and legend (Holbek 1987:197). Here is one central issue that I want to raise. A great deal of fairy tale scholarship tends to essentialize the genre and as a result to ignore its dialectic relationship with the other major category of folk prose, namely the legend. There may be some cultural variation to this and there may, as Holbek pointed out, be a clear difference between the West and the East (1978), so that the categories are more overlapping in non-European, especially Asian and Middle Eastern, folk narratives. Close readings of fairy tales may however disclose many hybrid rather than pure specimens of the genre.

I have elsewhere dealt more extensively with the dialectics of folktale and legend as the basis for folk narrative genre analysis, setting apart myth as a cognitive category following Lévi-Strauss, rather than the third component of the traditional genre triad of the Brothers Grimm (Hasan-Rokem 2000, 39-43, 147-50). Isabel Cardigos’s discussion of the difficulties involved in distinguishing between fairy tale and myth points in the same direction (1996:21-4). In addition, Cristina Bacchilega discusses this with great clarity in her book on *Postmodern Fairy Tales*. Especially pertinent is her observation, with reference to Jack Zipes’s seminal work, that “the fairy tale operates as “myth” par excellence” (1997, 8). A specific theoretical crack may be discerned in the terminological instability of “fairy tale” or “folktale” in the English, both represented for instance by “Märchen” in German, “satu” in Finnish, “saga” in Swedish and “eventyr” in Danish. My impression, although not substantiated by systematic research, is that “folktale” sometimes felt as too close to the generically unspecified “folk narrative” seems to open up a less essentialized perspective than “fairy tale,” which takes its name from an element of content.

Da Silva criticizes Holbek’s “systematic reduction of unknown elements in fairy tales to the familiar psychological predicaments of average people in rather vague socio-cultural settings.” This criticism invites us also to point out that the dissociation of the fairy tale genre from the system of beliefs and customs, of symbolical thought and ritual behavior, seems especially problematic in a work
that underlines the meticulous research of the context of the recording of the texts.

As it happens, the extensive source critical discussion is one of my favorite chapters in Holbek’s work (49-183). In it the author leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the focus of attention should be on the individual narrator (182). Holbek attempts to introduce a dialogue between the ethnographic fabric of the experiential world of the nineteenth-century Danish peasant and the schematic patterns of the strictly psychoanalytical interpretation of symbols, but somehow the individual narrator, especially if she is a woman, disappears. It may be this disappearance that accounts for some of the frustration that accompanies the rich intellectual experience in reading Holbek, a frustration that da Silva has competently grappled with in his re-reading of the *King Wivern* fairy tale.

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DOMINANT DISCOURSES OF POWER RELATIONS AND THE MELANESIAN OTHER: INTERPRETING THE EROTICIZED, EFFEMINIZING GAZE IN NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC

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The effeminate and sensual idealization of the Melanesian Other stems from National Geographic's gaze, which in turn is broadly linked to themes in Western cultural history. Race and geopolitics become organizing backdrops for narratives told about the Melanesian Other, and exemplify the "noble savage" theme as fetish. To travel in space is to travel in time. The fantasmagoric presentation of nude Melanesian men and women is for the consumption of Western white reader's back home. Immoderate sexuality and the uncontained body of black savage's poses a tangible threat to Western male viability in Melanesia. Mourning the passing of traditional Melanesian society and imperialist nostalgia makes racial discrimination appear innocent and pure in National Geographic, which masks the West's involvement with processes of domination. It is an eroticized, effeminizing gaze that reestablishes existing power relations in the imperialist scheme.

REPRESENTATION OF THE MELANESIAN OTHER

Reading National Geographic by Catherine Lutz and Jane Collins (1993) is an evocative portrayal of a "world brightly different" (Lutz and Collins 1993:87). According to Lutz and Collins, National Geographic has devoted 35% of its coverage to Asia, 22% to Latin America, 15% to the Middle East and North Africa, 12% each to Africa and the Pacific, and 6% to Polar regions (120). As an anthropologist whose focus is Melanesia, I was intrigued to learn that photographic representation of Pacific Islanders is 50 times higher in National Geographic than would be anticipated given the region's small proportion of the global population. Hollywood movies and World War II photojournalism (Lindstrom and White 1990) have been important contributors to the West's postwar depiction of the Pacific region. However, in creating an audience for images of cultural difference in the Pacific, National Geographic has an unrivalled worldwide reach to over 37 million people per issue. The contribution by Lutz and Collins (1993) to postmodern discourse and representation is taken as the main theoretical point of departure to critically examine the postcolonial depiction of Melanesians in National Geographic. When I started anthropological fieldwork in the eastern half of New Guinea in 1973 it was still an Australian colony, and did not become the State of Papua New Guinea (PNG) until 1975. In the western half of New Guinea the changeover from Dutch colony to Indonesian recolonization occurred just over 30 years ago. Data analysis in this paper is based on the 146 photographs of postcolonial Melanesians from the island of New Guinea that have appeared in the pages of National Geographic over the last three decades (see Table 1).

Dumont (1988) relates fashions in the exotic Other to shifting emphases in Western political and economic foundations, with the kind and amount of coverage vacillating according to prevailing international relations between the West and the rest. For Melanesia, race acts as a more significant backdrop constraining camera access than geopolitical interests per se. Backdrops, according to Appadurai "can be interpreted as sites of epistemological uncertainty about exactly what photographs seek to represent" (1997:1). Rydell demonstrates that the scale of evolutionary progress that placed the blackskinneed Other (e.g., Africans, Melanesians) at the bottom of the human scale, the brown-skinned Other (e.g.,
Asians) midway and Whites at the top not only informed nineteenth-century explorers and home consumers of their images but has continued to operate in the West (1984). Race becomes an organizing principle of narratives told about Melanesian peoples.

Racial attitudes control cultural ideas about the nobility of the Melanesian Other. Melanesians exemplify the Noble-Savage theme as fetish because they display “the kind of pathological displacement of libidinal interest that we normally associate with the forms of racism that depend on the idea of a ‘wild humanity’ for their justification” (White 1978:184). The nature of an opposition between a normal humanity (White) and an abnormal one (Black) is sufficient to transform Melanesians from being merely exotic into an ontological Other to be done with as desire requires (White 1978). The idea of black savages who are noble has the effect of demeaning the idea of nobility itself. National Geographic photography places Melanesian subjects under the imperial gaze of a realist ethnography that is civilizing at home and orientalizing in New Guinea (see Appadurai 1997). In seeking to cultivate the savage, imperialists were transforming their own society. Cultural colonialism is a reflexive process whereby the Melanesian Other is put to the purpose of reconstructing the Other back home, and the two sites went in hand in hand in the triumphalism of the bourgeoisie in the West (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992).

Knowledge of the Melanesian Other is a temporal, historical and political act (Fabian 1983). Mourning the passing of traditional Melanesian society and imperialist nostalgia makes racial discrimination appear innocent and pure, and masks involvement with processes of domination (Rosaldo 1989). To travel in space is to travel in time. Travel as science secularizes time for observation and description and space reflects the sequence of time as evolutionism (Fabian 1983). This paper investigates the representations and discourses of 146 photographs of the Melanesian Other appearing in National Geographic (Table 1). Photographs for representational analysis are identified with single quotation marks, and quotations for textual analysis from accompanying captions are identified with double quotation marks. Photographs of Melanesians in National Geographic are explained by the standard evolutionary model, and assigned to the Stone Age. Primitive Melanesian savagery is conveyed in article titles shown in Table 1 like “Headhunters in today’s world: The Asmat of New Guinea,” and “Fertility rites and sorcery in a New Guinea village.” The caption entitled “On the outside looking in” refers to “Papuan tribes…with their forest-based culture and animist beliefs” (O’Neill and Steinmetz 1996:16-7). Difference as distance becomes a “Journey through time” (Leydet and Austen 1982), as Melanesians proceed from location past to location present.

This paper conveys a different story than the National Geographic photographs originally meant to tell, one that is about their makers and readers rather than their Melanesian subjects. The National Geographic images of difference are denaturalized to override the temptation to imagine the Melanesian Other as basically living in a happy, classless and noble world in conflict neither with themselves nor us. The disproportionate attention to Melanesians in National Geographic is underlain by racist epistemology that says a lot about anthropology’s complicit role in this production of knowledge.

INTERSECTION OF GAZES

Lutz and Collins’ reading of National Geographic established the intersection of seven gazes (1993:88). A deconstruction of the intersection of gazes in the 146 photographs of the Melanesian Other reveals the context of imperialism that envelops and reinforces the dominant discourses of power.

The Photographer’s Gaze

The photographer’s gaze marks the structure and content of the photo (Lutz and Collins 1993:193). The National Geographic photographer/writer teams are literally
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“Dominant Discourses”

and symbolically the whitest and most masculine great hunter/adventurers (Bright 1989:137-8). Photographers are regularly featured in the “On Assignment” page of National Geographic, and “Not on the menu: George du jour” (On Assignment 1996) typifies the flamboyantly virile photographer identified by Lutz and Collins (1993:185) as bravely roaming, observing and evaluating locales inaccessible for most of his audience. Among the ten authors on assignment to New Guinea, seven are male and two, Robert Gordon and Gillian Gillison, are anthropologists (Table 1). All ten photographers are men and they must confront the Melanesian Other across the distance of gender. Okely (1975) notes that contemporary anthropology shares in the masculine part of this ethos and Said (1989) comments on the racially white part. National Geographic and Western anthropology share in the reproduction of white male privilege.

The Magazine’s Gaze

The magazine’s gaze represents the behind-the-scene institutional process by which a portion of the photographer’s gaze is used and emphasized. The viewer cannot know if selection of photographs and the cropping and arrangement of photographs on the page are the results of editorial or photographic decisions. The editors’ choices to commission an article and to fix captions are more clearly identified as the magazine’s gaze (Lutz and Collins 1993:195). Marketing studies show that just over half the magazine’s readers primarily view the photographs and only read the captions for additional thematic exposure to carry away with them. Barthes (1977:25-6) has commented on the anchorage function played by the caption writer’s fixing of a vantage point on the photograph’s meaning. The historical shift to caption functioning to illuminate the visual dips the picture in lyrical fixative and is crucial to the magazine’s gaze (Lutz and Collins 1993:76).

The Readers’ Gazes

The gazes of the magazine readers perceive, receive and read the photo (Barthes 1977:199). This is conducted independently and in addition to the gaze of the photographer and the magazine. Through agency, enculturation, and diversity of experience, readers’ gazes have a history and a future. Therefore the photograph is more than a material object. It evokes an imagined world before the photographer and author team arrives, it provokes further imagining of the photograph itself and remembrances of the story told (Lutz and Collins 1993:196). Fantasy is permitted through learned cultural models, which help interpret gestures and what is going on in the background and outside the photograph the reader is viewing. In vicarious viewing there is a presumption of consenting in the photo that leads to the illusion of having a relationship with the Melanesian Other. Paradoxically the readers’ gaze can also be impoverished by not experiencing what the photographer experienced. Moreover, the elevated class position assumed by those reading National Geographic could also create distancing from the Melanesian Other (Lutz and Collins 1993:196).

The Non-Western Subject’s Gaze

The non-Western subject’s gaze confronts the camera, looks at someone/ something within the photo frame, looks off into the distance or looks at nothing at all. Lutz and Collins calculated that the Other looked at the camera about one fourth of the time (1993:197). About eleven percent of the Melanesian gaze focuses on the camera, as depicted in the tourist work featured in “The face behind the mask” (Gordon and Austen 1982:148-9). Having a Westemer in “Stone Age drummer” draws attention away from the Westerner beyond the frame (Kirk 1972:383). Lutz and Collins indicate that the Other has no discernible gaze in about fourteen percent of the National Geographic photographs overall, comparable to the somewhat higher nineteen percent for the photographs of Melanesians (1993:203). “The village: still the pivot of Sepik life” is lushly shrouded in green, and typifies these photographs, which are often of dark or masked tiny
figures read as landscape or activity rather than as individuals (Kirk 1973:376). Group photographs with a mutual gaze are found in forty-five percent of the Melanesian photographs. Gift giving in Trobriand clan sociality, depicted in “Neighbors lend helping hands,” illustrates how group photographs tend to portray a determined, coordinated, forward-looking Other (Theroux and Essick 1992:126). Group photographs with the Melanesian Other’s gaze running off into the distance only account for eight percent of the photographs in National Geographic.

The Direct Western Gaze

Eight of the Melanesian photographs in National Geographic include outsiders who have a direct Western gaze in the photograph. Activity, vantage point and facial expression exchanged between the Westemer and the Melanesian Other dramatize cues to moral and social character. In ‘On the outside looking in,’ the reader views through the proxy of Indonesian settlers, but the Dani man does not look back (O’Neill and Steinmetz 1996:16-7). When there is lack of mutuality and reciprocity the gaze is distinctly colonial and the Westemer views the Other as exotic object (Lutz and Collins 1993:204). In “To connect with his flock” the White missionary assumes a superior colonial position by imperiously looking down upon his Melanesian audience (O’Neill and Steinmetz 1996:18). Incorporating a sloping structure into the composition creates the idea of descent or decline from the Westemer to the Other (see Maquet 1986).

The direct Western gaze, like that of the ethnographer, offers the validation of having participated in the life of the Other. In “To learn the ways of the Gimis” (Gillison and Gillison 1977:126) in the New Guinea Highlands, anthropologist Gillian Gillison indicates “they were very puzzled by what I was doing.” In featuring their daughter in “Six-year old Samantha,” “Timeless ritual of youth,” and “Favorite of the Gimis” (Gillison and Gillison 1977:127, 132-3, 146) Gillian and David Gillison opened a moral evolutionary chasm that revealed a contradiction in social relations between the West and Melanesians, otherwise less visible. Having a Westemer in the local setting conveys complex intercultural relations believed to obtain between the West and the rest and creates greater imaginary participation through identification with the Westemer (Lutz and Collins 1993:203).

Alternatively, the direct Western gaze can act to undermine the authority of the photographer by revealing the photograph being produced, an artifact rather than an unmediated fact. Having a Westemer in the photograph prompts self-awareness in the viewer, which can promote distancing rather than immersion. Seeing of the self being seen is antithetical to voyeurism (Alvarado 1979/80).

The Refracted Gaze of the Other

The refracted gaze shows the exoticized Other with camera, mirror, or mirror equivalent as tools of self-reflection and surveillance (Lutz and Collins 1993:207). Although more prevalent in the 1950’s in National Geographic, the refracted gaze has continued to be used to represent the Melanesian Other over the past 30 years. In “Style makes the man” (Kirk 1973:367) a Sepik man holds “a trade-goods mirror,” and in “Stone Age drummer” (Kirk 1972:383) an Asmat man confronts a tape recorder. These refracted gazes bolster the Western myth of the Melanesian Other as childlike and possessing historical self-consciousness only with discovery and colonization. The refracted gaze promotes the myth of history and change being characteristics of the West, and historical self-awareness for Melanesians only arriving with colonialism.

Academic Gaze

The various gazes embedded in this project ultimately reach the reader through the gaze of an academic anthropologist. The academic’s gaze is a subtype of the Western reader’s gaze because it reflects existing discourses on cultural difference and social relations of the Other, but is distinguished by distinctive
intent and by the societal position of the academic as a First-World, White, middle-
class, male (is this case), academic anthropologist. As with other readers, the
academic's gaze is still voyeuristic and hierarchic, perhaps even more insidiously
because of masquerading as science. My quest to experience fieldwork with
Melanesians outside the world capitalist system led me to the Wopkaimin in the
highlands of PNG. Wishing to experience a vanishing traditional society became
ironic under the accumulating social forces attendant upon the development of a
major open-cut mining project. Imperialist nostalgia became a mask to cover
my involvement with processes of domination that enabled my ethnographic
fieldwork (see Rosaldo 1989).

The academic anthropologist's gaze in this paper goes beyond an aesthetic/
literal appreciation to anthropologize the West (Rabinow 1986). It critiques the
images from National Geographic as cultural artifacts to illustrate how Melanesians
have been naturalized, exoticized, sexualized, and then idealized with the coming
of modernity to a premodern world.

**NATURALIZATION**

The naturalized Melanesian Other appearing in National Geographic would
be identified by Eric Wolf as “people without history,” characterized by having
pastor-oriented societies and personalities (1982). Not only are the unchanging
Melanesians more primitive than civilized, they are also “natural” humans without
history (Lutz and Collins 1993:108). When the White photographer-adventurer
plays music back to the black Melanesian performer in “Stone Age drummer”
(Kirk 1972:383), the refracted gaze of the Other informs a story about the coming
of self-awareness to primitives through encountering the West. Rosaldo situates
a cultural evolutionary ladder operating in the West that assigns a precultural
bottom rung to Stone Age peoples like Melanesians (1989). A cultural middle
rung is assigned to societies with historical dynamism like India and Japan. At
the postcultural top rung are Westerners no longer possessing culture, but who
hold on to history through their power to control the evolutionary advance of the
rest towards democracy and capitalism. Through the standard evolutionary model
of the Stone Age, Melanesians become people without history or trajectory.

**Halo of Green**

National Geographic considers their study of nature to be more scientific than
their treatment of society (Lutz and Collins 1993:109). Thus the naturalization of
the Other is a trope which naturalizes the time- and landlocked Melanesians in
their place. In “Beside a river’s elbow” (Kirk 1972:383), “Shrouded in rattan cane
and palm streamers” (Kirk 1972:386-7), “Lifeline of a tribal culture” (Kirk 1973:356-
7), “Magnificent feathered jewels” (Gillison and Gillison 1977:124-5), “Only 50-
years ago” (Leydet and Austen 1982:153), “This is the most remote spot I have
ever worked in” (Hapgood and Steinmetz 1989:246), “Tropical spawn of coral
reefs” (Theroux and Essick 1992:121-2), “The world beyond the mountain wall”
(O’Neill and Steinmetz 1996:11-2), and “Tightroping on roots” (Steinmetz 1996:42-
3), the routine location narrative presents Melanesians as people of nature.
Location images evoke in Western readers an imagined nostalgia of Melanesians
as “natural people” prior to the ecological degradation brought by industrialization,
which severed the link between humans and nature (MacFarlane 1987).
Melanesians are naturalized through their remote landscapes and seascapes,
and through their cultural practices.

**Nature: the Subject of Labor**

The passive and lazy Other often presented in colonial discourse is little in
evidence in National Geographic (Gilman 1985), which focuses on the
industriousness of the Other (Lutz and Collins 1993:106). The cultural
appropriation of nature in the West is the object of labor, but in Melanesia it is the
subject of labor, which further naturalizes the Other. Melanesian men are
represented as hunters in “Pork rides piggyback” (Leydet and Austen 1982:167), and “Tree people live in tightknit clans and hunt game like cassowary” (Steinmetz 1996:35). Both Melanesian men and women are shown fishing in “Women work while men relax” (Kirk 1972:402-3) and in “Piercing sunlit shallows with a wooden, metal tipped spear” (Theroux and Essick 1992:130-1), and they are shown gathering in “Everyday life” (Steinmetz 1996:41). A bountiful environment as the subject of labor further naturalizes and effeminizes the fecundity of the Melanesian Other.

Civilizing colonialism “enacted the principles of material individualism: the creation of value by means of self-possessed labor; the forceful domination of nature; the privatization of property; and the accumulation of surplus through an economy of effort” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:246). The hunting and ritual exertion of Melanesian men does not signify work to the colonialist gaze. Melanesian women seemed to have been coerced into doing what was properly male labor, their desultory scratching on the face of the earth in “Subsistence is an uphill climb” (O’Neill and Steinmetz 1996:12-3) evokes the ineffectual efforts of mere beasts of burden (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). The imperialist gaze perceives Melanesia as undomesticated, which is less the result of climate than it being a moral wasteland. Melanesians, the peoples of the wild, share its qualities. Unable to master their environment, they lack all culture and history (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992).

EXOTICIZATION

*National Geographic* reflects a fundamentally strange, yet beautiful exotic Other and rarely depicts poverty, starvation, dirtiness and violence. The Melanesian Other is by definition attractive. Trafficking in ugly, revolting images of ethnic difference has been left to movies and television news (Lutz and Collins 1993:90). To maintain its high circulation, the magazine appeals to preexisting, culturally tutored notions about Melanesians as the Black Stone Age peoples of the Pacific. Racial attitudes transfix attention on the unusual scene, often spread over two pages of the magazine, and the Western readers’ humanness as the people who act and dress in standard ways is defined. Exoticized Melanesians become a spectacle and their significance is discredited as a strategy of containment against any depth of involvement with the world (Polan 1986:63).

Effeminized Savagery

*National Geographic* photography shares an earlier Boasian salvage ethnography perspective that “ritual contained distilled history and cultural wisdom, [and] that it was the most conservative and thus the most meaningful remnant of culture” (Banta and Hinsley 1986:106). The enchantment with ritual stems from it being a key to the past and indicative of photographer and writer having traveled through space to travel through time, in accordance with the connection made by Victorian evolutionary anthropologists in the last century (see Fabian 1983). The display of Melanesians in indigenous dress suggests difference, social stability and the timelessness of a region characterized by nature, taboo, danger and adventure – a Stone-Age land out of time (see Graham-Brown 1988). The Asmat are referred to as “Stone Age inhabitants of a mosquito-ridden delta” (Kirk 1972:382). Among the Gimi in the highlands of New Guinea, Gillison and Gillison “found a community still living in a Stone Age culture,” (1977:126) Travel for the scientific study of primitive Melanesians is ultimately based on evolutionary stages, seeking out remnant cultural survivals.

The Melanesian world is male through the eyes of *National Geographic*. This stems from the Western cultural pattern that assigns things masculine to the cultural and things feminine to the natural (Ortner 1974). The male Melanesian performer of an initiation ritual in “Ritual adoption strengthens village ties” (Kirk 1972:390) is presented as rooted in tradition and living in a sacred and superstitious world. The picturing of Melanesians as living close to the supernatural and the past tends to flatter the image of Melanesian emotional life; ritual is
presented as routine procession routine (see Rosaldo 1989). The moment of
group grief during an Asmat funeral merely becomes cultural display of special
paraphernalia and performance in “Mourning the husband” (Kirk 1972:398-9)
that presents widows squirming through the mud in anguish to mask their scent
from the ghost of the corpse reposing in a sago frond coffin.

Lavish attention focussed on displays of bodily decorated men eroticizes
and eroticizes the male Melanesian Other in rituals of fertility in “Possum, leaves”
(Gillison and Gillison 1977:128-9) and “Crested with cockatoo feathers” (Theroux
and Essick 1992:128), of marriage in “Five pigs and a hundred dollars” (Gillison
and Gillison 1977:138-9), of ceremonial gift exchange in “Under sails of stitched
pandanus leaves” (Theroux and Essick 1992:122-3), of head-hunting in “Feathered
paddles churn the Pomatsj River” (Kirk 1972:380-1), in “Grisly relic” (Kirk
1973:374), and in “Once mortal enemies, still fierce competitors” (O’Neill and
Steinmetz 1996:32-3), of sorcery in “To catch a killer” (Gillison and Gillison
1977:142), and of funerals in “A feast of beetle larvae” (O’Neill and Steinmetz
1996:30-1).

The story told about the Melanesian Other is one of exotically and erotically
decorating the male body (Lutz and Collins 1993:91, 145). Portraits abound of
men with artifacts through their nasal septums (see “Men make their own
fashions,” Kirk 1972:384-5) and decorated headpieces (see “Saying this,” Gillison
and Gillison 1983:152). “Style makes the man” is captioned “a trade store mirror
prompts a bit of primping” (Kirk 1973:366-7), which renders a refracted gaze
designed to be read as a sign of vanity. Male finery and self-display become
salient markers, it is Melanesian males rather than females who dress in this
exotic fashion. Thus, the idealized search for exotic male cultural practice reaffirms
male dominance through effeminizing the Melanesian Other.

The voyeuristic coverage of death and blood, which seems obligatory and
obsessive, is eroticized and is arguably homoerotic. There is a nearness of
Melanesians to the violence and fearsomeness of death in ‘Uneasy stares’ (Kirk
1972:376-7) that dwells on the “grim, heavily armed warriors [who] are members
of a raiding party intent on taking heads,” and on the “Grisly relic” (Kirk 1973:374)
trophy of the head-hunter. The sinister, frightening quality of the Melanesian cultural
environment is accentuated in “Fear of ghosts” (Kirk 1972:378), depicting a man
sleeping with his head on a skull pillow identified as “grisly relics of ancestors as
well as of victims ... to ward off spirits of the dead.” Male initiation focuses on
bloodletting in “Tight-lipped with pain” (Kirk 1973:358-9), and human blood is
used to attach a drumskin to its base in “Human blood binds lizard skin to jungle
drums” (Kirk 1972:406–7). Feelings of danger are enhanced through references
to “Music of the soul” (Kirk 1973:380-1) and the “ghostly pipping of a sacred
bamboo flute” in “Haunting and mysterious” (Gillison and Gillison 1977:144-5).
The decorated male presented in National Geographic is effeminized, infantilized,
and eroticized.

SEXUALIZATION

The Melanesian Other is further effeminized through the imagery of naked
Black women in National Geographic. By purveying the nude Other, the magazine
developed Western ideas about race, gender, and sexuality with the marked
subcategorization in each case being Black, female, and unrepressed (Lutz and
Collins 1993:115). The magazine’s gaze interprets this volatile trio in the context
of National Geographic’s scientific mission in the pursuit of truth to forestall any
sexual attraction or eroticism being attributed to their photographs, but of course
they are erotic and exploitative (Abramson 1987:141). Supposedly, the breast
merely represents the struggle against prudery (Bryan 1987:89) and the realistic
picture of how the Melanesian Other lives. Considerations of race, gender and
sexuality are not factors influencing the ways in which White women’s breasts
are exposed. The art of photography exists behind the veneer of a scientific
agenda. The foundation of National Geographic’s project of beauty and truth is
based on racial and gender subordination, “in this context, one must first be
black and female to do this kind of symbolic labor” (Lutz and Collins 1993:116).
Motherhood and Domesticity

In trafficking in photographs of black Melanesian women for an overwhelmingly white readership, National Geographic is clearly linking narrative threads of gender and race (Lutz and Collins 1993:166). The Melanesian women in National Geographic also tell a story about civilizing colonialism. In the civilizing role of colonialism, women contributed through their nuclear families, healthily clad bodies and the practical arts of refined living and devotion to God (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). The imperialist gaze calls for a transformation of Melanesian motherhood and domesticity. Crude, dirty huts, as in “Men’s houses built in the centers of muddy, fenced compounds” (Gillison and Gillison 1983:150-1), should be altered into neatly bounded residences as a precondition for private property and refinement. The work of Melanesian men should be recast as farming while women should be brought indoors to the domestic domain, and families should start producing for the market to learn the worth of time and money (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). Melanesian life is represented as moral and social chaos. In violation of the bourgeois ideal of domesticity, Melanesian marriages are represented as bonds between groups, such as “Loving comfort but not kinship” (Theroux and Essick 1992:136), which depicts matrilineality through a Trobriand father’s mothering embrace of a son not of his matriclan. Melanesian mothers routinely hold babies (see “Tiny rider clings monkey-like,” Kirk 1972:404) and baby objects (see “Everyday life,” Steinmetz 1996:40) in ways to which the Western viewer is unaccustomed. As the reader’s gaze focuses on the ‘Child of the Sepik’ (Kirk 1973:354–5) and on another Melanesian child in ‘Gift to keep the peace’ (Kirk 1972:401), they become proof of the lack of boundaries between persons, their property, and their productive practices in Melanesia. According to Jean and John Comaroff (1992, 271), the civilizing colonialist gaze seeks:

“to domesticate the breeding grounds of savagery…. Marriage was to be a sacred union between consenting, loving, and faithful individuals; the nuclear household was to be the basis of the family estate; male and female were to be associated, complementarily, with the ‘public’ and the ‘private,’ production and reproduction.”

Sensuality

The naked Black woman is epitomized through mother-child photographs, nicknamed “tits and tots” by National Geographic (Meltzer 1978). Breasts in Western culture have been normalized as young, large, round, and not sagging (Young 1990:191), and more than anything else the National Geographic nude is a set of breasts, which over the years have been increasingly objectified (Lutz and Collins 1993:175). The racial distribution of female nudity in standard tit and tot images like ‘Women wear ‘modesty aprons’” (O’Neill and Steinmetz 1996:14) conforms to Western fantasies about Black women’s sexuality (Lutz and Collins 1993:172). Whether the Black Melanesian woman is presented as art and aestheticized or as science and dissected, she is portrayed as exuberant and excessive in her sexuality. There emerges from the anthology of breasts a sort of half-aesthetic concept: the Melanesian bosom as the property of National Geographic. The Melanesian bosom expresses an obvious invitation all along the trajectory from sender to addressee (see Alloula 1986).

Stylistic changes in the depiction of the female nude in the magazine relate to changes in commercial photography of women. Africanism (black) and Orientalism (brown) evidenced both intrigue and danger attributed to the Other (Clifford 1988). As a result of displaying their bodies for close examination, erotic qualities and sexual license are ascribed to Melanesian women. The naked Melanesian women in “Tiny rider clings monkey-like” (Kirk 1972:404) represents the nude presented as ethnographic fact. Only with the growing tolerance of aesthetic photos in the West has the nude become a more sexualized object.
Naked Melanesian women are often shown without children. In the prenuptial rite ‘Preparing their own performance’ Gimi women are “weaving sensually,” while in “Flower covered dancers” Gimi women enact “portrayals of rivers, wild taro, bandicoots-fast-moving or abundant things of the forest floor that symbolize the fertility of primordial women” (Gillison and Gillison 1977:135, 1983:148-9). Framing Asmat women in the arms of men in ‘Feigning the sleep of the newborn’ (Kirk 1972:390-1) portrays their sexual availability in fertility rites. The nude female Melanesian teenager erotically spread over two pages in alluring light and blurred background in ‘Face of the future’ (Leydet and Austen 1982:170-1) is aestheticized as soft porn.

The addition of a woman to a photograph can sexualize her as a commodity. Women in the practice of exogamy in “Mock gloom marks an Asmat wedding” (Kirk 1972:396), and in bride price negotiations in “Five pigs and a hundred dollars” (Gillison and Gillison 1977:138-9) are dramatically led away by the groom’s uncle. Depictions of Melanesian exogamy and bride price reinforce that women have traditionally been seen as objects to be possessed and owned as adornments to the lives of men (Pollock 1987). The Trobriand “Women of Kaileuna Island” (Theroux and Essick 1992:116-7) who “bathed in a paradise so unspoiled and sensuous that it could have flowed from the brush of Gauguin” are sexualized as a tourist commodity. The phantasmagoric presentation of nude Melanesian women is for the consumption of Western White readers back home. The immoderate sexuality and the uncontained body of the savage Black female poses a tangible threat to Western male viability in Melanesia (see Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). In The Colonial Harem, Alloula shows that when women became public “what they show of their anatomy ‘eroticized’ by the ‘art’ of the photographer is offered in direct invitation (1986:118). They offer their body to view as body-to-be-possessed, to be assailed with the ‘heavy desire’ characteristic of pornography.” It is an eroticized, effeminizing gaze that reestablishes existing power relations in the imperialist scheme.

LOCATION PAST TO LOCATION PRESENT

The savage innocence and beauty of Melanesians, as naturalized “primitives” without culture, is regularly represented in the National Geographic photographs. The Melanesian Other idealized as masculine and savage or as feminine and sensual stems from the magazine’s gaze, which in turn is broadly linked to themes in Western cultural history (Lutz and Collins 1993:95). Idealization of the Melanesian Other, like appreciation of taxidermy and nature photographs, allows for detemporalization and for fear for the loss of middle-class wealth to be allayed (Haraway 1984/5). The noble savage is idealized to assuage threats of chaos and to minimize Western connectedness to the Melanesian (Lutz and Collins 1993:95). The noble savage as fetish serves to undermine the nobility’s claim to a special status, but extends the status only to the bourgeois, not to Melanesians or lower classes at home (White 1978). Melanesian becomes “a metaphorical mirror held up between savagery and civility, past and present, bourgeois ideology and its opposites at home and abroad” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:289). Stories of natural abundance, sensuality and orderly social change, however, eventually give way to a radically changing narrative of a postcolonial world that is increasingly degraded and dangerous.

Modernization on the Periphery

Melanesians were depicted subserviently attending to White explorers in National Geographic photography until the 1970s when images like ‘A pack train treks across wasteland trails in the Kubors’ (Gilliard 1953:429) became too disturbing because of the ever present possibility of rebellion and anger (Lutz and Collins 1993:159). White travellers largely disappeared from the photographs and Melanesian space became racially tranquil. Since the 1970s, National Geographic coverage of the Other has been proportioned 28% to black people, 60% to brown people, and 12% to White people, with those of color most likely to
be portrayed at work and those with white skin at rest (Lutz and Collins 1993:161). This counterpoises superstition/ritual with science/technology and darker skin/exotic clothes with lighter skin/Western clothes along evolutionary lines. Photographs of the Melanesian Other are organized into a story about cultural evolution couched in normative discourse of modernization and development. The White reader remains able to interpret through standards of racial prejudice that the Black Melanesian Other was without wealth and technologically backward until Westernization provided the characteristics of civilized peoples.

Most Western media vacillate between angelic and demonic representation of the Other (Taussig 1987). National Geographic caters to an imagined middle-class world in the West without extreme wealth, poverty, violence, or illness by only infrequently presenting the Other as poor, ill, and hungry (Lutz and Collins 1993:105). In looking for and finding perfection, National Geographic is motivated by a classic humanism to clean up the Other to not be overly different (Lutz and Collins 1993:96). From the premodern world of exotic difference to the world of Western modernity is a story of stasis. In photographs contrasting the premodern with the modern, the commodity stands for the future. In ‘Seven years independence’ in postcolonial Melanesia “an umbrella replaces a banana leaf for shelter” (Gordon and Austen 1982:142). The commodity as contrasting representation is to be seen simply as stasis with the objects of modernity just being add ons. Dynamism, change, and agency are apportioned to the Western center, while Melanesians are just responding to the onslaught of modernization on the periphery.

The posture and stance of the posed portrait is a staple of almost all articles on the exoticized Other in National Geographic, and it humanizes and allows for scrutinizing the person and depicting character. The caption accompanying the Melanesian Tari man smiling from his backyard petrol station in “Almost 160 kilometres from the nearest competitor” indicates that “he himself owns no car. Such contrasts abound in this land where some communities still talk by drums” (Leydet and Austen 1982:151). Here the pose is semiotically standardized, with cars signaling technological modernity (Appadurai 1997). The pose and the backdrop have the radical potential to reconfigure social relationships. Backdrops locate the subject in the discourse of modernity as a visual fact expressed in clothes, machines, bodily comportment, and bodily accessories (Appadurai 1997). While these stories of modernity humanize, they constantly threaten to be absorbed into the taxonomic outcome of glossing over the Melanesian as an exoticized type rather than as an individual (see Geary 1988:50). The coming of modernity relates to what Rosaldo (1989) calls imperialist nostalgia for the passing of what we ourselves have destroyed.

Modernity is chronicled in contrasts between the Western capitalist economy and the Melanesian precapitalist economy. Cargo cultists in Melanesia in “Messiah of money” (Kirk 1973:362) believe wealth comes from magic shown in “Playing the dishes” (Kirk 1973:363), which “make money” by pouring coins back and forth between bowls. A high-ranking PNG government official ‘shouldering stalks of bananas greets relatives during a food-exchange ceremony honoring recently deceased elders of his native fishing village 28 kilometres from Port Moresby’ in “Success stories” (Leydet and Austen 1982:158). In “Death of a clan member” where “perhaps a third of the men in this region prefer Western dress” the “PNG Courts encourage pig and cash exchanges in hopes of ending cycles of revenge killings” (Leydet and Austen 1982:169). In ‘Neighbors lend a helping hand’ in the Trobriands “yams symbolize power and wealth...in how much one can afford to give away” (Theroux and Essick 1992:126). In the postcolonial setting of premodern gift-logic efflorescing with the coming of modernity, the photographic backdrop becomes an “experiment with modernity” (Appadurai 1997).

Feminization of modernity is told through two different stories about the work of Melanesian women. Social evolutionary theory “saw women in non-Western societies as oppressed and servile creatures, beasts of burden, chattels who could be bought and sold, eventually to be liberated by “civilization” or “progress,” thus attaining the enviable position of women in Western society” (Etienne and Leacock 1980:1). Western ideological understanding of women’s work has
changed since W.W.II from husband’s helpmate to self-realization and independence (Chafe 1983). Since W.W.II the middle class in the West has been subjected to intense sociocultural pressures idealizing motherhood and the family. After the late 1950s there was gradual erosion in acceptance of the mother-child bond (Ehrenreich and English 1978). The ambivalent message in this social field is presented in two types of contrasting images in National Geographic.

The premodern husband’s helpmate work of Melanesian women in ‘Bonanza of copper and gold’ (Leydet and Austen 1982:162) is gendered with vulnerability, primitivity, superstition and the constraints of tradition. The world of husband’s helpmate becomes a feminine repository of timeless family values and living in authentic harmony with nature. These women continue to be valued for their natural life, unruined by progress that weakens the vitality of their reproductive organs (Ehrenreich and English 1978). The Melanesian woman as husband’s helpmate questions progress in gender roles by acting as the repository for the lost femininity of liberated Western women (see Lutz and Collins 1993:184).

Modern self-realization and independence in women’s work is conveyed in “PNG’s first woman lawyer, Meg Taylor” (Leydet and Austen 1982:156–7), which is gendered with strength, civilization, rationality, and freedom (see Lutz and Collins 1993:180). In lobbying for prison reform and testing her skill in the sport of polocrosse, Meg Taylor demonstrates the feminization of modernization and statebuilding through work and play (see Kabbani 1986), even though women in successful work continue to threaten many men (Traube 1989).

Dispossession

It is the cultural landscapes of the Melanesians that are shown to be victims of modernity in National Geographic. Gold mining represents the greatest assault of modernity. Marx found the fetishism of gold was characteristic of the most highly advanced system of exchange, that of capitalism, and he explicated the logic of this absurd fetishism and the vicious practices it justified (White 1978:185). The Freeport mine in the western part of New Guinea is envisioned as ‘A mountain laid bare’ (O’Neill and Steinmetz 1996:21-2), whereas the Bougainville mine in the eastern half of the island is represented as a ‘Bonanza of copper and gold’ (Leydet and Austen 1982:162-3). According to O’Neill and Steinmetz (1996) the Freeport “mining giant has met fierce opposition from tribal groups who claim tailings have caused the flooding of their lands.” For Melanesians shown on Bougainville “mine expansion has twice relocated their village” (Leydet and Austen 1982). Oil and gas exploration is depicted in “This is the most remote spot I’ve ever worked in,” featuring “a Huli tribesman, atop a barrel of aviation fuel, [who] hiked to a site at 9,000 feet and, with some 60 others, cleared space for a helicopter to land” (Hapgood and Steinmetz 1989:247). Gold and oil of the Melanesian Other moves from savagery to industrial society. The resource as commodity is taken possession of by removing it from the context of place and people in Melanesia and placing it into the history of Western commerce, transporting it from the backward past location to the present of capitalist society (see Fabian 1983).

In the most recent National Geographic story, “Irian Jaya’s people of the trees” (Steinmetz 1996), what is quintessentially Melanesian is identified as living with the rainforest. In ‘Tightroping on roots’, Melanesians are represented as “People of the Trees” (Steinmetz 1996:42–3). The representation of nature as a spiritual domain for curing the ills of civilisation has a long association with wilderness conservation and environmentalism (Nash 1982). Green consciousness has spread beyond Western activists, and indigenous culture attached to “homeland” is starting to be sentimentalized rather than denigrated in the West. Melanesian uses of land and resources are becoming idealized as non-destructive and caring in contrast to rapacious development aggression.

COLONIAL PENETRATING GAZE

Commenting on colonial and postcolonial landscape views, Pratt (1982) finds
that the exotic scene for the viewer is encoded as male enterprises. Exoticized Melanesian landscapes and seascapes are construed as feminine and the colonized landscape is likewise symbolically feminine (Schaffer 1988). The feminine colonial frontier landscape of the Melanesian Other is exoticized and worth taking; the masculine colonizing force seeks the appropriation of the landscape. Being Melanesian is about sharing, ancestors, and forces of landscape and nature, which as Thomas (1994:30) suggests “offers a spiritual palliative to our overheated, overconsuming, unnatural, postindustrial world.” The trope of the romantic palliative co-existing with modernization is celebrated as the authentic identity of the Melanesian Other in National Geographic.

Representations and discourses of the Melanesian Other in National Geographic are interpreted in the context of imperialism as this discourse envelops and reinforces the dominant discourses of power. The general colonial gaze informs the presentation of the naturalized, exoticized, and sexualized Melanesian Other. It is a male, penetrating gaze, and all objects of the gaze are effeminized and infantilized. The phantasmagoric presentation of scenes from colonized Melanesia in National Geographic is for consumption of Western imperialists back home. The eroticized, and arguably homoerotic, effeminizing gaze in National Geographic reestablishes existing power relations in the imperialist scheme.

Works Cited


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**Table 1. Representation of Melanesians in *National Geographic* over the past 30 years.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHOR &amp; PHOTOGRAPHER</th>
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<th>ARTICLE</th>
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<td>Kirk</td>
<td>M/M</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Change Ripples New Guinea's Sepik River</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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<td>Hapgood &amp; Steinmetz</td>
<td>M/M</td>
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<td>M/M</td>
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<td>Steinmetz</td>
<td>M/M</td>
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Response to David Hyndman’s “Dominant Discourses of Power Relations and the Melanesian Other: Interpreting the Eroticized, Effeminizing Gaze in National Geographic”

David Hyndman’s article “Dominant Discourses of Power Relations and the Melanesian Other: Interpreting the Eroticized, Effeminizing Gaze in National Geographic” brings to the fore some interesting aspects of the subject. It discusses major theoretical positions on the question of “representation” and applies them to the photographic representation of the Melanesians in the well-known nature magazine National Geographic in the last three decades. David Hyndman focuses his analytical attention on the “representers” and not the “represented,” hence the clarity and coherence in the arguments.

This article, however, raises certain larger issues, to which the discussion could be connected to reach an understanding or insight into the processes of photographic representation, which are based on claims of empirical evidence. In the following, I will identify some of these, though more in the form of questions than answers.

National Geographic’s mode of representation is colonial – and that is based on the history of the organization as well as that of the disciplines of anthropology and ethnology. Their emergence in the colonial context of the nineteenth century is well known. In that context the term “colonial” refers both to particular socio-political and ideological systems. In our present context of the twenty-first century, however, this term needs to be explored in greater depth. Does it convey continuity without change? Or, does it refer to something different, yet similar, to its predecessor? I would support the latter hypothesis and argue that the term “colonial” has increased in complexity in the twentieth century. The contemporary “colonial” is in continuity with the nineteenth century “colonial,” but concerns the geopolitics of today’s power relations. The nineteenth-century perspective had real socio-political implications, and the socio-political implications of contemporary perspectives need to be identified. In my opinion, Hyndman’s clarity in perspective – that he is discussing the representers of the Melanesian and not the represented Melanesian – delimits the article’s tight focus. However, this focus could also be fixed on the contemporary socio-political implications of National Geographic’s representations. That the colonial gaze of National Geographic effeminizes the Melanesian applies also to the nineteenth-century colonial representation of colonized people. It is the implications that define change and continuity. If the “colonial” gaze of the nineteenth century sanctioned the colonial states, then what does the effeminizing gaze of twentieth century sanction? If effeminizing the colonized gave a sociobiological dimension and often legitimacy to colonial rule, then feminizing the so-called “post-colonial” non-European or the people of the so-called “developing countries” gives a socio-biological dimension to contemporary international relations and trade. The representer is not only the photographer and/or the anthropologist, but the organization behind and around them – the National Geographic – and the power-blocks to which it belongs.

Two inter-linked aspects to the above are the electronic transmission of the National Geographic – the National Geographic Television Channel – and contemporary environmental consciousness. National Geographic as an organization has modernized, even though it retains its colonial gaze. It reaches more people through the power of the moving image and is more capable of communicating its worldview than it was in the nineteenth century. The second inter-connected aspect is that of contemporary discourse on the environment. From concern for the natural environment to the objectification of nature as “environmentfriendly” products and as eco-ethnic-tourism, the representation of nature and the natural is a socio-political phenomenon. The exotic, natural worlds feed two of the biggest industries – the media and tourism, often combining both. Yet, a cursory match-making would show that in many cases these exotic and natural locales and people happen to be the same as those represented and objectified by the nineteenth-century gaze – the worlds that were then categorized as “colonized” and today as “developing.” This inter-connection exists in the gaze of National Geographic in all its historical complexity. Thus the “eroticized,
David Hyndman’s article is a succinct analysis of just one set of representations that can be abstracted from the pages of National Geographic and sorted according to many categories, but other regions come easily to mind. An exercise such as this induces a train of reflections on the frames of perception by which those in dominant situations in the First World Nations “know” the peoples of the globe. They thereby barely sense their position of privilege as anything other than natural.

National Geographic occupies a unique position in the magazine market, with its social cachet as the ground-staking publication of a well-endowed scientific foundation. Given its massive circulation and the standards it developed for the juxtaposition of text and photograph for the whole field of popular scientific publication, it can safely be said that this type of media object is an educational and ideological tool for “setting” visual perception on a grand scale. With National Geographic’s continued development of film features and media programs, it expands the scope of its editorial frame to the realm of sound and the voice overlay. The photographs of the magazine in particular are common resource materials in institutional classrooms, especially with the development of age-graded versions of the codes of information. Ultimately, it is as if the First World citizen was endowed with twelve gifts before she/he became cognizant, and thus has never existed without their powerful effects. One day the individual might be unlucky enough to prick a finger on a spindle of reality, should she/he actually venture into the pictured world and be assaulted by the smell and texture of the bodily space. The development of photography, or what Pierre Bourdieu has called the “Middle Brow Art,” as a spatial practice and as a perceptual apparatus of the bourgeoisie, and its expansion into the transnational information fields of advertisement and tourism, is thus one direction that Hyndman’s paper suggests for analysis. Transnational developmental agencies seeking financial supporters and regional and national tourist bureaus vying for the jaded eye of the First World culture hawk have perforce adopted the standards of voyeur-traveler established in National Geographic. But the adventure of the tourist is one into a contended space of interaction, where safety is an affect of class. The breach of constructed safety barriers is experienced as violence and penetration on sensual levels arranged in a hierarchy that privileges vision. Now, via the splice of the camera, the extension of vision, the virtual, rates as the only safe experience.

A major concern for Native American Studies has been to destabilize the seamless authority of scientific knowledge, the acceptable categories of evidence in discussions of truth, and indeed the whole constructed nature of the ideological system of scientific belief. Photographs have long had an essential truth-value that has been carefully nurtured, both for making use of and creating the primacy of vision. Seeing is believing. In tandem with captions that suggest the type of metaphorical transformation that might take place through use of such words as “contrast” and “exchange,” a powerful series of operations is effected within the body of the reader. At the end of the very long telescope that views the indigenous as other, as “good to think” (a la Lévi-Straus) but intractable in reality, very real issues of land rights, territorial control of resources and economic viability are at stake.

One fertile area for exploration described in Hyndman’s article is the linked eroticized image of the female and the effeminized image of the male, and their
conflation with symbolic values for the land to be discovered and absorbed into
the capitalist sphere. A number of cases come to mind in the Native hemispheres
of the Americas. For highland Maya groups, for example, there is the photographic
conflation of women dressed in traje (traditional dress), flowers and the mountain
landscape in National Geographic and other culture/travel magazines, numerous
tourist brochures, and on postcards. In a Western frame the metaphors of nature
and culture are freely transposed in a fertile ground of popular psychology as
"what it is that might be plucked" and the evanescence of the moment. But
beyond the first level, such images specifically play on some registers of National
Geographic's format that were not mentioned in the Melanesian case. The
indigenous person is framed not just in a landscape that avoids all that is ugly,
but also the photograph is juxtaposed to and serialized within and across issues
of the magazine with photographs of the monumental but eroded achievements
of the "Ancient Maya." The idea of the Indigenous as once cultured, once
productive on a monumental scale by organized surplus labor (and therefore
imminently civilizable as laborer in the field of capitalist modernity) is played
against the encoding of ancient knowledge woven through the costumbre or
practices of the Maya today. All is presented to the gaze and camera of the
traveler-reader. Thus knowledge of the land and its commodifiable riches becomes
the perceptual domain of the investigator. The spatial separation of the magazine
creates the plane on which the extraction of value and knowledge takes place.
While Hyndman identifies the resources as the desired commodities to be
transported from the backward past location to the present of modern capitalist
society, I would suggest it is the knowledge held by the people and its pertinence
to resource development that is detached and alienated in such a series of overlays
against past achievements.

Hyndman's development of the Melanesian world as male through the
investigation of cultural portraiture can be refracted through other fields where
the female and land are displayed and the male backgrounded for significant
ideological and practical reasons. It is in the more remote villages of highland
Guatemala, or amongst the aged or those in subservient positions in resort hotels,
or for ritual occasions and for photographs that the men don their carefully stored
traje. This responds to several strands of reasonable existence. It is one legacy
of a genocidal civil war, when it was necessary to not be identified as being from
one's hometown. Secondly, there was a reaction to being seen as feminized in
the context of migrant labor. Thus traditional dress becomes a marker by absence
in the process of alienation and ethnic differentiation in the development of labor
resources. The presence of women in photographs as the symbol of the country
then takes on significant symbolic levels beyond women as nature and man as
culture, where woman wears in her costume the marker of the indigenous space
in their land. Just as women have to do business when the men are gone, so
too they do a certain kind of work of presence here in a photograph. The rural
village inhabited by woman while men travel from their homelands on
transnational labor circuits is also being marked by absence. Such a vacating of
identity and presence by males can be read from the series of photographs over
the decades as recording a response to the forces of globalizing identity, making
that very process seem inexorable and natural.

As is made clear in this article, the analysis of National Geographic as
ideological practice and of the work that it does in the modern psyche, is a job
that is pertinent to a first world struggle to see the world clearly, with as few of
the effects of the gaze as possible. This is the work in a transnational context.
But the translation of such a study back into the context of national politics yields
further insights. The tension between native populations and national
administrations geared to international development grows more complex with
the presence of the camera in regions under dispute. Furthermore there is the
need for the happy smiling natives of the adventure romance on the tourist-dollar
interface. Finally, the excursions of First-World citizens into the pictured story
raise the issues of resentment and safety when resources are being exported on
the class and national interface. The natives are aware of the commodification of
presence in a photograph: "Un photo; una quetzal," "A penny for a photo," cry
the children to the passing tourists. But given a chance, after long decades of
exposure to the glossy paper of magazines and the culture of the family
photograph, the local family and community delight in the capture of reflection
on the shiny surface for their own records and, in the end, for their own agendas.
The capture of the world media for fifteen minutes of fame is the necessary
lifeblood of the uprising that has learnt the very lessons of which they were
previously the subject and the object. The viability of photo transmission over
the Internet further extends the range and influence of the contender for the
reflecting gaze. But the very real tension of the image presented and the contended
space that creates and devolves from it are issues that Hyndman’s article draws
to our attention.

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Collection and research on expressive culture had its beginning in scholars’ deep and often emotional and sensory attraction to folk song, narration and craft. Writing and print were the customary 19th-century media of learning and communicating knowledge, and the growing scholarly habit of screening out emotional vocabulary further impoverished our understanding of the sensory and sensual totality of experience. While students of culture have long begun to critically examine their fields’ legacies, the more intimate, affective linkage between burgeoning scholars and their disciplinary subject has not been fully considered. It is this implicit attraction and its marginalization, if not disappearance from scholarly purview, that contributed to the equal marginalization of sensory experience, affect, and emotion from ethnographic work. To comprehend the marginal place of what I would like to term an "ethnography of listening" (as one example within a larger ethnography of sensory perception), this essay sketches the implications of the successive exclusion of sentimentality and sensuality from scholarship concerned with folklore, before turning to a discussion of why such marginalization is increasingly untenable and how ethnographers are beginning to recover sensuality and corporality as a vital part of understanding expressive culture.

“A deeper appreciation of sound could ... make us consider in a new light the dynamic nature of sound, an open door to the comprehension of cultural sentiment” (Paul Stoller 1984:561).

“Instead of the genuine historical, and by us improved mistones in the songs – as important as they might be – I hear in my ears the beats and sounds of the great drum which ruled the cheerful and quiet waltzes in the dancing halls ... I cannot fight off the thought that such a song has its best history within itself and is most happy when another [person] with true compassion enfolds it in his soul and shapes it as he desires. . . . If every sensual reader, stirred in his innermost by one of these songs, seeks to clear away all that disturbs him and adds all [the song] inspires and excites in him then our efforts have reached their highest goal” (Achim von Arnim [1818] 1963:265).

“So there will soon be a need – perhaps there already is a need – for something that may seem a contradiction in terms: an ethnology of solitude” (Augé 1995:120).

In the introduction to Slave Songs of the United States, a slender collection published in 1867, William Francis Allen relates the extraordinariness of African American music. He points to its affective powers and laments the insufficiency of transcription:

The best that we can do, however, with paper and types, or even with voices, will convey but a faint shadow of the original. The voices of the
colored people have a peculiar quality that nothing can imitate; and the intonation and delicate variations of even one singer cannot be reproduced on paper. And I despair of conveying any notion of the effect of a number singing together, especially in a complicated shout (Allen, Ware and Garrison [1867]1992:iv-v).

But convey Allen and others nonetheless did, turning what they heard into texts and musical notation for others to study or perform. What was not in the notations was the “soul-turning” quality of spirituals that had stirred Allen so deeply. In this regard Allen and his cohort followed the pattern set by the German romantics who had been enthralled by the gamut of expressive culture. They, too, had set out to objectify in print the songs and tales that nourished their craving for sensual and emotional experience encapsulated in the German term Empfindsamkeit—a mostly untranslatable word connoting sensibility for both sentimentality and sensuality.

Volumes of song texts and tales, fragments of epic poetry, verses and riddles began to fill the shelves of bourgeois households—volumes that also represented the beginnings of the academic study of verbal arts and expressive culture more generally. The nineteenth century’s unreflected preference for writing and print as media of learning and communicating knowledge almost automatically impoverished our understanding of the sensory and sensual totality of experience. Students of culture, in this case particularly folklorists, have long begun to critically examine this legacy, recognize the nationalist fallacy, and seek ways to disentangle the complex politics involved in collection, publication, appropriation and domination carried out in the name of liberation or celebration.

What has not been fully considered is the more intimate, affective linkage between burgeoning scholars and their disciplinary subject. It is this implicit attraction and its marginalization if not disappearance from scholarly purview that has contributed to the equal marginalization of sensory experience, affect, and emotion from ethnographic work. To comprehend the marginal place of what I would like to term an “ethnography of listening” (as one example within a larger ethnography of sensory perception), I will first sketch the implications of the successive exclusion of sentimentality and sensuality from scholarship concerned with folklore, before I turn to a discussion of why such marginalization is increasingly untenable and how ethnographers are beginning to “come to their senses” (Sklar 1994). Scholars in cultural disciplines have in recent years increasingly turned to address sensuality and corporeality. But it appears, for instance, that in the process of turning the body into a site of study, grasping it as a site of cultural agency is a more manageable task than understanding the body and our senses as instruments of cultural reception. The “reflexive turn” brought into ethnography through the writing culture movement has allowed for the (re-)insertion of the researcher’s affective state, but in its focus on the authorial self shies away from seeking to understand the role of the senses and affect within as well as outside of the researcher-and-researched dynamic.

Folklore has been defined as expressive culture and artistic communication, and it is arguably this implied aesthetic dimension that endows such “chunks of culture” (Berger 1995:11) most powerfully with affective potential. But to textualize expressive culture in preparation for scientific study eliminated from consideration all the levels of perception and associated experience that had enthralled scholars in the first place. By excluding the seemingly personal as irrelevant, scholars also excluded the vital role of expressive forms’ and performances’ sensual affect within and between the social groups they worked with. Anthropologists such as Lutz and White have observed a similar gap: “The past relegation of emotions to the sidelines of culture theory is an artifact of the view that they occupy the more natural and biological provinces of human experience, and hence are seen as relatively uniform, uninteresting, and inaccessible to the methods of cultural analysis” (1986:405). There were, early on, studies of phenomena such as homesickness, where scholars recognized that feelings of nostalgia were connected to sensory impressions and memories of the sound of language and song or the scent of foods. But the very term “homesickness” shows that the
somatic aspects of the phenomenon were considered crucial, and homesickness found scholarly attention in medicine and psychiatry, but not in the study of expressive culture. The more recent inclusion of concerns with emotions’ social-relational, communicative and cultural dimensions in anthropology has focused disproportionately on non-Western, pre-industrialized, ‘homogeneous’ cultures, and it is only in ethnomusicology, where an engagement in lived reality of complex societies has begun to manifest itself. This paper hopes to participate in the development of a perspective on sensual experience and emotions in complex societies.

The gaps in comprehending expressive culture resulting from textualizing practices have been felt in recent years. A great deal of reflexive ethnographic work has been groping for a way to legitimately include the sensing self in scholarly work, with sound experience leading the way (M. Baumann 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999; Feld 1982; Stoller 1984, 1997). Preceding this reflexive turn, the ethnography of speaking broke through the confines of textual and etic understandings of expressive forms, clearly seeking a fuller, contextually located subject. By linking these two developments to the omission of sensual perception during the formative periods of the study of expressive culture, I hope to contribute to a reconfiguration of the subject that takes into account the entirety of the communicative and affective process. Rudolf Schenda symbolically encapsulated this in his title Von Mund zu Ohr (“From Mouth To Ear” 1993). I will mostly concentrate on the aural experience that is indicated in it. One reason is that the ear is targeted prominently in current aesthetic experiments, such as the rapidly growing ‘world music’ with all its burgeoning sub genres which deserve cultural analysis (Feld 1995) in addition to some of the equally deserved cultural critique (Feld 1988, Erlmann 1999). A German philosopher speaks of “the intervention of the ear against the tyranny of the eye” (Dietmar Kamper, cited in Baumann 1990:133), and Yi-Fu Tuan proposes:

“Sound can arouse human emotion to a more intense level than can sight alone. ‘Screaming’ headlines in the morning newspaper catch our attention but have no grip on our heart. Pictures of disaster may elicit more of a response. But we will be thoroughly engaged by the sound of an ambulance siren or by cries of pain, rage, or despair” (1995:72). It should be understood, however, that the kind of holism aimed for goes beyond our sense of hearing, but points rather toward the need to empirically and epistemologically address the entire sensory spectrum.

Among the early folkloristic contributions to the ethnography of speaking was Alan Dundes and Ojo Arewa’s piece on proverbs and the ethnography of speaking (1964). Dundes’ “Texture, Text and Context” (1964) has perhaps the most telling title to recall the growing interest among American students of expressive culture in the ethnography of speaking in the early 1960s. By differentiating texture (defined in his case as “the language, the specific phonemes and morphemes” 25) from the text, and emphasizing context as inextricably linked to folkloric production, Dundes hoped to achieve greater definitional precision for folklore genres. He articulated a folklore-specific variant of the larger goals of the ethnography of communication – a field that sought to bridge between (structurally inspired) grammars and ethnographies. As Richard Bauman and Joel Sherzer formulated it: “We took it as our task to show that there is pattern, there is systematic coherence, and there is difference in the ways that speaking is organized from one society to another, and that this pattern, this coherence, this difference are to be discovered ethnographically” (1974:1989:xi).

For the study of expressive culture, this shift proved to be very productive. On the basis of a comprehensive, ethnographic record, the differentiation between analytic versus ethnic genres could be formulated as a much-needed corrective to more than a century of analytic practices (Ben-Amos 1976). The works establishing the interrelationship of poetics and politics through careful considerations of verbal art in performance are legion (cf. Brenneis 1993).

The focus of “the new perspectives” in folklore remained, however, largely
on speaking and on performances as products of speech or enactment. Those who heard, saw, and experienced performances remained, with few exceptions, oddly marginal, accommodated in important but rarely theorized terms such as coperformance. How listening differs culturally and/or individually is at least within cultural scholarship largely unexplored. The possibility inherent to the idea of a reception theory, as it was practiced within literary studies since the late 1960s, never seems to have fruitfully converged with folkloristic performance study (Jauss 1970; Fish 1970; Bendix, in press). Equally evident is the paucity of terms such as “sound,” “sound-symbolism,” or “soundscape” in standard reference works on communication. Working within a disciplinary trajectory that has always emphasized rendering the poetic visible, we have concentrated on verbal art as it emanates from the mouth and travels through the communicative channel, capturing it before it disappears into the mysterious tunnels and crevices of the ear. Roman Jacobson’s much employed “scheme of the fundamental factors” of communication and their corresponding functions takes into account addresser and addressee, and while particularly his elaboration on the poetic and metalingual function potentially lead toward what occurs within the listener, the focus remained solidly – and for his project justifiably so – on the message (1960:353-357).

There were those who did hear, such as Dennis Tedlock who wrote: “The apparent lack of literary value in many past translations is not a reflection but a distortion of the originals, caused by the dictation process, an emphasis on content, [and] a pervasive deafness to oral qualities” (1972:132). But one would have to add that a great deal of Tedlock’s own effort was unmistakably focused on improving textualization, thus bringing about literary value, and not on exploring the crosscultural dimensions of listening. Just as text-centered literary analysis fails to spell out how a reader is moved by a great work of literature, textualizing oral poetics – with all the pains taken to render the performative in print – in the interest of adding oral literatures to the canons of written arts at best skirts the issue of culturally divergent pleasures of listening or generally sensory perception.

The parceling out of scientific discovery, in turn, located the ear and the cognitive enigmas associated with our sense of hearing outside of what cultural scholarship considers part of the subject. One might remember, however, that the romantic impulse had been to collect, edit, publish and also sensitively and artfully experience (nachempfinden) the poetry of the folk. The first three tasks were eagerly followed, but the positivist turn soon influenced the nature of scholarship so profoundly that the component of savoring sensual experience was marginalized. Herder could still describe a Spanish song as “exuding the perfume of lilies” and summarize folksong in its totality as “meadows of flowers and sweet fruits” (1807:75). Yet standard romantic phrases attesting to the effect of verbal arts on heart and soul came to be commonly labeled and dismissed as evidence of romantic exuberance. With this dismissive stance, a window into a sensory awareness potentially quite different from our own has been closed. Successive generations increasingly removed sensory metaphor out of printed works for public consumption into the private realm of correspondence and talk. Seen in this light, the arduous tasks of categorization and analysis inherent in the scholarly practices of burgeoning nineteenth century scholarship were also instruments of puritanical denial of sensual/sensory pleasures.

Allen’s preface to Slave Songs stands precisely at this juncture between the rapture expressive culture holds over the listener and the rigors of documentation and analysis demanded by the scholarly habit. Affective responses did not belong to the growing canons of folklore scholarship. Dundes’ “Texture, Text, and Context,” while important in breaking the textual focus within the study of verbal arts, was intent on heightening the scholarly respectability of a discipline. Thus in a footnote Dundes chastises one Richard Chase’s “mysticism,” arguing that his exuberance stood in the way of definitional clarity. Chase had written that genuine folklore did not need the stamp of approval from a professional folklorist, because “You know by the feel, by a tingling of your scalp, by an indefinable something inside you when you hear the song sung, or the tale told, or the tune played” (Chase in Dundes 1964, ft.7).
The potential pitfalls of relying on tingling scalps and indefinable somethings notwithstanding, it is more often than not such sensual experience that draws scholars into working with expressive culture and that has been central to the way they identify and locate subject matter to work with. If listening has such an effect on the scholar, do we not have to assume that it affects the “native” audiences similarly? and should it not arouse our curiosity whether we hear what “they” are listening to?

“Nothing is more exclusively national and more individual than the pleasures of the ear.” Herder made this observation in his treatise on Hebrew poetry in 1782 (Herder [1782] 1833:35). The scope envisioned in this one sentence is astounding, especially considering how Herder’s interests have, in assessments of folklore’s history, been simplified. Herder is often read narrowly as an engine of romantic nationalism, but he clearly grasped the differential levels of allegiance open to us as human beings, encompassing a spectrum from the most intimate and closed-off individual experience to the mass imagined in a nation. He understood the sensual element in “the voices of the folk” – performed vernacular arts do have the power to make the scalp tingle, the spine shiver, the pulse increase. The pleasures and displeasures of the ear feed both body and mind, and evoke a complex mixture of physiological, emotional and reasoned responses. Herder’s “pleasures of the ear” require the kind of reflection that an ethnography of listening might generate, and that the ethnography of speaking has, despite best intentions, obfuscated.

The ethnography of speaking foresaw attention to the “attitudes, values, and beliefs current in the community concerning the means of speech and their use” (Bauman 1983:6; cf. Sherzer and Darnell [1972] 1986). The relationship of these patterns of speaking to other aspects of culture was also an intrinsic aspect of this project, but the focus built, among other influences, on the agency implied in Austin’s How to do things with words (1962, centering on speech production, all the while implying intended speech perception), and the poetics of language as elaborated by the Prague Circle. We learned about the great diversity of speech rules, the aesthetic range of speech performance, and the culturally located ideologies of language. It is perhaps not surprising that it is a consideration of silence – in Richard Bauman’s extraordinary study of seventeenth century Quakers – which points to (spiritual) responsiveness within a congregation, sensed mutually by minister and congregation. Yet Bauman, too, elaborates more on the ideology occasioning the silences. The experience of the Quaker Inner Light, part and parcel of the dictum of silence, is very likely another “soul-turning” moment which out of reverence and out of ethnographic helplessness has been hard to render as text (Bauman 1983:22-9).

The scholarly fixation on text and textualizing, combined with the paucity of interdisciplinary vocabulary to address the aural, have then impoverished much of the ethnographic record. Particularly strange in its almost stenographic approach was the study of belief or “superstition” – assisted, of course, by communities’ own predilection to summarize as well as forecast belief experiences in proverb-like texts. Within folkloristics, the experience-based study of belief has begun to emphasize the corporeal and sensual more strongly (e.g. Hufford 1995, 1997; True 1997). Indeed, in work such as his classic The Terror that Comes in the Night (1982), Hufford forces us to recognize in the experience of the supernatural a form of sensory and mental reception. Paul Stoller, working with the Songhay of West Africa, learned through his native teachers’ disappointment with him of his own inability to hear what they heard. “Sound is a dimension of experience in and of itself” (Stoller 1984:567), and a number of ethnomusicologists in turn have in very different ways uncovered connections between sound and music perception, emotions such as grief (Feld 1982), and other aspects of culture such as narrative and healing (Seeger 1986, Roseman 1991), or have been able to demonstrate that in some cultures, it is hearing, not seeing, that “constitutes the pivotal sensory channel” (Menezes Bastos 1999:92).

Much of this work has, however, been carried out among so-called tribal, often isolated cultures. Furthermore, some of the focus on hearing and listening that has become a bigger part of ethnomusicological inquiry, has been turned
back onto the performers themselves – how do the individual members of a Gamelan ensemble process what they hear from each other (Brinner 1999)? How does listening to each other bring about the specific sounds of barbershop harmony (Averill 1999)?

There are steps to bring us out from the rain forest to concert halls and youth culture’s raves or techno parties, from seemingly whole systems of grieving and health, to the fragmented soundscapes of automobiles with quadruple speaker sets and the lonely jogger wearing headphones, from the Third World to the Fourth World of reflexive modernization. Harris Berger’s ethnography of the metal, rock, and jazz scene of Cleveland, Ohio, seeks to provide a “phenomenology of musical experience,” and while he, too, focuses primarily on the perceptions of the musicians themselves, he offers glimpses of what audiences might be hearing or what they might hope to hear (1999, esp. 242-5). Becker and Woehs chose European techno or rave events and seek to understand how this combined listening and dance experience grows into a mass ritual based on a sense of both listening and co-performance (1999). Michael Bull (2000) goes farthest in the opposite direction. Seemingly turning away from collectivities such as are gathered at a rave, Bull is interested in how individuals manage their own space perception and experience through their personal Walkman. Bull conducts not what Augé wistfully called “an ethnography of solitude” (1995:12) but an ethnography of what one might term “intended solitudes.” Bull shows the ways in which individuals work with the available technology to shape their perception and by extension their mood. In the urban environment Bull probed, the social collective does not disappear in this personal maneuvering, but it remains present through its very denial on the part of the individual. At any moment, forces beyond the individual can intrude on the carefully managed aesthetic and experiential control, and the very fragility of this strategy thus continually reminds the individual of the powers – social and technological – that control her environment.

Bull situates his study in the tradition of critical theory to “analyze the historical nature of the senses in relation to the use of new forms of communication technologies” (2000:7). I would suggest that an ethnography of listening may begin at a still more rudimentary – or innocent – level, offering potentially an avenue to get beyond the theorizing of cultural politicization and commodification. This necessary, deconstructive move has gotten us close to disciplinary self-annihilation, and an ethnographic lens transcending (though by no means ignoring) the market and exploring the sensual could be one productive complement. The social groups we study are as reflexive in their practices as the scholars who document them. They are as aware as we are of the objectified nature of what was once called traditional culture. But they experiment with new tools and new settings to create experiences for themselves and those who will listen – experiences that are aesthetically moving and appropriate for our time. An example from the Austrian Alps might serve as illustration.

In July 1995, Trio Clarion, a group of three classical clarinetists based in Vienna, invited an interested public to partake of a “hike within sound” (Klangwanderung) at the Gosaukamm in the Dachstein mountains. Offered as part of the summer season’s concerts (and free to the public), only people who live in this remote part of Austria’s Salzkammergut or those who spent their vacation there were likely to even know about the event. Yet there were hundreds of people who ventured and found this outdoor arena created by solid granite walls. Located at approximately 2000 meters above sea level, it could be reached from the village of Gosau by foot (a three to four hour hike) or, at least for part of the way, by an aerial cableway.

On the appointed day, people of all ages walked, ambled, and scrambled over the grassy slopes toward the designated area. Some temporary signs had been posted, but they were barely visible amidst the regular signs for different hiking routes to the surrounding peaks and to the inns and alpine huts along the route. Some people wore “good clothes” to mark the fact that this was a concert, but most wore hiking attire and sturdy shoes to cope with the uneven terrain.

Yet how to behave during this unusual listening experience? There was no code of conduct, other than the designation provided by the announcement
itself – “a hike within sound.” This signaled only a contradiction to one stereotypical way of how Westerners are accustomed to consume classical music: hiking, not sitting quietly, outdoors, not in the concert hall. The predominant response on the part of the audience was thus experimental. While Trio Clarin played an hour’s worth of Mozart, the audience clambered around from one rocky spot to another to bring – as the brochure had advocated – “continually new sounds to the ear.” Many people arrived after the concert began, there was continuous movement of what looked like tiny bodies on a gigantic expanse of mountain. There were no norms of how to listen, the bewildering mix of postures and positions of attaining aural pleasure was a beautiful illustration of how many different ways there could be of “how to listen to Mozart.” It was also an illustration of modern individuals’ reflexive effort to literally “bring themselves to their senses.” Whether sitting on a boulder, eyes closed to shut out the glorious landscape, or continually shifting place, clambering up and down a steep, grassy incline, they manifested people’s effort, even strain, to listen and “experience.” Given the altitude, there was a constant wind suffusing the sounds, spreading them and leading to unfamiliar aural crosscurrents; birds cruised by, especially the loud mountain daws; so did airplanes; rocks slithered away from under the feet of those who had stationed themselves in more precarious places; dogs held on leashes panted and barked; and people talked – less so the closer they got to the musicians. Freed of the norms of the concert hall, talk could be heard about anything from the music itself to requests for help with getting better footing to choices of where to eat lunch.

There was applause after every piece, and the musicians provided brief announcements of what they would play next. The end was as informal as the beginning; people began to disperse once the last piece was over. The musicians who happened to crowd into the same tiny two-table alpine hut cum restaurant as our family did seemed pleased with the event. Concert halls were, in their estimation, still a more valuable venue to their craft, but, stated one, “one can do something like this ever so often.” Playing outdoors, especially in scenic elevation, provided a different aural experience for them as much as it did for those who listened, but while they concentrated on each other’s playing, the audience had the opportunity to turn inside themselves. Conventions of listening lifted – everyone was preoccupied with keeping space and footing, eliminating the social control against intruding noises customary in the concert hall; everyone had the opportunity to feel the sensation of familiar sounds in unfamiliar space, though clearly each individual realized this opportunity to a different degree.

Sound experiments of this nature are not new, but at least in the Austrian approach to touristic diversification, they are mushrooming. This is the case not least because an appreciation of music, classical and otherwise, is valued enormously in Austrian culture. The experimental sounds are intended as much for native consumption as for the tourists. A first of this nature was something called Klangwolke (cloud of sound) of Anton Bruckner’s music, flooding the outdoors of Linz in Upper Austria in the 1980s and traditionalized since then. Other places have adopted the Klangwolke-idea, and clearly the described Klangwanderung is a further level of experimentation with sound. Vienna’s music summer regularly includes open-air screenings of classical concerts, specifically old recordings of all of the Beethoven symphonies directed by a long-deceased Leonard Bernstein. The big screen is placed in front of City Hall, with a food fair providing continuous olfactory and gustatory nourishment. But the music, projected with countless enormous speakers, floods the entire area. It can be heard from the trolley along Vienna’s Ringstrasse several stops away, and fills the night air for those taking walks or sitting by the fountains in the surrounding park.

The preponderance of musical events geared toward jostling habitual ways of listening and offering opportunities for sensual experiences of an ever new nature occur all over Europe, the United States, and very likely the entire globe. The fact that we tend to traditionalize such events, such as repeating the legendary open-air rock concert “Woodstock” of 1969, is testimony not only to the play of the market which is heavily in evidence in the Austrian touristic scene described
above. It also attests to our craving for overwhelming sensual experience which, even when repeated, provides the satisfaction of sensory memory.

How might one go about initiating an ethnography of listening? Take steps toward an ecology of the senses, their linkages to cognition, their collaboration in providing us with aesthetic pleasure? Nearly every promising point of entry requires cross-disciplinarity. The first is enculturation into sound that thus far has received more attention from education (McDevitt 1994) as well as advertising specialists (Miller and Marks 1992) than from researchers in the field of expressive culture. Children, although intent on communicating from birth, develop their communicative skills by developing and differentiating their senses, in particular listening. Language enculturation necessitates that a child learn to distinguish from a sea of sounds those considered relevant. Without sound perception, speech can be learned only imperfectly. Unlike eyes, ears cannot be closed to stop the incessant exposure to sounds that need to be sorted, and new parents are told that sometimes an infant will cry simply to drown out the onslaught of sounds surrounding her. The child’s reactions to sound are then partially instinctive/physiological (loud noise tends to result in muscular reaction, certain sound selections induce calm, relaxation etc.) and partially molded by parental and environmental cues. Already in a pre-speech stage children acquire tastes – some sounds are favored over others, some are sought out and some are shied away from. Such tastes are in part enculturated, in part a result of physiological disposition. Yet much of this training occurs contextually and latently. Much more effort is expended teaching a child to speak, while vision and even more so sound perception are regarded as far more physiological and given. As children develop language and participate in verbal discourse, they begin to formulate their sensual perceptions verbally: what is heard and felt is labeled pleasurable, touching or revolting, touching, inducing fear, happiness, anger or elation.

Language thus helps children construct a referential meaning to grasp the meanings embodied in and through sound (Manuel 1995, elaborating on Zuckerkandl 1956). Listening to a ghastly tale or a hilarious song, “fear,” “pleasure,” “anger” etc., become appropriate verbal referents for what was embodied in the message as it traveled “from mouth to ear.” The question is to what extent such sensual perception is culturally molded, and to what extent the ‘pleasures of the ear’ remain idiosyncratically resistant to cultural patterning.

In his argument for a discourse-centered approach to culture, Greg Urban invokes Marcel Mauss’s *Les Techniques du Corps*, subsuming them under the notion of “style” – as in styles of body painting, hair, clothing, ornamentation, postures, gestures, etc. Urban states that body techniques may become part of the content of consciousness when they are named by means of language and discourse and so reflected upon, but which exist first and foremost in the realm of the senses. They are culture as inscribed in the physical person rather than, or in addition, to the mind. They represent a realm of physical experience that reflects a direct and immediate control by culture over the body (1991:107).

The reflexive influence of discourse on such sensually experienced self-fashioning is doubtless real. Yet when it comes to the sense of hearing, I would maintain a softened stance regarding Urban’s presumption of immediate patterning by culture. The sensual processes facilitated by the ear are a great deal less subject to immediate social ordering than are other, more visible and hence more controllable sensual experiences such as touch and taste. Max Peter Baumann accepts a “culture-specific intent of the listener” but is not satisfied with that as an assessment of the complexities of what happens within the ear. He invokes the image of an eggshell mediating between sound and brain/body, arguing for a consciousness which taps the shell of reality from both sides – through which the inside becomes the outside and the outside becomes the inside.... This consciousness incessantly listens with a ‘third ear’ which
finds between the two auricles the creativity that constructs reality in its own and special manner (Baumann 1990:123).

Pursuing this direction will of necessity lead into the kinds of territories that Gregory Bateson charted (1972), and which reverberated in a more experiential form through Victor Turner’s late work. These areas join cognition, experience and culture. In anthropologist Maurice Bloch’s terms, this will force us to overcome the rift that has developed between those who, in the wake of the writing culture movement see anthropology above all as a “literary enterprise [and] criticize the ‘objectivist’ and scientific pretensions of the field,” and those who are “interested in cognition [and] who are often impatient with the lack of scientific rigor in traditional ethnographic writing” (Bloch 1998:40). Interest and understanding of cognitive science does not constitute a relapse into naïve, dubious and politically devastating reductionism, but contributes to an essential aim of ethnography. As Bloch states:

If people’s knowledge, in its broadest sense, is an essential object of what we study, it is necessary to reflect on its nature, its psychological organization, and to be able to explain it in such a way that we can account for one of its most fundamental yet problematic features: the incredible speed and ease with which it can be used. I would argue that all ethnographers employ, whether they are aware of it or not, general psychological theories as soon as they try to make us understand how the people they study see the world and what motivates them in their actions. These theories cannot and, therefore, should not escape from critical examination, especially from disciplines specialising in the study of knowledge in use (1998:44).

If we are to probe the contours of sensory perception and reception and seek to understand the transitions between the individual, cultural and transcultural dimensions, as I am urging here, then research methods will be needed that are capable of grasping “the most profound type of knowledge [which] is not spoken of at all” and thus inaccessible to ethnographic observation or interview (Bloch 1998:46).

There are concrete places where an ethnography of listening might set in to begin correcting some of the voids in understanding that disciplinary specialization has brought about. One might for instance consider the role of sound in custom and festival. Display events of this nature that have seen extensive research and may, in their sensory comprehensiveness, be useful bridges to the kind of genteel sound orgies I attempted to describe with Austrian examples. Earlier generations of ethnologists and folklorists (perhaps particularly in Europe) created even a special analytic category of “noise customs.” Studies of such events describe the instruments involved, how they are made, the costumes worn by the players, and the supernatural creatures or phenomena that are to be driven away by the noise. Yet the noise itself and its effect on those who make and hear it remain elusive. It was generally presumed that what was ‘noise’ to the ear of the researcher was also noise to the practitioners.

My first fieldwork dealt with one of these “noise customs” in Switzerland – classified as such because of the use of massive cowbells in processions by New Year’s revelers (Bendix 1985). I was not fully prepared for the local discourse on cowbell harmonies, in tritones and octaves. My monograph gave equal space to the exorbitant price paid for these bells and the ‘pleasures to the ear’ gained from them. A retired postal worker, concluding our interview, led me to the attic of his home where he had hung one such set of bells – though he himself never herded cows for a living. Putting his finger over his lips to make sure I’d stay quiet, he lightly tapped each bell and looked at me with glowing eyes as the sound reverberated through the staircase. Similarly, the staircase down into the village doctor’s practice had one such set mounted, within easy reach for anyone passing underneath – and male patients without fail would tap the bells in passing, feeling an echo of the deep pleasure this tritone provides them as they went or
came from medical treatment. Fieldwork in this community did expand my own aesthetics to be affected by the wordless yodel of the area, but like so many other scholars before me, I shied away from grasping it analytically in any depth.

“A certain dilettantism, or more precisely perhaps a helplessness in the face of very complex phenomena” has been attested to by various European ethnologists (Burckhardt-Seebass 1992:62).

This reluctance once again is lodged in disciplinary separation and specialization. Musicology relies on an esoteric system of notation and its disciplinary focus, analogous to literary fields, attached itself to ‘high culture,’ until a breakthrough into ethnomusicological interest became more acceptable in the latter part of the twentieth century. Interdisciplinary rapprochement until recently has thus been difficult and sporadic, as anyone not conversant in musicological terms and notation hesitates to participate in the discourse or defers to the authority of someone who is. Ironically, Herder’s best known contribution to folkloristics is the collection of songs — without musical notation — and subsequently, text and music went their increasingly separate academic paths. Yet for the realization of romantic ideology — the expression of national sentiment — the fusion of text and music in performance was (and remains) of the utmost importance.

Feld and Fox’s comprehensive assessment of the analytic dissonances and convergences of musicology and linguistics arrive at a conclusion that should indeed be the jumping board for further inquiry, paying “attention to the social immanence of music’s supreme mystery, the grooving redundancy of elegant structuring that affectively connects the singularity of form to the multiplicity of senses” (1994:43-4) — experienced, one might add, along an as yet to be properly understood spectrum from great individual variety to cultural specificity to human commonality, and lodged not only in music but to a degree in the whole gamut of aesthetically shaped culture.

My argument has been built on the interrelationship between speaking (or sounding) and listening, but the intent is to open the field of cultural inquiry to the breadth of sensual experience that fosters aesthetic comprehension. Performers and performance have been too starkly separated from audiences’ perception. The present juncture of deconstructing our disciplinary heritage and ethnographically confront globalization and the concomitant commodification of what used to be our subject may also be the right moment to seek both a recovery and an expansion of what we study.

The ethnography I am suggesting overcomes the questions “is that really expressive culture,” and “is it lodged within the class of phenomena usually studied by folklorists (or anthropologists or ethnologists),” but rather accepts that the aesthetic thrills of the present warrant attention, no matter where they are located. It employs the “kinesthetic empathy” during fieldwork that Deidre Sklar (1994) has advocated, and it brings into play the sensual register of researcher and researched alike — the boundary between the two is getting blurred in any case. Ethnically or culturally defined communities are an artifact and tool of sociopolitical interests, with expressive forms objectified and strategically employed. Behind these kinds of “shouting matches” — a term borrowed from Roger Abrahams (1981) — emerges a reality that finds individual identities interacting less with circumscribed groups than with a global cacophony of potential sensations. The ear is an enormously important place for selecting and mediating from this gigantic soundscape who we are and who we want to be— to adapt Herder to the present: “Nothing is as individualistic and as transcultural as the pleasures of the ear.”

Notes

1 For some of the preliminary research for this paper I was very ably assisted by Edward T. McKinley. An earlier effort on this topic was presented in German as a plenary address at the congress of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Volkskunde in Karlsruhe in September 1995 (Bendix 1997b). Another version was read at the 1996 California Folklore Society Meetings in Berkeley. For responses to drafts and for bibliographic assistance I am in-
debted to Roger Abrahams, John Bendix, Don Brenneis, Lee Haring, David Hufford, Kim Lau, Carol Ann Muller and Janet Theophano, as well as the editors of Cultural Analysis.  

Abrahams (1993) constitutes both a summary statement as well as an expansion on the historiography of “folklore” and nationalism. Handler (1988) and Herzfeld (1982) are among the most comprehensively conceptualized case studies on folklore and the politics of culture.

See Bauman & Briggs (1990) and Bauman (1993) for considerations of scholarly entextualization practices. Stewart has pointed to the “crimes of writing,” and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s work on the artifactualizing of segments of culture and their further journey into museums and other destinations tackles the complicated interface of politics and commodity culture as it has evolved over the past one hundred years (1998b).

My interest here is first of all historical, and focuses on the impact of the scholarly predisposition in shaping the subject matter of fields such as folklore studies. There are certainly efforts to correct the lacunae I am pointing to, but they occur largely in the second half of the 20th century, and find a relatively narrow following, vis-a-vis the larger scholarly production. Robert Plant Armstrong’s inquiry into the affective presence of Yoruba art (1971), his insistence that in the artist’s creation there is also an intentionality to bring about affect in the viewer, and his recognition that art, once created, requires a curating ambience all point toward “reception” in the broadest sense. Armstrong, much as Alan Merriam in his key introduction to the ethnomusicological enterprise in the USA (1964), work with the concept of synaesthesia which might best be glossed as the human capacity – intentional or not – to translate between different sense impressions and derive from the process a holistic experience of a phenomenon, be this an material artifact, a sound, a performance – an experience that is brought about by the working together of the senses. Merriam refers back to the work of the German musicologist Erich v. Hornbostel (1972) who worked with the term synaesthesia, as does the contemporary Swiss ethnomusicologist Max Peter Baumann, whose work will be touched on in this essay.

The major works in the realm of “bodylore” are Young (1994) and Babcock and Young (1995).

While there are numerous precursors, the writing culture movement is generally associated with Clifford and Marcus’s conference volume (1986) and with the feminist response or corrective edited by Behar and Gordon (1995).

Somewhat surprisingly one discovers that the first comprehensive literature assessment on homesickness was penned by philosopher Karl Jaspers whose dissertation probed the linkages between nostalgia and crime (1909).

“Expressive culture” has always attracted interdisciplinary attention, and while it has received the most focused attention from scholars in fields called folkloristics, folklife studies, or, in Europe, Volkskunde; folk literature research, and European Ethnology (which naturally expands beyond expressive forms but includes them prominently in its scope), the present essay takes the liberty of ignoring disciplinary boundaries and acknowledges instead that the theoretical basis from which students of expressive culture draw are located in disciplines such as anthropology, literary studies and the philosophy of language and art, as well as specializations such as ethnolinguistics, semiotics, and in this essay’s case, especially ethnomusicology. A historically more accurate account would acknowledge that all of these fields and subfields have been inspired by an intellectual interest in the vernacular (and the emotional and sensory experiences it stirred and stirs) which arguably preceeds their disciplinary formation. Yet it cannot be disregarded that folklore studies have been far less successful at establishing disciplinary clout than in fostering an awareness for the subject in a given polity. This in turn very likely has contributed to the field’s suspect status among disciplines dedicated to more obvious categories of ‘knowledge.’ Fostering awareness involves not least an appeal to the sensory and emotive faculties, which, so this essay implies, have eluded scholarly comprehension, have been censored out of proper scholarly attention, or have been relegated to the realm of a more medically inclined psychology.

Historically, Western thought has privileged the sense of sight over all others, and generally worked with a gradation of higher and lower senses, and this trust in the visual has left an indelible mark on the way in which knowledge is conceptualized. According to
Hornbostel, writing in the 1920s, sight and hearing are more specialized and are acquired later in the infants’s development (1927:84) – but the state of “scientific research” to which he referenced himself at that time has changed, but it remains to be explored, how if at all the senses are hierarchically experienced culturally – historically and in the present.

10 For comprehensive articulations of the emergence of the ethnography of speaking, see Hymes (1962, 1964) and Gumperz ([1972]1986).

11 Sherzer and Damell’s “Outline Guide,” for instance, incorporates audiences only in point 1, F and 2. ([1972]1986:550-51). Basgöz (1976) is often cited as a case study, but the “product” is foregrounded here, too. Duranti and Brenneis (1986) document and theorize audiences as co-performers, but the emphasis remains to a great extent on the emergent shape of the “text.” Even one of the recent, exciting collections of articles edited by Silverstein and Urban (1996) emphasizes the textual and the agency engendering discourse.

12 A fruitful exception is Coleman (1996) and the aforementioned work by Schenda (1993).

13 Even the latest reference tool for anthropological linguists has entries for “deaf” but not for “hearing” or “sound” (Duranti 1999).

14 I am obviously overstating the critique here; there are a number of works that could be cited here that go a ways toward at least employing this sense of listeners’ pleasure to further the analysis – Barre Toelken’s article on Yellowman’s “pretty language” (1976) can be mentioned as one such example, and Toelken’s subsequent experience with the ethical dilemmas of voice on tape points precisely to the interface of native assumptions and experiences of sound perception, belief, and scholarly practice (1998).

15 Max Peter Baumann thus initiates an anthropology of listening with a preliminary inquiry into the biological mechanics, cognitive psychology, and philosophical ramifications of the sense of hearing (1990).

16 In this regard the definition of the romantic stance as opposed to the rational one vis-à-vis emotion presented in Lutz and White bears extension: “In the romantic view, emotion is implicitly evaluated positively as an aspect of ‘natural humanity’; it is (or can be) the site of uncorrupted, pure, or honest perception in contrast with civilization’s artificial rationality” (1986:409). At least among the German romantics, emotion is not necessarily evaluated positively, but there was an immense curiosity there to both live it and understand it, which then lead to early discourses on the psyche, cf. Kaufmann (1995).

17 By including this citation I obviously do not intended to support genuine/fake dichotomies that I attempted to undermine in my study of the concept of authenticity (Bendix 1997a).

18 The year of this statement is interesting – it appeared more than two decades before Herder’s Stimmten der Völker, the work commonly associated with Herder’s involvement with song in the history of folklore studies. From the acknowledgment of the internal and “individual” in this quote from his essay on Hebrew poetry, he moves to a greater emphasis of the textual and national/cultural.

19 On silence from an interdisciplinary perspective, see also Tannen and Saville-Troike (1985).

20 Stoller (1997) has carried questions of cognition and sensation especially far into senses other than sight and his work similarly to what is posited here criticizes the Eurocentrism of visual and textual privileging.

21 Similarly, Lutz and White observe that much of the anthropology of emotions “has been done in the Pacific, reflecting both an indigenous focus on emotional idioms and Oceanic ethnography’s traditional psychodynamic focus” (1986:406).

22 I am using the term Fourth World as introduced into the anthropology of tourism by Nelson Graham (1976). “Reflexive modernity” is discussed, in quasi-dialogic form, by Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994), and is suggested as an alternative to postmodernity. Their concept appears particularly productive for empirically focused work.

23 A largely interview based study of the youth culture of “techno” has also been carried out by Muri (1999), and she skirts at the very least the intersection of drug consumption
and sexuality as reported by her field consultants, though one would have to assume
that the sensory preparedness is to a great extent shaped by the soundscape of Zürich’s
annual rave event.

24 Scholarly work to no small measure contributes to this reflexivity; Hans Moser called it
Rücklauf (flow back), and it is continuously in evidence – scholars act as consultants to
politicians and reporters, appear as commentators for cultural events, write (at least
outside the USA) frequently for newspapers, and their observations are in turn absorbed
again in the practices they will study. Konrad Köstlin glosses this
process as the “Verkulturwissenschaftlichung des Lebens” – that is, the intermeshing of
cultural analysis with the flow and discourse of everyday life (1997).

25 Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1998) has insisted that “the tool is the topic” – that is, the
technologies available to us as researchers have fundamentally shaped the way in which
we are able to conceptualize our discipline’s subject.

26 Fieldwork on tourism in Austria in summer 1995 and 1996 was supported by the
University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation, and in spring and summer 1998 by a
grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

27 “Experience” was the key word in Austria’s 1996 tourism concept, and has been on
the rise within tourism promotion over the past decade. It signals a transformation in
what guests expect and what the promoters seek to offer. This clearly ties into the craving
for sensory/sensual pleasure I am trying to outline here, but requires further analysis
elsewhere.

28 Interestingly, the Vienna event is also accompanied with gustatory possibilities, as
there are temporary drinking and eating establishments set up for the duration, and the
scent of all kinds of food traditions mix with beer and wine as one ambles about, flooded
by music.

29 A very specialized recent exception is Cook (1999). A volume such as that edited by
Wolvin and Coakley (1993) coming out of speech communications seeks to operationalize
listening as a communicative skill, albeit recognizing the complexity of the phenomenon; the emphasis is unmistakably on the needs of corporate America’s interest in
improving working efficiency.

30 Human ears are differentially equipped to perceive and tolerate varying spectra and
decibels of sounds. One researcher generalizes as far as follows: “Prolonged exposure
to high-decibel sounds can cause . . . stress, lack of attention, mental and emotional
fatigue, poor socialization, and the inability to form values” (Wallin 1986). The leap from
the personal to the socio-cultural here is interesting – very likely measured with some
kind of quantitative schedule of questions.

31 These observations are not based on the specifics of ethnography, but rather abstracted from common Western practice. I would very much welcome evidence to the contrary. Max Peter Baumann reinforces the centrality of the ear: “The ear as a sense organ for time and space is the most important of our senses. Throughout the history of time, hearing has functioned as the central and dominant sense through its overall synaesthesia. . . . It is faster than the eye” (1992:127).

32 On the workings of the inner ear, see Ashmore (2000).

Experience (Turner and Bruner 1986) spelled out related concerns, but with few excep-
tions (contributions by Renato Rosaldo, Roger Abrahams, and James Fernandez) the
overall issue disappears in the intriguing aspects of specific cases.

34 Apologists might claim that for Herder’s contemporaries, the tunes to these songs
might actually have been known, but given the cross-cultural nature of the collection,
this stands on pretty wobbly legs. Rather, in the phase of textualizing vernacular prac-
tices that Herder helped to initiate, it was always the words and not the musical or
gestural medium carrying them that was emphasized.

35 Inta Carpenter’s work on the Latvian song festivals (1996) demonstrates this particu-
larly well: these festivals are typical of reflexive modernity in as much as the practitioners
at this point in time of course invoke Herder’s writings to legitimize or comment on what
they do, but the testimonials to “soul-turning” are there.

36 Peter Kivy’s observation relates to Feld and Fox’s: “Music, in its structure, bears a resemblance to the ‘emotive life’; and the primary aesthetic response is a cognitive response: a recognition of the emotive content present in it” (1989:39). His argument is thus that music is not a stimulus for emotion, but that in our listening we undergo a cognitive recognition.

37 Here one needs to refer to Konrad Köstlin’s “Passion for the Whole” (1997), a really intense argument for Volkskunde’s continuous ability and responsibility to tackle life as lived, in contrast to disciplines that purposely confine their specialization to a narrow slice of ‘the whole.’

38 Politically this is highly problematic to claim – I write as a Westemer here, with all the economic privileges available to me. But the market is, I believe, propelling the planet toward this form. The choices open to me, though, are obviously not available globally.

Works Cited


Cultural Analysis

“Pleasures of the Ear”


“The Pleasures of the Ear” is a pleasure to the eye and mind as well as challenging, nuanced, and imaginative, it links very particular insights to very general and suggestive possibilities. With her usual clarity and élan, Bendix speaks both to the intellectual traditions of our discipline and to the traditions, local and otherwise, with which our scholarly work is concerned. At the same time historical, ethnographic, and programmatic, her essay should open many ears – and sound new directions for research and reflection. In this response I want briefly to pursue several of the themes raised by Bendix: the intimate links between sound and emotion, the tensions between “rapture” and the “rigors of documentation,” and her counterposition of the acoustic and the textual as scholarly subjects.

Central to Bendix’s discussion is a strong sense of the immediacy of sound; she argues that the acoustic is “a great deal less subject to ... social ordering than are other, more visible sensual experiences,” a position shared by other scholars writing about the phenomenology of sound. This is, as she notes, a claim deserving considerable exploration. One site for such exploration lies in the process of children’s acquisition of communicative competence and the balance between “instinctive/physiological” reactions to sound and more culturally specific aspects of their experience. It is clear that infants are attuned to, and productively play with, the prosodic features of others’ speech (e.g., intonation) long before they produce recognizable words. Another site for exploration lies in the almost automatic association made between sound, musical and otherwise, and emotional experience, a phenomenon with which all of us teaching about such issues are familiar.

A second point has to do with Bendix’s brilliant examination of the self-imposed split, which scholars often make between their powerful personal responses to the acoustic and the impersonal terms within which they conceptualize and write about cultural experience as professionals. Bendix makes audible an internal conundrum, which many of us have noted in our own work and that of others; the pleasures that bring us to, and keep us, in a field often remain marginal and mute in our own writing. Bendix connects this conundrum to a third striking observation – the slow and slouchwise movement towards the pleasures of performance, auditory and otherwise, which has centrally informed the ethnography of communication but has not been fully realized within it. In suggesting that we shift our goals from ever more comprehensive “texts” to a somehow richer and more aesthetically compelling account, Bendix outlines a difficult but promising project.

She is not alone in making culture more audible, but, remarkably, folklorists and anthropologists have been somewhat slower than scholars in other disciplines to take sound seriously. Historians, e.g., Alain Corbin in his Village Bells: Sound and Meaning in 19th-Century France (Columbia University Press 1998), and literary scholars, e.g., Bruce R. Smith in The Acoustic World of Early Modern England (University of Chicago Press 1999), have made significant contributions toward this pursuit. Bendix’s siren song is timely, necessary, and seductive for all of us wrangling with sound and culture, even those of us who don’t yet know quite what we’re hearing.

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"YOUNG NED OF THE HILL"
AND THE REEMERGENCE OF THE IRISH RAPPAREE:
A TEXTUAL AND INTERTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

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The song "Young Ned of the Hill" by the Pogues resurrects an outlaw hero from Irish folklore and attempts to make sense of contemporary experience by appealing to a meaningful past. Through a close attention to text and intertextual references, this article considers why Ned of the Hill has reemerged as a symbolic figure, and what messages are conveyed by the song's representation of the outlaw. In particular, the song may provide commentary on the contemporary political situation in Northern Ireland. In the process of exploring how the song selectively draws from previous discourse, scholarship in folklore and linguistic anthropology help us explore broader issues in interpreting text, context, and tradition.

In 1989, the Pogues, an eclectic Irish folk/punk/rock band, included "Young Ned of the Hill," a song written by Ron Kavana and Pogues member Terry Woods, on their ironically titled album, Peace and Love. The song is somewhat remarkable as a political statement, fiercely condemning Oliver Cromwell and his ruthless seventeenth-century campaign through Ireland. However, the song's tone is also standard fare for this now defunct London-based band of mostly Irish expatriots, who cultivated an image of hard-drinking, blue-collar machismo. Perhaps more remarkable is Kavana and Woods' choice of the Irish outlaw and folk hero Ned of the Hill as their foil to Cromwell. Éamonn Ó Riain (Edmund O'Ryan), better known in Irish folklore as Éamonn an Chnoic or Ned of the Hill, was one of many Irish Catholic landholders forcibly dispossessed by English and Scottish Protestant settlers in the seventeenth century. Rather than fleeing to the continent, many like Ó Riain chose to remain in Ireland, hoping to frustrate their supplanters. Living the lives of political bandits – harassing British troops, robbing Protestant planters and landlords, and aiding the Irish poor – these men were outlawed and termed "rapparees" and "tories"1 by Crown authorities. After the historical Ó Riain's death, ballads, chapbooks, and local legends immortalized him as a Robin Hood-like resistance fighter and proto-nationalist folk hero.

Given the infrequency of contemporary published references to the folkloric Ned of the Hill (and, indeed, other political bandits from the Irish past), one might think him a symbolic figure more relevant to a previous era. Yet he reappeared on a reasonably popular album produced during a period of heightened political tension in Northern Ireland. Through several centuries, media, and reworkings, elements of Ned of the Hill's story have continued to resonate with vastly different audience – Irish, Anglo-Irish, English, and now anyone who buys Peace and Love and enjoys this song. One reason may be the purely structural appeal of the outlaw's romantic story. In a context in which justice has been divorced from law, he seizes the opportunity to simultaneously be bad and do the right thing by breaking the law. Whatever the specific reasons for its appeal to contemporary audiences, the Pogues' "Young Ned of the Hill" is a recent innovation in a long, though admittedly waning, narrative and poetic tradition concerned with Irish outlaws and one outlaw in particular. It is not a revival of an old ballad or a recounting of a folksy oral history but a modern mass-marketed product that draws in part from a larger, three-century-old discourse on Irish outlaws.2

Given the song's juxtaposition of Ned and Cromwell – resistance fighter and English invader – the song provides commentary on the role of republican paramilitary groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in contemporary
Northern Ireland, a commentary that draws on the aura of tradition for its authority. At stake is how a meaningful past is constructed and referenced in order to make sense of the present. In addition, we must ask how this is achieved given different audiences’ varying levels of familiarity with the discursive traditions from which the text is drawn.

My purpose here is to contemplate, through a close attention to text and intertextual references, why Ned has reemerged as a symbolic figure and what messages are conveyed by the representation of the outlaw in “Young Ned of the Hill.” I direct my focus more to potential interpretations of the song and their consequences, rather than to authorial intent. In the process, I will draw from scholarship in folklore and linguistic anthropology – especially the works of Richard Bauman, Charles Briggs, and William Hanks – to explore broader issues of interpreting text, context, and tradition. Before embarking on a textual analysis of “Young Ned of the Hill,” however, I should first define my use of some key terms and discuss the central issues of context and contextualization, text and entextualization. Some of this discussion may be familiar to folklorists, but the story is worth rehearsing.

**REVISITING CONTEXT AND TEXT**

**Context to Contextualization**

In the 1960s and ’70s, performance-oriented folklorists and linguistic anthropologists began to demonstrate how the form, function, and meaning of verbal art are grounded in and inseparable from situational contexts. However, identifying and delimiting exactly what constitutes context proved difficult, if not impossible, given the “infinite regress” of detail that could be included in any description of context. Further, considering context to be an amalgamation of relevant situational details that exist prior to or independent of performance allowed for a false dichotomy of text and context (Briggs 1988:12-15).

Realizing the interdependence of text and context, many scholars shifted their attention to how participants in performance constantly monitor each other and negotiate meaning (Goffman 1974), i.e., how meaning and interpretation is emergent in performance (Duranti 1994). This shift was, in part, from an untenable concept of context to contextualization – the process through which a performer embeds cues in his or her narrative that make the form and content meaningful to a specific audience (Bauman and Briggs 1990:66-72; cf. Duranti and Goodwin 1992). More than the successful communication of information relevant to an audience, the measure of a performer’s competence is his or her ability to compose a narrative that resonates aesthetically with a specific audience. By extension, competence in performance can be understood as the use of language in creating and sustaining human communities (Briggs 1988:xv). Given the role of the audience in the myriad of choices made by a performer, the audience – whether present in face-to-face interaction or imagined by the author/performer – has been identified as a co-author (Duranti and Brenneis 1986; cf. Lord 1960).³

**Text to Entextualization**

As Bauman and Briggs remind us, the reason we need to focus on context and later on contextualization is “precisely that verbal art forms are so susceptible to treatment as self-contained, bounded objects separable from their social and cultural context of production and reception” (1990:72). If texts are understood to be bounded objects, then individual performers are merely vehicles for their expression; we are stuck with an antiquarian conception of folklore as “reified, persistent cultural items” rather than a performance-inflected conception of folklore as a “mode of communicative action” (Bauman and Briggs 1990:79; see especially Ben-Amos and Hymes in Paredes and Bauman 1972).

However, Michael Silverstein and Greg Urban point out that considering texts to be extractable, autonomous units of meaning, and culture to be a shared ensemble of such texts, is appealing for both scholars and the people they study.
Seen as the building blocks of culture, texts retain specific meanings regardless of their performance contexts, can be transmitted from one generation to the next helping to replicate culture, and create the image of a durable, shared culture. Such a conceptualization of text is too simplistic, and like context, text deserves a more nuanced treatment (Silverstein and Urban 1996:1-2).

A text “can be taken (heuristically) to designate any configuration of signs that is coherently interpretable by some community of users” (Hanks 1989:95), but a text does not necessarily preexist performance any more than context does. To understand the origins and boundaries of texts, we must turn our attention to entextualization – the process through which a text is extracted from previous and surrounding discourse. From this vantage point, a text is “discourse rendered decontextualizable” (Bauman and Briggs 1990:73).

Entextualization is the basis for an entirely new direction of inquiry. Whereas previous attention to contextualization emphasized how the meanings of texts are inseparable from performance contexts, attention to entextualization forces us to consider the flip side of the coin: that is, the propositions that texts “can function and mean as wholes that are abstracted from performance” and that we can speak of the “point” of a specific text and trace its transference to, appropriation in, or reinterpretation in other texts (Braid 1996:9). Seen as a dialogic process (cf. Bakhtin 1981), entextualization makes possible the extraction and decontextualization from previous and surrounding discourse, followed by the recomposition and formalization of this discourse in a new situational context. It is the attempt to temporarily fix meaning using others’ discourse. The resulting text is a temporarily encapsulated moment of discourse, supported by intertextual reference, which itself is subject to further decontextualization and recomposition.

Implications for Interpreting “Young Ned of the Hill”

“Young Ned of the Hill” offers us unique material for a case study, not only in textual interpretation, but also in the process of entextualization. Mikhail Bakhtin reminds us that our mouths are full of the words of others (1981:293, 337), and any given performance “is tied to a number of speech events that precede and succeed it” (Bauman and Briggs 1990:60). Even though “Young Ned of the Hill” is a new song that is in its form and content unlike any previously published text commemorating Ned, it is prefigured in many ways by all previous articulations of Ned’s story. Further, even the most recent entextualization “may well incorporate aspects of [previous] context[s], such that the resultant text carries elements of its history of use within it” (Bauman and Briggs 1990:73). Thus, contextualization cues in the text will lead us to previous entextualizations of Ned’s story; I will attempt to construct a natural history of the text at hand, with reference to the many versions of Ned’s story that precede and inform the present text. In returning to the text itself, we can see, simply put, what is old and what is new. Seeing how the text draws from or reframes tradition – how it depends on the authority of tradition and/or pointedly neglects elements of discourse that have come before – helps us better understand the possible meanings and social functions of “Young Ned of the Hill.” In so doing, we also come to better understand tradition and the process of its construction: traditionalization (Hymes 1975; Bauman 1992).

The process of decontextualizing and recomposition discourse makes a new text like “Young Ned of the Hill” possible. It makes an old hero relevant to present concerns, bridges tradition and innovation. As Briggs observes:

Folkloric performances are not simply repetitions of time-worn traditions; they rather provide common ground between a shared textual tradition and a host of unique human encounters, thus preserving the vitality and dynamism of the past as they endeavor to make sense of the present.

(1988:xv)

Understanding a text like “Young Ned of the Hill” as the product of entextualization
obviates debate over the text’s traditionality, even authenticity (e.g., is it folklore or fakelore?); it helps us conceive of all texts as simultaneously traditional and innovative, of the past and of the present.

**TEXTUAL ANALYSIS**

To explore form-function-meaning interrelations in the song, I will begin with formal features of the text itself, working inside out from text to context and back again, realizing at the same time that text and context cannot be separated. As Hanks asserts, “the form of a text can give many clues to its . . . proper interpretation; but the interpretation arises only in the union between form and context” (1989:98). I take textual analysis, then, to mean the identification and exegesis of contextualization cues that make a text meaningful to an intended audience. Rejecting the notion that a text’s meaning is ever completely fixed, Hanks observes that a text requires not only the cues of an author or performer but also the interpretation of a receiver to temporarily fix meaning (1989:104-107). This is one way in which situational contexts – which include the reception of an audience, whether face-to-face or imagined – have a constitutive role in the composition of texts.

Hanks terms this interaction of performer and receiver in the creation of temporarily fixed meaning “centering” (1989:103 ff). Certainly every text has multiple meanings, but the number of possible interpretations is not infinite; meaning is “partly inscribed in textual form, and partly contested by actors” (Hanks 1989:107). Thus, when searching for the meanings a text holds for the participants in its performance, we must begin with the formal elements of text, which hold clues to the negotiation of meaning. For example, “poetic parallelism; rhythmical, metrical, phonological integration; the structure of deictic terms . . .; intertextual reference all help to regulate the centering of text” (Hanks 1989:107).

**Management of Formal Features**

In order to investigate formal features of “Young Ned of the Hill,” we must have the text before us. The lyrics are:

1. Have you ever walked the lonesome hills  
2. And heard the curlews cry  
3. Or seen the raven black as night  
4. Upon a windswept sky  
5. To walk the purple heather  
6. And hear the west wind cry  
7. To know that’s where the rapparee must die  
8. Since Cromwell pushed us westward  
9. To live our lowly lives  
10. Some of us have deemed to fight  
11. From Tipperary mountains high  
12. Noble men with wills of iron  
13. Who are not afraid to die  
14. Who’ll fight with Gaelic honour held on high  
15. A curse upon you Oliver Cromwell  
16. You who raped our motherland.  
17. I hope you’re rotting down in Hell  
18. For the horrors that you sent  
19. To our misfortunate forefathers  
20. Whom you robbed of their birthright  
21. “To Hell or Connaught” may you burn in Hell tonight  
22. Of such a man I’d like to speak  
23. A rapparee by name and deed
Cultural Analysis

“Young Ned of the Hill”

24 His family dispossessed and slaughtered
25 They put a price upon his head
26 His name is known in song and story
27 His deeds are legend still
28 And murdered for blood money
29 Was young Ned of the Hill

30 You have robbed our homes and fortunes
31 Even drove us from our land
32 You tried to break our spirit
33 But you’ll never understand
34 The love of dear old Ireland
35 That will forge an iron will
36 As long as there are gallant men
37 Like young Ned of the Hill

38 A curse upon you Oliver Cromwell
39 You who raped our motherland
40 I hope you’re rotting down in Hell
41 For the horrors that you sent
42 To our misfortunate forefathers
43 Whom you robbed of their birthright
44 “To Hell or Connaught” may you burn in Hell tonight

(Kavana and Woods 1989)

As you can see, “Young Ned of the Hill” has four stanzas and a refrain that appears after the first two stanzas and last two stanzas. The first two stanzas can be taken as a unit, consisting of seven lines each, as can the last two stanzas, consisting of eight lines each. Although the content of the song draws on traditional tropes and imagery (to be discussed), and the instrumentation identifies the musical style as specifically Irish, the structure of the song is not a traditional Irish lyric form.

As recorded on Peace and Love, the greatest musical transformation in mood is made during the first two stanzas and refrain. The first stanza is given only the sparse accompaniment of tin whistle and accordion, cultivating the “lonesome hills” imagery of the text. Then in the second stanza the tempo quickens dramatically, and bass, guitar, and bodhrán (percussion) are added, complementing the introduction in the text of those “noble men” willing to “fight with Gaelic honour held on high.” Once the “lonesome hills” have been populated in stanza two with these as yet unnamed rapparees, backup vocals join in the refrain, which pounds on in a frenetic pace to the third stanza. This orchestration and intensity is maintained until the end. Thus, given the management of tempo and instrumentation, the song follows a gradual crescendo toward the third stanza, in which Ned is finally mentioned by name, then maintains a sort of high plateau through the fourth stanza and final refrain.

Turning specifically to the content of the text, we should consider those “metalingual textual elements that refer to, describe, or otherwise characterize text itself” (Hanks 1989:107), because these signal how language may be interpreted. One form of metalanguage used throughout “Young Ned of the Hill” is deictic personal pronouns (“you,” “us,” “they,” and “I”), which indicate who is speaking and signal shifts in who is being addressed by the narrator. Demonstrating the context-dependent nature of meaning, deixis not only anchors utterances in context (Levinson 1988:163), it also creates context (Hanks 1989:70).

Taking the different indexical uses of “you” as a guide, we see that deictics posit a narrator and a listener, suggesting an imagined narrative event as a frame for the song, and point us to the man responsible for Ned’s downfall and Ireland’s woes (a move that might be understood, after more explanation, as the purpose of the song as a whole). In line 1, “you” refers to an imagined listener in an imagined storytelling event, and we the audience of the song are the targeted
listeners. In line 22, “Of such a man I’d like to speak,” the imagined narrator (“I”) identifies himself in announcing his shift to speaking exclusively of Ned. The line as a whole is metanarration4 that further establishes the frame of the song as an imagined storytelling event. Through the narrator, Kavana and Woods ask us, the audience of the song, if we know Ned’s story. Asking the question admits the possibility that we do not, so the rest of the song tells us all that we need to know about Ned, according the writers. This is the first indication that Kavana and Woods may be writing for contemporary audiences who are not familiar with Ned’s story or rapparee lore in general.

Positing a narrator (“I”) and a listener (“you”) – one who knows the story and one who does not – helps grant the narrator authority. The narrator asks the listener if he or she knows the desolation of the “lonesome hills” in the same way a storyteller would make a bid to begin a story about something he has experienced. The deictics “us” (lines 8 and 10) and “our” (line 9) in the second stanza identify a group of Cromwell’s victims, described as noble and brave in their resistance. By counting himself a member of the “us” with “wills of iron” who have “deemed to fight,” the narrator may be claiming to be a contemporary, even a colleague, of Ned.

Whether or not the narrator is literally Ned’s contemporary does not matter for the central message of the song, in which affinity is more important than temporality. In order to clearly define an “us” group and a “them” group, the narrator indicates that, “Since Cromwell pushed us westward” (line 8) – from the mid-seventeenth century onwards indefinitely – everyone who resists English colonization is effectively part of the same solidarity. As we shall see, positing an “us” and a “them” has important implications for twentieth-century audiences understanding the song as a commentary on political conflict in Northern Ireland. What is important for the narrator’s authority is his insinuation that his knowledge of the “lowly lives” (line 9) of men on the run is from personal experience. The narrator, then, is credible possibly as Ned’s fellow resistance fighter, and therefore a “gallant” man.

Although “you” in line 1 refers to an imagined listener, “you” in the refrain (lines 15-18, 2021, 38-41, 43-44) and probably in stanza four (lines 30, 32-33) refers to Cromwell and signals a shift in attention from the characters of the imagined speech event (narrator and listener) to the antagonist in the story of Ned’s life. Not only is Cromwell addressed, in the third stanza he is cursed with, “A curse upon you...” and “may you burn in Hell tonight.” The narrator’s curse on Cromwell ironically appropriates and turns on its head a curse directed at the Irish, traditionally attributed to Cromwell – “To Hell or Connaught,” i.e., “move westward or die.” The curse on Cromwell is performative speech. In doing social work, it has illocutionary force – the act of saying the curse accomplishes it, and therefore sends Cromwell’s soul to Hell. Its perlocutionary force is persuading the song’s audience of Cromwell’s unparalleled wickedness. The curse also has potential perlocutionary force in the wider socio-political world outside the song if it compels audience members to defy in some way the dispossession and colonialism that Cromwell stands for in the song.

One curiosity is that, for a song entitled “Young Ned of the Hill,” the protagonist is mentioned by name only twice, briefly, and not until the second to last stanza. In fact, only one of the four stanzas, the third, is entirely devoted to him, whereas Cromwell is introduced in the second stanza and remains the narrator’s addressee in the refrains and possibly in the fourth stanza. The lyrics provide meager information about Ned, although they establish that Ned was prompted to become a rapparee as a result of his family being dispossessed and slaughtered. Consequently, the English put a price upon his head for which he was murdered.

On one hand, the song depends on its audience’s familiarity with other texts and other genres that provide the details of Ned’s legend: “His name is known in song and story/His deeds are legend still,” (lines 26-27). Familiarity with these would provide a listener with a fuller appreciation of Ned’s cultural resonance and therefore of the significance of his appearance in Kavana and Woods’ song. In a way, this lack of narrative elaboration is typical of traditional Irish song, which “Young Ned of the Hill” emulates in instrumentation and imagery. Complemented
by a rich narrative tradition, Irish song tends not to tell a complete story; it tends to reference people and events through a few select details that cue one’s memory of or pique one’s interest in a longer narrative (Glassie 1982:275, 755 n. 5). On the other hand, Kavana and Woods give us only what we need to know about Ned in order for them to communicate their message about noble resistance and villainous aggression. As we shall see, too much knowledge of Ned’s deeds in song and story might unravel the authoritative image of Kavana and Woods’ song.

Whether Ned’s brief treatment is the result of Kavana and Woods’ emulation of traditional Irish song, their conscious decision to write for a relatively uninformed audience, their ignorance of Ned’s legend, or some combination thereof; Ned’s function in the song is minor in light of the song’s significant preoccupation with Cromwell. The curse on Cromwell appears in the refrain, the only repeated part of the song. The refrains are the concluding remarks after the two structural units of stanzas one and two and stanzas three and four. The curse appears in the one section with an implied participatory structure. In face-to-face performance contexts, the refrain is the part in which the audience would feel most free to join in the singing; it is the section in which social accord is focused and achieved.

The choice of Cromwell as antagonist and the frequency and ferocity of his condemnation deserve consideration, for he is not necessarily the clear choice for Ned’s foil. As an historic person, Éamonn Ó Riain was an active rapparee in late seventeenth and early-eighteenth century County Tipperary, long after Cromwell’s death in 1658. William III, victor of the Battle of the Boyne and institutor of the anti-Catholic Penal Laws, was Cromwell’s counterpart in Ned’s day and would have served as an equally recognizable nemesis.

Kavana and Woods’ choice of Cromwell may be intentional rather than the result of faulty historical research: the narrator does specify that Cromwell robbed his “forefathers … of their birthright” (lines 19-20 and 42-43). Though somewhat jarring for the historian, the choice of Cromwell is appropriately resonant for Irish audiences given Cromwell’s long-standing place in Irish popular imagination as the archetypical anti-hero and quintessential evil invader. Several historical tales depict him in league with the Devil. One tells of Cromwell leaving instructions to be buried in Ireland after the Irish seer Mac Amhlaoibh (Mac Auliffe) predicted Cromwell’s power in Ireland would last as long as he remained in the country. After burial, the very soil of Ireland rejected Cromwell’s body and cast it into the Irish Sea, which as a result is turbulent to this day (S. O’Sullivan 1976:479-80; Ó hÓgáin 1991:128-31). Twentieth-century scholarly works on Cromwell are hardly less partisan or exaggerated in tone (see, for example, Ellis 1975 and MacManus 1921, especially chapters 50-51).

True, Ned is the song’s namesake; he embodies the heroic resistance fighter who is martyred for a just cause and is clearly intended as the more sympathetic character. But the song fixates on the injustice Cromwell inflicts and embodies, and the overall point of this entextualization in the discourse on Ned of the Hill lies in the song’s references to Cromwell. Once the irredeemable Cromwell is identified as the face of English conquest and oppression, it does not matter who Ned’s individual adversaries are. Historical context is irrelevant in the shadow of Cromwell’s singular infamy, and the authorities who would hang the rapparee are identified generically with the deictic personal pronoun “they” as in line 25, “They put a price upon his head.” To whom “you” refers in lines 30, 32, and 33 of the fourth stanza is left ambiguous. “You” may refer to Cromwell specifically but may also refer to the same unnamed people “they” does in line 25.

Were the song simply a commentary on the political situation in seventeenth-century Ireland, we could interpret “they” in line 25 and “you” in the fourth stanza to mean the English army – all those murderous pillagers of whom Cromwell is the most infamous example. The song would personify both sides – the Irish as Ned and the English as Cromwell – and characterize only seventeenth-century conflict in rigid binary terms: Irish/English, good/bad. Yet by leaving the historical period in question open to any time “Since Cromwell pushed us westward” (line 8), Kavana and Woods allow “they” to mean any party that oppresses “us,” those Irishmen at any time since Cromwell who “have deemed to fight” (line 10).
The most significant categories established are not necessarily Irish and English but “us” and “them.” These categories are ambiguous enough to include whoever fits these slots from the seventeenth century to the present. They are also rigid enough to establish only two sides and declare that any given historical actor – whether Young Irelander, Land Leaguer, or IRA volunteer in the nationalist/republican tradition, and whether Protestant yeoman, marching Orangeman, or UVF paramilitary in the unionist/loyalist tradition – is either on the right side or the wrong side. In this way, Kavana and Woods achieve in their song a decontextualized, uncomplicated, and clear-cut vision of blame in Anglo-Irish and Protestant-Catholic relations throughout Irish history. We will return to this point.

Intertextual References

As the brief discussion of Cromwell’s symbolic resonance for Irish audiences demonstrates, textual analysis can only go so far before extending into the wider social and historical contexts that shape a text in its present form. Any given text is necessarily heteroglossic and in many ways prefigured by preexisting texts. Explaining the literary term “heteroglossia,” derived from Bakhtin, James Diedrick observes that, “Whatever the artistic intention of a given author, he or she must make use of a pre-existing language that is already informed by the social intentions of other authors” (1993:552). No text is a closed, self-sufficient system, and all language contains traces of past discourse that bear upon its meaning. As such, we should consider previous entextualizations of Ned’s story to better understand “Young Ned of the Hill.”

The text itself points us to “song and story” that recount Ned’s deeds, so continuing for now in the same genre, we should consider previous songs commemorating Ned. Whereas other famous Irish outlaws such as William Brennan, James Freeney, and Redmond O’Hanlon are represented in numerous songs and ballads, Éamonn Ó Riain appears in relatively few. The two extant published lyric texts concerning Ned are a folksong in Gaelic, “Éamonn an Chnoic” (with various spellings and versions), and a short literary ballad, “Ned of the Hill,” composed by Samuel Lover, the nineteenth-century Anglo-Irish novelist, painter, and amateur folklorist.

Like “Young Ned of the Hill,” “Éamonn an Chnoic” tells only a fraction of Ned’s biography as it is found in oral narrative traditions. The lyrics are framed as a conversation between Éamonn and his lover in which Éamonn seeks shelter from the inhospitable wilderness and bemoans his life as a wanted man. Here is a literal English translation of a representative version:

“Who is that without
With passion in his voice
That beats at my bolted door?”
I am Éamonn an Chnoic,
Drenched, numbed, and wet
From long walking mountains and valleys."
My dearest, my treasure,
What should I do for you
But cover you with the skirt of my dress?
For black gunpowder
Will be thickly shot at us,
And we should perish together.”

“Long am I abroad
In snow and in frost,
Not daring to approach any man,
My fallow unsown,
My horses unloosened,
And they lost to me entirely.
Friends I have none (I grieve for that)
Who would harbour me early or late,
And so I must go eastward over the sea,
For it is there I have no kindred.

(D. O’Sullivan 1960:151)

As in “Young Ned of the Hill,” wherein Ned has given a glimpse of the rapparee’s miserable life with a “price upon his head,” (line 25), here too, Ned can trust no one and is constantly looking over his shoulder for those who would betray him. In both songs, unjust dispossession is protested. In the above version of “Éamonn an Chnoic,” Éamonn laments that his land is left uncultivated and his horses are confiscated. In other versions, he more directly laments being robbed of his birthright when announcing himself to his lover: “It is Éamonn an Chnoic, will you not let me in./Who am seeking my own rightful land?” (D. O’Sullivan 1930:36) and “It is Éamonn an Chnoic you have here./And proscribed is he now in his own country” (D. O’Sullivan 1930:41).

Being outside the law, the rapparee lives outside society and is identified with nature. In the wilderness, he is isolated from the comfort of human contact and the support of friends and family – “Friends I have none (I grieve for that)/Who would harbour me early or late.” The “lonesome hills” and “windswept sky” described in the first stanza of “Young Ned of the Hill” are reminiscent of the mountains and valleys Éamonn wanders in the cold, damp, and frost. The themes of isolation from society and suffering in the wilderness are common in other rapparee songs, such as “The Wild Rapparee” from County Fermanagh attests:

How green are the fields that are washed by the Finn.
How grand are the homes that those Peelers live in.
How fresh are the crops in the valleys to see,
But the heath is the home of the wild rapparee.

Ah, way out on the moors where the wind shrieks and howls,
Sure, he’ll find his lone home there amongst the wild fowl.
No one there to welcome, no comrade has he.
Ah, God help the poor outlaw, the wild rapparee.

(Glassie 1982:110)

Just as Young Ned of the Hill lives and dies in the “purple heather” (line 5), “The Wild Rapparee” makes his “lone home” in the heath, while his suppliants live in grand homes, tending their fresh crops in green fields and valleys. In addition to the desolate wilderness imagery, the soundscape is the same in “Young Ned of the Hill” and “The Wild Rapparee.” The curlews and the west wind cry where Ned spends his days, and “out on the moors” where the Wild Rapparee fends for himself, “the wind shrieks and howls.” In using conventional themes and imagery of older rapparee lyrics, Kavana and Woods connect their song with those that have come before and appeal to the authority of tradition. They supply “Young Ned of the Hill” with elements of past discourse that are already meaningful and resonant, “already informed by the social intentions of other authors” (Diedrick 1993:552).

However, there are important and telling differences. In “Young Ned of the Hill,” the rapparee’s miserable life is recounted to highlight his bravery and sacrifice in contrast to Cromwell’s wickedness. In “Éamonn an Chnoic” and “The Wild Rapparee,” too, the rapparee’s hardships are offered so that we may better appreciate his heroism. Yet in these two songs we are invited more explicitly to sympathize with the rapparee as an individual, or at least to pity him. In “Éamonn an Chnoic,” he is drenched, pounding at a bolted door, and imploring for help “With passion in his voice.” In one version of the song, his lover and only ally, actually rejects him:

“You are harder than steel or limestone
And your heart is a rock, fair lady;
You never come at night to lie down by my side
And relieve me of part of my pain!
“I would rather be lying for a quarter and a month
On a hard, narrow bed, husbandless,
Than to have your babe at my breast or on my arm at night,
With you away courting your fancy!”

(D. O’Sullivan 1930:37)

“The Wild Rapparee” includes the line, “Ah, God help the poor outlaw, the wild rapparee,” and ends with the following scene:

There’s a stone-covered grave on the wild mountainside.
There’s a plain wooden cross on which this is inscribed:
Kneel down, dear stranger, say an Ave for me,
I was sentenced to death being a wild rapparee.

(Glassie 1982:110)

Laments and entreaties to pray for the dead or dying outlaw are also common in other rapparee songs. Solicitation of sympathy in “Eamonn an Chnoic,” “The Wild Rapparee,” and other songs fleshes out the rapparee’s humanity and vulnerability, lending rapparee lore a sense of romantic quasi-defeatism.

In contrast, the thrust of “Young Ned of the Hill” is to vigorously condemn English oppression. Ned’s defeat solicits anger and indignation, not commiseration. Ned functions in the song as little more than the face of heroic defiance against aggression and injustice. We only need the briefest outline of his biography – Ned was dispossessed, he fought back, and he was murdered – to appreciate “the horrors” Cromwell brought to Ireland and to join in the refrain, cursing Cromwell and all he stands for. Older rapparee songs flaunt boastful defiance, and I have argued elsewhere that all Irish outlaw lore in general provides commentary on social justice (Cashman 2000). But I have yet to come across any rapparee song from oral tradition or prenineteenth-century broadsides that, like “Young Ned of the Hill,” singles out and curses to Hell an English governmental figure; reduces all parties opposing Irish resistance to “they,” the “bad guys” (line 25); or directly addresses these “bad guys,” claiming that they will never break the Irish spirit because of the iron wills of her gallant men (second stanza).

Although Samuel Lover’s “Ned of the Hill” shares some themes with “Eamonn an Chnoic,” it has almost nothing in common with Kavana and Woods’ “Young Ned of the Hill.” Nevertheless, it provides an interesting example of how differently the same discourse can be entextualized given the social and political intentions of an author. Even in its rejection of the ways in which a text such as Lover’s “Ned of the Hill” is contextualized, “Young Ned of the Hill” is prefigured by previous entextualizations of Ned’s story.

Published in 1839, “Ned of the Hill” post-dates and probably draws inspiration from the romantic and pastoral themes of “Eamonn an Chnoic.” As an amateur folklorist, Lover was almost certainly familiar with “Eamonn an Chnoic,” and given his flair for using folktales as frames for his literary sketches of stage Irishness (see Lover 1834), appropriation would have come naturally for him. “Ned of the Hill” appears in Lover’s collection of mostly love songs, many collected and others composed by fellow Anglo-Irish antiquarians. The text follows:

Dark is the evening and silent the hour:
Who is the minstrel by yonder love tow’r?
His harp all so tenderly touching with skill
Oh, who should it be but Ned of the Hill!
Who sings, “Lady love, come to me now,
Come and live merrily under the bough,
And I’ll pillow thy head,
Where the fairies tread,
If thou wilt but wed with Ned of the Hill

Ned of the Hill has no castle nor hall,
Nor spearmen nor bowmen to come at his call;
But one little archer, of exquisite skill,
Has shot a bright shaft for Ned of the Hill,
Who sings, “Lady love, come to me now,
Come and live merrily under the bough,
And I’ll pillow thy head,
Where the fairies tread,
If thou wilt but wed with Ned of the Hill

’Tis hard to escape from that fair lady’s bower,
For high is the window, and guarded the tower,
“But there’s always a way where there is a will,”
So Ellen is off with Ned of the Hill
Who sings, “Lady love, come to me now,
Come and live merrily under the bough,
And I’ll pillow thy head,
Where the fairies tread,
If thou wilt but wed with Ned of the Hill
For Ellen is bride to Ned of the Hill!

(Lover 1839:36-37)

As in “Éamonn an Chnoic,” the setting of “Ned of the Hill” is the wilderness, but one transformed from the inhospitable margins of society into fantasy forests and glades “where the fairies tread.” The imagery of desperation and danger, too, are transformed with romantic antiquarian language such as “If thou wilt” and “yonder love tow’r.” Ned himself becomes a wandering minstrel.

Again as with “Éamonn an Chnoic,” Lover’s “Ned of the Hill” depicts Ned approaching his lover, but he has come to woo, not to seek shelter from his assailants. Lover’s introductory note tells us: “Many legends are extant of this romantic minstrel freebooter, whose predatory achievements sometimes extended to the hearts of the gentle sex.” Were it not for this mention of Ned as a “freebooter,” we would know him from this text as simply a minstrel pursuing his “Lady love.” Even the term “freebooter” skirts the political significance of his life as a seditious rapparee. Whatever extra-legal activities he engages in simply lend him more glamour. His “predatory achievements” can only be surmised to be the sort of apolitical adventures of English “gentlemen of the highway,” such as Dick Turpin and William Nevison, which were popular in chapbooks and broadsides of the time (see Seal 1996:49-68).

Like sentimental stereotypes of attractive ‘colleens’ and servile ‘Paddys,’ “Ned of the Hill” reflects nineteenth-century English and Anglo-Irish attitudes towards the Irish as being of little political threat. Men such as Lover and Thomas Keightley depicted the Irish as childlike and compelled by their passions and harmless superstitions, very much like Whites in the United States portrayed Black slaves during this period. As the romantic loner-hero of the wild, Ned escapes childishness and servility in Lover’s song, but Lover erases all politically controversial elements from Ned’s story. He has no “spearmen nor bowmen,” and the only shots fired are Cupid’s. The collection in which “Ned of the Hill” appears includes no historical ballads and certainly no pro-Irish rhetoric, and it even offers one song in praise of Queen Victoria (who a decade later would be known by Irish nationalists as “the Famine Queen”). Lover’s text demonstrates well that the way in which an author makes use of preexisting discourse – i.e., how an author decontextualizes and recontextualizes discourse – is an act of control and an exercise of social power. Entextualization is an instrument of authority (cf. Hanks 1989:119; Bauman and Briggs 1990:76).

The lyrics of “Young Ned of the Hill” state that Ned’s “deeds are legend still” (line 27), so for details of his larger story that an informed audience might bring to this song we should turn to published, oral narrative traditions. As mentioned, Ned has a relatively minor function in “Young Ned of the Hill” as a foil to Cromwell. As such – and because probably no audience would be familiar with all entextualizations of Ned’s story – there is no need to report the fullest account of
Ned’s legend that can be gleaned from folklore. But identifying the themes or motifs cued in the text of “Young Ned of the Hill,” and comparing them to those not cued, helps us better understand Kavana and Woods’ recontextualization of Ned’s story and Ned’s function within their text. Those themes and motifs not cued in “Young Ned of the Hill” again suggest that either Kavana and Woods were uninformed authors, or that they were not writing primarily for a well-informed audience and therefore felt free to take liberties with the contents of previous discourse as long as their text’s image of traditionality and authority was maintained.

“Young Ned of the Hill” tells us that his family was “dispossessed and slaughtered” (line 24). Oral traditions and land records confirm that Éamonn Ó Riain was born into a relatively wealthy family at Knockmeoll Castle, Atshanbohy, County Tipperary, and that his family had lost a substantial portion of their estate during Cromwell’s campaign (Freeman 1920-1922:285; Ryan 1930:52; D. O’Sullivan 1960:151). I have found no oral, lyric, literary, or historical accounts of his family being slaughtered, although this was certainly true for other Catholic landholders who resisted Cromwell. Perhaps this is a matter of conflation. Or, granting Kavana and Woods poetic license, we can accept that claiming Ned’s family was slaughtered is a concise and convenient way to give Ned a good reason to become an outlaw without too much explanation in the one stanza allotted him.

Oral traditions refer to more complicated circumstances for Ned’s career choice. Two texts from the Irish Folklore Commission archives tell roughly the same story (in Ó hÓgáin 1985:186 and Ó Catháin 1982:18). Ned is studying for the priesthood in France when his father becomes ill, prompting Ned to return home. During Ned’s visit, the local sheriff seizes the only cow of a neighboring widow who cannot pay her rent. Ned and several neighbors help rescue the cow and drive off the bailiffs, and in the struggle, one of the bailiffs is killed. Ned shoulders the blame and takes to the hills. Soon he gathers a band of men, and together they harass the local authorities, stealing from the rich and giving to the poor. Ned and his band are also instrumental as irregular soldiers in Patrick Sarsfield’s army, supporting James II in his war with William III. After 1691 and Jacobite defeats at the Boyne, Aughrim Hill, and Limerick, many Irish soldiers, known as “the Wild Geese,” fled to the continent, joining Irish brigades in the Catholic countries of Europe. Ned and his band, however, remain in Ireland to continue their raids on Protestant landlords and the English military (Ryan 1930:52; Ó Catháin 1982:18; Ó hÓgáin 1985:186). Curiously enough, Ned’s service in the Jacobite army is not alluded to in “Young Ned of the Hill,” though this overtly political element of his biography could have lent more support to the nationalistic thrust of the song.

“Young Ned of the Hill” continues with, “They put a price upon his head” (line 25), and indeed, a proclamation offering a £200 reward for Ned’s capture dates from 1702 (D. O’Sullivan 1960:151). What the song does not mention is that, at least according to folklore, Ned was eventually pardoned. Two stories, recorded in several variants, explain his pardon. The first depicts Ned guiding a hunt for two English army officers. Once the officers are out of ammunition, Ned reveals his identity and holds the Englishmen at gunpoint. Ned assures them that he does not intend to kill them, relieves them of their money and weapons, and writes them a note addressed to the other rapparees in the vicinity to guarantee the officers’ safe passage. The two officers are so thankful for Ned’s treatment that he does not intend to kill them, relieves them of their money and weapons, and writes them a note addressed to the other rapparees in the vicinity to guarantee the officers’ safe passage. The two officers are so thankful for Ned’s treatment that they secure his pardon (Ó Catháin 1982:201; Ó hÓgáin 1985:186-87). The second explanation of Ned’s pardon tells us that a “common robber”—or worse, one claiming to be Ned or one of his followers—robbed a substantial sum from a Mrs. Maude of Dundrum, the wife of an English landlord who is away at the time of the crime. Incensed that someone would tarnish his reputation for fairness by acting so unchivalrously to a lady, Ned tracks down the robber, punishes him, and returns the money to Mrs. Maude. Upon his return, the husband is so grateful that he procures a pardon for Ned (Ó hÓgáin 1991:344; D. O’Sullivan 1960:151-60; cf. Ryan 1930:57)

In both stories, Ned lives by a moral code that obliges him to defend the
underdog and to enforce that others not prey on the vulnerable. Living by his code guarantees that his actions are heroic as opposed to merely criminal, and his integrity gains him the respect, cooperation, and pardon of his enemies. In the first story, he is willing to take the money and weapons of men who are unjustly rich and armed to keep wealth from his constituents, but he cannot justify killing them. In the second, Ned judges the robber to be out of line not only in his imposture but especially in taking advantage of a member of “the weaker sex.” Ned encounters English people in both stories and treats them fairly; he is not prejudiced against them simply because they are English. Through invasion and colonization, the English had divorced justice from law in Ireland, but Ned’s fight is with injustice, not a nationality. In contrast to “Young Ned of the Hill,” these stories offer commentary on social justice rather than a forum for blame or inspiration for gallant men to “fight with Gaelic honor held on high” (line 14).

Despite the pardon, the price on Ned’s head is his downfall, according to both oral traditions and Kavana and Woods’ song: “And murdered for blood money/Was Young Ned of the Hill” (lines 28-29). What the song does not mention—and what would make its message more complicated—is that oral traditions tell us that Ned was murdered by his own kin. A fosterbrother or cousin by the name of O’Dwyer (Ned’s mother’s maiden name) sheltered him, and once Ned was asleep, O’Dwyer chopped his head off with an axe. Hoping to collect the reward, O’Dwyer then took the head to the authorities in Clonmel but was disappointed to find that Ned had already been officially pardoned (Ó Catháin 1982:20; Ó hÓgáin 1985:187; Ryan 1930:5758). Ned’s destruction is consistent with almost all Irish outlaw legends: the rapparee can only be defeated by foul or unfair means, most often through betrayal. This common motif of betrayal by confederates not only enhances the rapparee’s quasi-martyr status in Irish folklore, but also prevents any clear-cut distinctions being made between “us” and “them” in rapparee lore. “Young Ned of the Hill,” however, is invested in clearly defining the line between the solidarity of Ireland’s gallant men and the homogeneity of Cromwell’s villainous crew and their successors. Admitting betrayal by the very community Ned defends and supports would problematize the simplistic view of Anglo-Irish conflict offered by “Young Ned of the Hill.”

Other elements of Ned’s story in oral tradition that are not referenced in “Young Ned of the Hill” include his many daring escapes; his clever use of disguise; his taste for the finest clothes, horses, and weapons; and his various schemes for stealing from the rich and giving to the poor. Many of these are migratory traits and motifs attached to other rapparees in Irish folklore. Were “Young Ned of the Hill” to reference more of these traits and motifs, Ned would have a more important role in the song than that of a two-dimensional foil to Cromwell; the nationalistic message of the song would necessarily be subtler, as are the messages embedded in older songs and stories concerned with Ned and other rapparees. Certainly, the rapparee’s actions portrayed in older folklore have political implications that invite nationalistic interpretations, but explicit antagonism toward a specific English ruler is unique to “Young Ned of the Hill” (cf. Seal 1996:15, 78). In older Irish entextualizations of outlaw lore (late-seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries), the main function of Ned and other rapparees is to enforce social justice and embody a moral, even Christian, proposition: the last will be first, and the first will be last (Matthew 19:30, Mark 10:31). If the rapparee breaks his moral code, then he is defeated or humbled, as are Redmond O’Hanlon and William Brennan in their attempts to rob poor or younger tradesmen (Ó hÓgáin 1985:185; Seal 1996:74). The focus in the majority of older rapparee lore—especially in prose narrative traditions—is not on the struggle between two nations or political affiliations but the struggle to redress inequality, to defend the vulnerable, and to elevate the lowly.

CONCEIVING A PRESENT, APPEALING TO A PAST

Entextualization involves the decontextualization and recontextualization of discourse, which is ultimately an act of control and an exercise of social power. Lover, for example, carefully made Ned an uncontroversial figure for his English
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and Anglo-Irish audiences in his “Ned of the Hill” by excluding all references to dispossession and Ned’s political significance as a rapparee. Between the oral historical accounts summarized previously and “Young Ned of the Hill,” there is a shift in the interpretation of Ned as the enforcer of social justice to Ned as the nationalist anti-Cromwell. Like Lover’s appropriation of “Éamonn an Chnoic” (and unknown other texts), the decontextualization and recontextualization of discourse achieved in “Young Ned of the Hill” is also the result of a shift in who is in control of the discourse. Yet whereas Lover’s text reflects a shift in intended audience and author’s social intentions localized in the mid-nineteenth century, Kavana and Woods’ text—when compared to its precursors—reflects a gradual shift in the Irish political climate, even zeitgeist, from the late-eighteenth century to the present. “Young Ned of the Hill” bears witness to what Bauman and Briggs call “the nationalization of culture as it is appropriated in the service of [cultural nationalist ideology]” (1990:78).

Reconceiving Ireland as a cultural unity and as a nation with the right to independence required the reinterpretation of traditional texts, including rapparee stories and songs. These rapparee texts have a role to play in granting the IRA and other republican paramilitary groups the legitimacy of being part of a longer, heroic tradition of armed resistance to English colonization. When Henry Glassie recorded Theresa Rooney’s 1972 singing of “The Wild Rapparee” in County Fermanagh, he was aware that rapparee stories and songs were performed as thinly veiled commentaries on the just cause of the IRA in post-partition Northern Ireland (personal communication, 2/28/96). In her dissertation, Margaret Steiner noted how singers in Newtownbutler, County Fermanagh, avoided singing about rapparees in the company of Protestants for fear of seeming to support armed struggle now carried on by the IRA (1988:113). During my own fieldwork in County Tyrone, 1998-1999, a few people I spoke with made a direct comparison between the rapparees of history and the modern IRA. I asked an elderly man and a middle-aged man near Killeter about rapparees, and the first replied, “Well they were out of circulation by my time! But I heard them talking about Proinsias Dubh, singing on Brennan on the Moor in Segronan. There were always rebels in this country, you see.” The second man added, “Aye, well, it’s the same as the present day Troubles, you know. That Proinsias Dubh, he was the same thing as the present IRA.” This cognitive connection between rapparees and selfconsciously republican groups (e.g., United Irishmen, Young Ireland, Irish Republican Brotherhood, Irish Republican Army and Sinn Féin) may well have motivated the Clancy Brothers and Tommy Makem to include a version of “Éamonn an Chnoic” on their album Irish Songs of Rebellion (1963). The conceptualization of the rapparee as a nationalist or protonationalist explains why a song with only limited political content beyond the mention of dispossession would be included on an album that contains other key rebel songs such as “The Rising of the Moon,” “The Minstrel Boy,” “Kevin Barry,” and “Men of the West.”

Since the United Irishmen of the 1790s, the nationalization of Irish culture has also been achieved through new entextualizations of previous and surrounding discourse (Thuente 1994), and “Young Ned of the Hill” can be read as a contemporary example of this process. On one hand, collecting folklore, for example, is a new valuation and interpretation of previous texts that can persuade people that they have a unique, durable, and shared culture and therefore a “natural” right to exist as a nation. On the other, new texts can provide more direct assertions of nationalist ideology than can reworked old texts, but they must appear to partake of and emerge from the durable and shared culture that cultural nationalism requires as a prerequisite to nationhood.

In order to grant a new entextualization like “Young Ned of the Hill” the authority of tradition, an author can employ what Bauman, after Dell Hymes, calls traditionalization: the “active construction of connections that link the present [text] with a meaningful past” (1992:136). As we have seen, Kavana and Woods make use of traditional characters, tropes, imagery, and even instrumentation in “Young Ned of the Hill.” In fact, their overtures to tradition are almost indiscriminate. The text of “Young Ned of the Hill” can be read as a sampler of lyrical styles...
including the sentimentality of the folksong in the first stanza, the defiance of nineteenth-century Young Ireland song writers in the second, and the broadside tone of “Of such a man I’d like to speak” in the third. In this way, Kavanagh and Woods not only contextualize but attempt to authenticate their song by leaving bare the traces of its provenance— “His name is known in song and story/ His deeds are legend still” (lines 26, 27).9

“Young Ned of the Hill” can be “valued because of what you can use [it] for . . . or for [its] indexical reference to desired qualities or states” (Bauman and Briggs 1990:77). In 1970s Northern Ireland, “The Wild Rapparee” provided a nationalist community with a sense of legitimacy through the symbolic construction of continuity with a meaningful past. The same may be said of legends of Proinsias Dubh in contemporary southwest Tyrone. “Young Ned of the Hill” may well have the same function and provide the same commentary for nationalist communities today. In the 1990 film Hidden Agenda—the story of American civil rights investigators embroiled in the combat between the IRA and British security forces—“Young Ned of the Hill” features as the background music in an “authentic” Falls Road, Belfast IRA public house. Employing the song in this way reflects an identification made in popular imagination of Ned as a forerunner of the contemporary IRA gunman. It is an identification that appropriates the rapparee of folklore for a contemporary debate over the use of violence in politics; that wrests control of discourse about the IRA as a terrorist organization, recasting it as an organization of freedom fighters; and that grants the contemporary gunman or bomber a principled image and a legitimizing connection with tradition.

As a text, “Young Ned of the Hill” can be viewed “as a form of cultural capital, . . . as a mode of naturalizing and familiarizing social realities, as an instrument of authority, and as the medium (and the measure) of political debate” (Hanks 1989:119). Through its contrast of Ned and Cromwell, it has the potential perlocutionary force to further instill a “love of dear old Ireland” and to “forge an iron will” (lines 34-35). In addition to the aura of traditionality, one of the “desired qualities or states” (Bauman and Briggs 1990:77) the song affords is the simplistic vision of Anglo-Irish conflict that establishes only two opposing parties—a wronged but resilient Irish one and a villainous English one to whom all blame can be assigned.

In the contemporary context of Northern Ireland in which innocent people have lost their lives in a violent triangulation between various Catholic republican paramilitaries, Protestant loyalist paramilitaries, and British security forces, being able to confidently assign right and wrong to only two sides would certainly be a desired state for anyone attempting to choose a morally informed course of action. As an allegory for contemporary political conflict in Northern Ireland, “Young Ned of the Hill” is an attempt to provide that assignment of virtue and blame and to render the world in black and white. If the IRA volunteer can be equated with the rapparee of folklore, he, too, partakes of the transgressive power and appeal of one who can simultaneously be bad and do the right thing by breaking the law. He, too, is a heroic outlaw enforcing social justice and invoking laws higher than those legislated at the expense of the oppressed.

Formal features of “Young Ned of the Hill” have led us to both contextualization cues and the history of the process of its entextualization, and both have guided our understanding of the present text’s potential meanings. “Young Ned of the Hill” is an attempt to fix—though inevitably temporarily—the meaning and significance of almost three centuries of discourse concerned with the life of Éamonn O’Riain, rapparee. Expanding our focus to the social and historical contexts of which it is a part, we see “Young Ned of the Hill” as an attempt to make sense of contemporary experience and predicaments by appealing to a meaningful past through textual traditions considered relevant and authoritative.

Notes

1. Concerning the derivations of the terms ‘tory’ and ‘rapparee,’ the earlier term, ‘tory,’ comes from the Irish tórai, meaning “pursuer, raider.” It first appears in print in 1645,
though it was most likely used in spoken language much earlier (Marshall 1927:11; Duffy 1982:11). The roughly synonymous term ‘rapparee’ was coined shortly after the English Civil War, 1642-1649, overlapping in usage with ‘tory.’ It was probably derived from the French word for a half-pike, rápaire, a common weapon of the time (Croker 1985:54). An alternate etymology explains that rapparee comes from ropaire, the Irish term for robber, itself borrowed from English (Ó Catháin 1982:7). By the end of the reign of Charles II, radical Protestants in English parliament who formed the Whig faction labeled the mostly Anglican supporters of the Catholic James II “Tories,” a derogatory term conjuring images of rebellion and subservience to Rome. Making a clear distinction between the Tories of English parliament and the Irish outlaws, the term rapparee became the more popular term by the time of the Williamite War of 1689-1691.


3. Both the attention to context and the later shift to contextualization were correctives in a sense. For over a century, folklore collectors had extracted texts from the world of social interaction, archiving them in alien settings like items on “grocer’s bills,” as W. B. Yeats complained (1986 [1888]:viii). Historic geographic work and the scientistic categorizations of type and motif indexes easily decontextualized texts, ignoring artistry and obscuring situated meanings. Worst of all for the humanist, understanding, revering, and conserving folklore texts as objects obscured the agency of individual performers and audience members, allowing us to conceive of “the folk” as merely anonymous, passive tradition bearers. Bearing witness to the construction of meaning in the social interaction of performance— in other words, focusing on contextualization— affirms the status of individuals as artful and reflective agents. Through a consideration of contextualization over the last twenty to thirty years, many folklorists have come to understandings such as the following: “Performers are not passive, unreflecting creatures who simply respond to the dictates of tradition or the physical and social environment. They interpret both traditions and social settings, actively transforming both in the course of their performances” (Briggs 1988:7).

4. Bauman describes metanarration as “those devices that index or comment on the narrative itself . . . or on the components or conduct of the storytelling event” (1986:98; drawn from Babcock 1977).

5. Even people with only the slightest investment in an Irish identity know Cromwell as the villain from Irish history. My grandfather— a second-generation Irish-American who didn’t know Daniel O’Connell from Darby O’Gill— made a point of spitting whenever anyone (usually himself) mentioned the name Cromwell.

6. Although it may be an over simplification, for our purposes republicanism can be understood as the militant subset of Irish nationalism. In other words, nationalists are the people, mostly Catholics, who are invested in a unified Ireland, and republicans are nationalists who have historically favored the use of physical force to achieve a united Ireland. In a similar dynamic, we can understand loyalism to be the militant subset of unionism. That is, unionists are those people, mostly Protestant, who are in favor of maintaining the union with Britain in the six counties of Northern Ireland, and loyalists are unionists willing to resist a unified Ireland through physical force.

7. See for example: “A Lament on the Execution of Captain Brennan” (Healy 1965:11819), “Bold Jack Donohue” (Glassie 1982:103-104), and “Captain Grant” (Seal 1996:77-8).

8. For example, consider the second to last stanza of “The Wild Rapparee”:

   He has robbed many rich of their gold and their crown.
   He has outrode the soldiers who hunted him down.
   Alas, he has boasted, They’ll never take me,
   Not a swordsman will capture the wild rapparee.

   (Glassie 1982:110)
9. Bauman’s concept of traditionalization—drawn from Hymes 1975—has important implications for conventional understandings of tradition: “Tradition, long considered a criterial attribute of folklore, is coming to be seen less as an inherent quality of old and persistent items or genres passed on from generation to generation, and more as a symbolic construction by which people in the present establish connections with a meaningful past and endow particular cultural forms with value and authority” (Bauman 1992:128). The intellectual shift from tradition to traditionalization recapitulates in many ways the shifts from context to contextualization and text to entextualization. Tradition, context, and text have conventionally been granted authority, even authenticity, by appearing to be preexistent, external, and objectified. However, through interest in entextualization and contextualization, text and context have been recast as emergent and negotiable. In the same way, tradition can be better understood through traditionalization, a process of the active construction and mediation of meaning and value.

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Cinderella, a popular children's story, features a woman of ideal proportions elevated to myth. This is not the ubiquitous folktale's nature but derives from mistranslation and application. The contemporary Cinderella's most memorable and crucial features – glass slipper and ugly sisters – have little original relevance; now magic, not maturity, is lauded. Feminist phenomenology reveals Cinderella as a primer for moral and gender role conventions, leeched of race, gender and class. Sub-textual messages train girls in anti social behaviors and antipathetic family relations. Despite the almost thoroughly female content of Cinderella, the end-result of this instruction is the eventual absence of female agency and identity.

The Cinderella Myth

The tale of Cinderella is encoded as a text of patriarchal moral instruction in which a sense of female agency will always by definition be absent. In this folktale, which is also a fairytale, female character is positioned in terms of what it is not: not dominant, not powerful, not male. Cinderella herself, non-hero of a dubious tale, evinces more depth than most archetypes. She is capable of developing relationships, meting forgiveness, manipulating her own destiny, even of attracting magical help. This latter suggests a divine personage, with whom ancient myth is rife, but in fact there is never any indication that Cinderella is inhuman. On the contrary, her essential humanity is her salvation.

These qualities on their own make Cinderella an anomaly among fairytale principals: she is given no journey, no quest, no troll to enrage or woo, but permitted to stay at home (albeit in a life of unrelied drudgery). Although one of three sisters, she does not best them in riddles or games of strength or chance; even the sewing for which she is punished is not her own. Cinderella does not return from the party with a prize but (as I will show, I will shout) the opposite: she comes home missing what she had when she set out. Cinderella does not experience any perceivable growth or transformation with the exception of the tangible one directed by her magic guide – one which is also undone. We can read Cinderella as a mythical character only because of what she means to us as women.

But that is enough. By virtue of what Cinderella represents to contemporary women, the character of Cinderella passed from her fairytale origins to mythical proportions. Cinderella has escaped the bounds of her own story. Cinderella defines girls’ first choice for a romantic partner, the strictures of friendship and obedience that girls are trained to uphold, unconditional family love and, not least, ideals of personal appearance and deportment. Cinderella demonstrates the potential of even the least socially advantaged female to achieve public success, the ability of the meek to triumph over the (female) competition, the trick of appearing to be what one is not. These are important techniques in the battle for male approval. If we have impressed Cinderella into service as a myth, it is because we need to look up and forward to a figure who has successfully navigated the obstacles on the distinctly female journey. Cinderella’s rags-to-riches story inspires females to prevail against improbable odds. We do not believe in myths because of some inherent truth in them, but because they substantiate what we most wish to be true: Cinderella is a falsehood painted as possibility. What we worship in her is not what she is but what she gets; by
subscribing to the myth of *Cinderella*, we sustain our collective female belief in wealth, beauty, and revenge.

**New Origins**

Folktales had their origins in oral accounts, stories told by people before the advent of writing, or before someone determined them worthy of literary transcription. Grimm Brothers Jacob and Wilhelm did not, in an original creative act, write the tales published under their names, but went out as folklorists (before there was such a profession) into the countryside, like anthropologists in their wilds, and listened. What they brought back they then edited, like the good ethical binary German men they were: anything that didn’t suit their “Christian” standards simply disappeared. I have read transcriptions and abstracts of their notes and wondered at the absence of certain types of tales. Stories about children surviving on their own, or women leaving the husbands who beat them, somehow never made it to press; concurrently, stories about Jews being robbed and hung in thorn trees, or torn apart by dogs while (mendacious) villagers laughed, stayed in. The Grimms were very careful not to let what they heard get in the way of what they wrote. Charles Perrault held the same view, concerned lest women and other children go astray. Both Perrault and the Brothers Grimm published these folktales as if they were their own – under their own professionally upstanding names, and not as anthropological records but as literary fictions.

The performance of meaning for fairy tales ... becomes both an intratextual and an extratextual matter, one enacted by (re)writers of the tale, who rescript stories passed on to them, and by its readers, who collaborate with the (re)writers to negotiate yet another production of textual meaning (Tatar 277).

Although “old wives” may have originally imparted the stories we read today, the power and authority of writing sat fast in the hands of male scholars; publication, moreover, was granted to the wealthy. For each fairy tale, *Kindermärche*, folk legend and myth with which we are now familiar, there are possibly thousands for which there is no record. Folk legend, like history, is selective. *Cinderella* was similarly written (or transcribed) from oral accounts as a piece of moral instruction. A *Cinderella* by any other name exists in a variety of languages and cultures,1 with many culturally-revealing alterations to the basic storyline, most telling us of a poor but beautiful girl who, by going to a party on the hill, wins the attention of a wealthy man. Look what the right pair of shoes will do for you.

*Cinderella*’s story is a curious one. Many of us know this tale in its modern extensions but cannot say how we know it – whether we read it in a child’s picture-book, watched Disney’s animated version, saw a movie with human actors unanimated by comparison, or “fell in love with” the ash-girl in her other forms (including in Dickens’ revival). Indeed, *Cinderella* is legion: as Barbie in diversely perfect incarnations, the “heroine” of almost any romance novel, new and sometimes relevant literary concepts (for instance, the “Cinderella complex,” the “whore with a heart of gold”).2 Bernard Shaw’s drama *Pygmalion* presents another instance of male bonding conducted through the service of a woman, in this case one who believes that she can only win by trying, as she has started with nothing. To his credit, Shaw allows the character to shove off at the end, bearing her body away, but to have true love and devotion this Cinderella must give up all pretenses to education. Education therefore becomes a pretense. Further transformed as the Lerner and Lowe musical *My Fair Lady*,3 the music ends with a new-made woman who newly makes man: Eliza converts her creators. The underlying message is one Mary Shelley crafted a hundred years earlier: Frankenstein has no loyalty. But in this case the monster manages to marry one of the scientists.

Both *Pygmalion* stories are commercial perversions of an ancient Greek myth that performed a service for its culture. In the original, a male artist falls in love
with his own sculpture, surely an intriguing commentary on the power of art to
seduce even its own creator, and a warning to gaze on verisimilitude with sus-
picion. This brings us to Hollywood’s contemporary Pretty Woman and another
Disneyized threat, The Little Mermaid (if there is a hell, then Hans Christian
Anderson is now in it). In these movies Cinderella transforms from foul and fish
into a lady that only proves how far women will go to change for their men. As
Oedipus provides a model for the male (kill Daddy, bed Mommy), so Cinderella
serves the female, directing us to similarly anti-social behaviors and antipathetic
familial relations: to hate and compete with other females, suffer in silence, and
seek rapport with males through the mysteries of flirtation, fashion and marital
fitness. Fortunately for women, this involves only virtuous activities, easily
enough acquired in the observance of girlhood duties: cleaning, cooking, sew-
ing, nurturing and displaying ourselves publicly, all the while taking up little space.
Taken to its logical conclusion, woman herself at last disappears from view.
This is true in the story of Cinderella, as we shall see.

Absence
Let it be known that the ballerina is not a woman dancing; that, within
those juxtaposed motifs, she is not a woman, but a metaphor that sum-
marizes one of the elemental aspects of our form, sword, goblet, etc.,
and that she is not dancing, suggesting, by the wonder of ellipses or
bounds, with a corporeal writing, that which would take entire paragraphs
of dialogued as well as descriptive prose to express in written composi-
tion: a poem detached from all instruments of the scribe (Mallarmé, Oeuvres
Completes⁴).

One of the first absences in the text occurs in translation of Cinderella from
an earlier publication in French⁵ to English – the absence of a word. It is a
simple word and a little loss that heralds an enormous and important one: ex-
change of the French velours (velvet) for verre (glass). In the centrality of the
image conjured by its sign, this Word reads as Logos for the remaining popular-
ized text. It is an understandable mistake given the hardships of transcribing in
the field (from which Charles Perrault, at least, copied out his manuscripts), of
hearing and absorbing frank orality and then transforming it to arid print. The
terminological difference, however, leaves women literally walking on glass,
each step a faux pas. How does one navigate on such a fragile basis? This may
be interesting to women who wonder how Cinderella got through the night in
those shoes. Cinderella’s new shoes are truly, clearly, invisible, her feet naked
to all eyes. But worse – she must dance in an unforgiving shoe (dancing for the
first time in public, mind you) – which at any moment threatens to break, re-
place her barefoot, bloody, and utterly helpless. How carefully she must step.  A
good thing the Prince has learned to dance.

To comprehend the magnitude of this error – estrangement of the word and
actions of our young charwoman – we are forced to retrace the steps of that
perilous slipper, magicked into being with the rest of Cinderella’s fancy outfit.
There is no honest explanation for why the slipper remains as testimony – why,
if the shoe fits, it drops. moments earlier, we are told, the young woman was
gaily dancing in this very shoe; surely it would have fallen off then, in the
endless (and, as dancers know) breathlessly swift rounds of the older Austrian
waltz. But after a night of aerobics indoors, the woman rushes outside and
immediately loses a shoe. This mistranslation points us towards understanding
the slipper as a prominent signifier, rather than towards seeing some more
substantial object: “glass” operates as a red flag, leading us to a fanciful but
ultimately unnecessary correction of an image. Glass breaks, it is true (although
in the story it does not, at least overtly). But in the French source material the
shoes were velvet. Velvet, a word strongly associated with skin (more so than
glass), tears. It is strong, soft, stretchy and pliable. A velvet slipper can be left on
the road and retrieved and can still be worn in a ragged condition. Not so glass.
So while glass attracts our attention, velvet rubs us better. Something velvet
has been lost. And found.
If the slipper’s loss signifies another loss, the slipper signifies another slip. It is troubling that only one item retains its shape (the shape of magic) after the ball, when everything else has returned to its poor normalcy, right down to the golden pumpkin. If everything is magical, then the slipper’s exclusion makes no logical sense in the story. But without the slipper as a calling card, a sort of invitation to be stepped on, the Prince may never find Cinderella in the sea of women vying for his notice. Conversely, it is not clear to me now why the Prince has to find her. The story dazzles us with finery, which we all too readily see as refinement. In the spell of the lost slipper, we overlook the more obvious intrusion of the Prince himself, and in the absence of honest cogitation conclude that he must be the one for Cinderella. (It’s true he is the only one, but in modern times that is not as good a reason as it once was.) Having had no time to know Cinderella as a woman apart from her unpleasant family, we have certainly failed to meet the Prince, and know nothing of this man except that he is extraordinarily superficial, a late bloomer, and wholly dependent upon his parents. In the remainder of the tale he develops as a foot fetishist. At no point in the story are we logically convinced that these two should be together, that the Prince is worthy of our supposed “heroine,” or heroic himself. Cinderella is not particularly romantic, even after the finding of the slipper that initiates a sordid (wo)manhunt. The objective of this search is a stranger who clearly wants to hide; otherwise she would have answered the call. (Her sequestration at home in a locked house is far from likely, given that a principal domestic duty is emptying the char outside, and her name signifies her as that domestic.) And despite his hunting, there is no reason to think that a prince is going to be excited to end up with a poor ragged girl with ashes on her hands – never mind the in-laws. On the face of it, what Cinderella lost at the ball is a shoe, but we do her an injustice if we look only at her instructions (particularly as she has already ignored those of her stepmother) and neglect her feelings at the moment of flight. Cinderella is now in a palace, a place of possible refuge, safe from her family. The Prince likes her. But at the striking of the clock – no, the calling of the watchman or ringing of the bells – she gets scared and runs away. Modern detectives would phrase this differently: Cinderella exits the party late, leaving behind material evidence of her existence. (Without this the Prince might have thought that Cinderella was a fantasy.) She runs as fast as she can in an effort to beat time and find a way home. (If she’d had a mother she would have known better than to go to a party where she doesn’t know anyone: anything can happen at a party.) Then Cinderella loses her velvet, and the Prince gets it. (You decide what went on at that party.) And there is another ending, suggested by what is not stated in the story: Cinderella disappears from the party, last seen in the company of a prince. Passers-by report having seen a poor woman in tattered clothes, sitting in the middle of the carriage-track massaging her feet. This is the last either woman was seen. Police are now searching for this beggar whom, they believe, may have murdered a foreign princess as she left the party, probably for money. Anyone knowing the whereabouts of (but what is her name?) an anonymous princess, please contact this writer. Presentation of any story results in commission of at least two versions – the story that is told and the one we hear. I propose a tertiary rendition, that of the story we do not hear because it is not told – not, that is, forcefully sounded. Were we to listen to the spaces, as artists from Aaron Copland to Noah Ben Shear have reminded us, we would hear those speaking parts. The heard Cinderella is, despite its magic and fantasy, the authoritative edition; the unheard Cinderella is the practical, plodding story that might bring us to furious tears rather than ecstasy. A moment ago I suggested how Cinderella might seem to an outsider, one not as privy to events as she. Underlying that suggestion is another one, that the writer or teller of the well-known Cinderella is either Cinderella herself or a close companion, as indicated by the naïve credulity of the story itself. But that quality we have come to accept in the folktale genre, one which causes us to reflect upon the medieval notion of story-telling and which tells us much about religious tradition of belief in that period.
Now I wish to produce something different: a case history of poor Cinderella, the pieces and bits of her life which may have been discarded by her “original” creator/story-tellers. Again this is an unheard story, but now it is also unspeakable. I speak as a caseworker in the Women’s Shelter:

*Cinderella gave Intake the following story:*

Her mother died when Cinderella was perhaps five. Her father remarried a year later. Two older step-sisters were at the wedding, aged between eight and twelve; the stepmother’s first husband died when a nearby witch’s cottage burned down *suspicion of arson.* Almost immediately, and for the next twelve years, Cinderella was beaten regularly by her stepmother; she showed us an early scar, located on the upper left thigh, from a fire poker. Cinderella’s father fell ill *probably Plague* and died *date uncertain.* The sisters began to kick, taunt, pull her hair and feed her bugs. When Cin began her menses, she was locked in a closet for...? some extended time. There seems to have been a change in the family’s finances at this point; the last remaining servant was let go, or left, and Cin took over all chores. She was probably eleven years old when she was first sexually assaulted, by the eldest stepsister. The abuse was repeated periodically until this day. *Cin believes that her stepmother does not know of this, but C- does not dare tell her.* C- sneaked off to watch the Grand Ball and, once in the estate and aided by strong drink *says she had a “bout” with a stableboy* she made it upstairs disguised as a maid, entered a room and “borrowed” a gown. She then appeared in the ballroom. The Prince danced with her, drew her into a private room, and “seduced” her *not rape? C- won’t say the word* then returned to the party. C- fled wearing only underclothing and carrying her shoes in her hands. Outside she dropped a shoe without noticing until she got home; the other shoe is in her garret. We have all received, of course, the Royal Proclamation, and *know that Prince Ode is hunting for the owner of something in his possession.* Cinderella came to the Shelter because she believes that he means to find her, take her away, and kill her.

The “case” above, common enough in the lives of women, is not what we know as Cinderella but, given the circumstances of the folktale, its bizarre elements and strange silences, it could have been. In re-telling it I invite the reader to think how reading that as a child might have influenced her life, her love for housework, her attitudes towards men, and her desire to marry early.

**My Cinderella Confession**

A current trend in scholarship, at least printed scholarship, is self-reflexivity. The speaker is expected to identify herself, admitting her biases (as if the reader could not detect them) so as not to hide behind the formality of academic writing. In this vein I step forward and make confession, presenting some personal limitations regarding the story of Cinderella. Despite all I know about Cinderella, regardless of all that currently annoys me in the story, I confess that as a child I did identify with Cinderella. I liked animals. I liked pumpkin. I lived in a small room. When I went to parties I had a curfew – and it was unreasonable. I couldn’t sew, and needed help in home economics. I went barefoot most of the time. It seems I never got dessert, possibly because I often lost things on the way home. I had to do such hard chores that I investigated child labor laws. I had two older sisters and, although they are regular sisters rather than stepsisters, they often seemed very wicked indeed. So what if they weren’t ugly, my feet were much smaller than theirs. (Then.) Because of them I wore hand-me-downs. (Then.) You see how it all fits. So although I was not a beautiful golden-haired orphan (my natural color is sun-bleached brunette), kept in a dungeon or an attic (I adored my aunt’s basement), forced to clean ashes from the hearth (we had a wall furnace) and befriended only by mice (we had large dogs), I did think that eventually someone would come and take me away from all this. I even
learned to waltz. But I didn’t meet any princes.

The Conventions of Class

Cinderella begins with Cinderella’s primary absence: her mother. In fairytales, motherlessness indicates an absence of quality attention and the necessity (given the staggering amount of handiwork done at home) for men to remarry. Their second wives are invariably brutish, and fathers die off like flies. Female children raised by these monstrous women are lucky to be married, while still children, to ugly old men – thus escaping beatings, beheadings, being poisoned, cooked, frozen, sold, or accidentally left somewhere awful. Male children with stepmothers tend to seek their fortunes at an early age, so as to find their own women to punish.

The next absence in Cinderella’s life is a father. Is it only that absent parents are common to the childhood fairytales which govern our memories and learning patterns, thus wending their way into our literary texts, or does this trope stand for more a “founding absence,” like the “founding murder” Oedipus is said to represent? The next absences we hear about in Cinderella are, in order: clothes, shelter, appropriate work, friends, and opportunities to socialize (with humans). It is at this point in the story that Cinderella encounters magic, something generally absent beyond fairytales. Or does she merely recognize the magic in her life? For it seems as if the Fairy Godmother were always there, available, like Glinda the Good Witch, to drop in when you needed direction. From that point on it is apparent what else Cinderella lacks: transportation, a formal dress and decent shoes. The final absence is Time. Even her Fairy Godmother gives her very little – as we find out later, just enough. After Cinderella loses the shoe in escaping (too late) from the party, she is plunged back into the animal world she dominates, shorn of finery, reduced to essentials. She returns to the level of minimal survival. Thank goodness the Prince is already searching, his spies canvassing for little feet. Cinderella will soon be lifted up, placed on a horse or in a carriage, and transported to a world of wealth and satisfaction with a big house and a good family. (I hope I didn’t ruin the story for you.)

On a basic moral level the instructions are clear as glass: good triumphs over bad, beauty over its repulsive opposite. Cinderella is intimately associated with nature, as we are told several times: through the animals which, like she, become domesticated; through her beauty which, in the tradition of the Aesthetic experience, demonstrates its superiority over homeliness. (“Homeliness?” What is “homely,” really, but housewifely, comfortable, and familiar – and therefore contemptible?) From our perspective of identification with Cinderella (we’d hardly choose to identify with ugly, nasty women) these females, older than she and more mature, are females prepared to party, women rather than girls, and not “real” (biologically real) sisters. Partly because of the brevity of the story and paucity of detail, this suggests that they, mere “step-sisters,” are somehow “unnatural.” Beyond the “natural” beauty that testifies to Cinderella’s (yet unrealized) status, her elevation over this unconnected family is physically represented by spatial signifiers: imprisonment in an attic, conveyance in a horse-drawn coach, and finally marriage into a royal family. Above all, Cinderella’s most natural gift is magic: the girl’s beauty and (its) charm shine brightly through mere rags. This is so apparent that it is noticed immediately by a prince – a man born into an entirely different milieu, to wealthy and indulgent parents. The story asks us, among other things, to anticipate that such a wedding of opposites will work. In fact, fairy tale happenstance and happily-ever-afters aside it just might, and because of Cinderella’s “nature.” The Prince, culturally her Other, is the aesthetic brother of Cinderella. The kinkiness is just beginning.

We customarily avoid class in reading and rewriting folklore, but Cinderella affords a remarkable discussion. Before the Prince lays eyes on her, Cinderella does not exist in the legal and economic awareness of her country. She pops into being at a party, relatively mature, decorated, and provocatively displayed. It is not a party for poor people; poverty is absent from the ball. But that in itself
is an absurd notion: naturally the castle is full of servants, and most are penniless; one can only say that no poor people are “present” because poor people are beneath the notice of the wealthy population, invisible. This fact has not changed. Cinderella gets the invitation because it goes to the house in which she lives, a place where she is kept captive by her poverty. She seems not to have been born into the lower class (otherwise she would never have been able to get through the castle gates, let alone waltz), but fell into deprivation through the death of her parents. Who can really blame the stepmother for not wanting to take care of a girl with whom she had no real relation? Biology speaks: woman must protect her own offspring – particularly if the physical attractiveness of another female threatens their own reproductive success. The absence of Cinderella’s own mother is unremarkable, superficial, unless one regards it as a fundamental absence, the one upon which the half-orphan’s rags-to-riches story is initially built: through the father’s emotional absence, Cinderella’s mother is replaced by a non blood-relations whose own issues of reproductive success create class strife and difference within the family; the girl is faced with rival kin; and finally a mystical figure intrudes from the other world, faintly identifiable as her mother (the magic helper styles herself a “Fairy Godmother”) but granting no more than material assistance.

Transformation of animals into human servants, and their disappearance at midnight, symbolically expresses the absence of the lower classes, which serve the upper class as if animals. When we observe how Walt Disney attempted to fill in the absences in the text with additional animal habitation, this concept becomes clearer. Disney explains Cinderella’s primary absence by the increased presence of animals that evidently take the place of a mother. With the appearance of the stepmother and two daughters the animals are replaced, and abandoned as Cinderella had been. An absence of family acknowledgement is discernible in Cinderella herself who, regaining the humble form of a scullery maid, becomes unrecognizable – virtually invisible – to her own family. The means by which Cinderella will eventually succeed is over-determined by class: she must physically impress her Prince and lord at court, and later fit his image of the perfect (small) woman at home. Still she requires a bit of magic.

The story presents an array of questionable absences, none of them textually answered. Why is there a ball? Only because of the Prince’s failure to get a date on his own. His folks have to arrange something, to find women for him. Cinderella attends a party meant not for her but the “beautiful people” associated with money and fame. We privately know that Cinderella really belongs to this group; therefore we suspend our disbelief at the unlikelihood of her ever getting there. At the moment of Cinderella’s entry, a representative of the poor actually becomes visible to rich people. But she is not really poor, is she? The tale does not end with Cinderella speaking in the public square, peasants invited up to the castle for lunch – in short with the French Revolution. (If it did, Cinderella’s own head would roll.) She ascend, making aliyah; the rest of the lower-class remains in galut (the Diaspora). In fact, in the hands of Disney, Cinderella turns into a girl (few of Disney’s female heroines are women) who sings as she is dressed – oh, those happy peasants! – in accordance with the tradition of musical theatre to sing instead of enjoying a useful discussion. Everything stops while we listen to the same few lines being repeated. The formula recurs in nearly every Disney movie: when animals, peasants and racial minorities show up it’s time for a song.

Do children want a story interrupted with a song? As a child I hated that sort of thing. Surely we must question for whom these stories, and their cinematic adaptations, are truly meant, written, animated, shown and sold. Jacqueline Rose points to the “impossibility” of children’s literature as a genre ostensibly for children, but written by adults, while in the marketplace it is adults who (because of their economic position) are the true consumers. It is even the adult who reads the book (aloud) to the children. Thus it is an adult’s version of the child’s world which is manufactured through the aegis of children’s literature. Children’s fiction, says Rose, “sets up a world in which the adult comes first (author, maker, giver) and the child comes after (reader, product, receiver)” (Rose
So what is it that adults want children to understand from the story of Cinderella?

**Female Relationships**

One of the horrors of Cinderella's tale is the moment when she flees the castle and its famous ball. She is running, running, running away from the bright lights, the fun, the food, the nice guy, running to keep a date imposed by the Good Witch. This is a moment of horror not because she has to leave the party: she's pretty young, high time she went home. (Anyway she wouldn't want the Prince to think she was easy.) No, it is horrible because of the Fear of Public Exposure. If there is one thing that would compel me to leave a good party it would be the fear that my clothing would disappear. She runs out the door, the gate, goes down those steps, she's just off the grounds, and poof! there it goes.

Fortunately she is not standing there naked, but we couldn't be sure of that beforehand. For a child to imagine being naked in public is terrible; so what if only the animals can see? There is no good explanation why the Fairy Godmother add this potential punishment to the assistance she gives Cinderella, there is no point. In my mind, something is missing from the story, something vitally important. Why is she set up in this way? What do we see in Cinderella is a tale of perfidy and female treachery. The bad characters are all female. How can one speak of a female absence in Cinderella, when it would seem that almost all of the characters are female? But these people consist of a good but romantically stupid girl who prefers to accept the ill treatment of her step-family rather than to pack up the mice and leave; two step-sisters, ugly mean and very ugly, who are indistinguishable from the other, except through Disney’s putrid use of color; an evil step-mother, also ugly; a strange woman who shows up once in a lifetime, twice if you subscribe to the Disney account. (Where was she the previous sixteen years? Thanks a lot, “Mother.”)

Female hatred. Female sabotage. Female jealousy. These are all shown us repeatedly in Cinderella as is. We discover that the way to win a prince is over the ugly bodies of our competitors, who are similarly trying to cut our throats. Beauty on its own is not enough: you have to be seen by the right people. You must triumph over those who would hide your beauty. You must outdo them. No wonder female friendships are so problematic, when this is how we are trained to see our relationships with other women. Hatred, sabotage and jealousy are also present in earlier tellings of the story which, though present in the current Disneyized version, is absent at its end, when Cinderella rides off into the horizon and the bad family vanishes from sight and mind. In Aschenputtel, the Grimm version of Cinderella, birds attack the evil stepsisters and bite out their eyes. But in many other accounts Cinderella’s goodness is almost saintly: she forgives her stepsisters’ horrible behavior and sometimes even manages to match them up at court. This is certainly not what I would do – but I also have an opportunity to rewrite this story at the point of my retelling it. I have already reinterpreted the story for you using a metaphoric polemic on absence. In my story, what is most important about Cinderella is the shoe.

**Ways of Seeing**

This article concerns metaphors and ways of seeing, particularly ways of seeing what others are not looking at. The logical assumption is that a non-subject is therefore trivial, unworthy of serious study. Conversely, my response was and is to question why these are non-subjects, to investigate decisions made by others about what is likely to be important to me or to anyone else. So my work begins with a rejection – of the canon, of the politics of literature and its publication, of academic appropriateness, of the legislation of opinion. One of the ways that academics seem to operate is through the posing of binary or structural opposites. It is comforting to know that if a thing is not this it must be that; what is not cold is hot. Never mind that we are capable of thinking about
and experiencing an enormous range of temperatures, that heat is a relative
term as is cold; structural opposition (Levi-Straussian construction) enforces
binary coding, usually with the additional motivation of fixing, or affixing, moral
values. Because one is already conditioned to look at things as this or that, cold
or hot, the value indicators are similarly binary: negative and positive. We need
both, of course, and not only in our flashlights; polarity is a dependent relation-
ship. But because of this tendency towards a tension of opposites, we end up
limiting our transactions, our thinking, to bad and good. This is the outcome – if
not the point – of children’s literature: it conditions us to distinguish bad and
good, and to make a number of other associations with these terms; that which
is considered good is that which beautiful, smart, nice, polite, fair or even white,
obeient, tall, slim, quiet, and so forth. In fairy tales, the basis of what we now
call children’s literature, a person’s inner qualities are instantly discernible from
external attributes. Good and bad are physiologically, physiognomically mani-
fest: the dark little crooked old woman in black with the wart on her nose is not
going to be the hero. Thus a good person is also pleasant to look at and (as we
know from television) has clean clothes, fresh breath, and carefully styled hair.

I have gone into an extended discussion of binarisms and ethics because I
invite you to suspend binary judgements, to move beyond an evaluation of
“absence” as the opposite of “presence,” and to consider absence in a different
way: as something present – but not. That which is “not not present” is absent.
When something present is not looked at, not recognized, not seen, it acquires
a certain invisibility – in part, what I call “absence.” Absence is what is always
there but overlooked, or there but unheard, or seen and heard but never men-
tioned. We do not immolate the story in reconsidering what it conceals.

We literally unveil nothing of her, nothing that in the final account does not
leave her intact, virginal (he loves only that), undecipherable, impassively
fictit, in a word, sheltered from the cinder that there is and that she is
(Derrida 41).9

Those characteristics of Cinderella left un-addressed support this view of
absence: somewhere behind the story sits another story, the one we are not
meant to hear. Were we to hear it we would walk away with an entirely different
perception of the poor beaten Cinderella – or several different perceptions.10 We
might be inspired to question the value of the hidden features, to wonder where
issues of class, aesthetics, nature, superstition, parenting, hunger or politics fit
in our founding myths, to wonder at the importance of such a myth as Cinderella
in our female lives. We might be sufficiently moved to overturn the patriarchal
texts, insert others in their place (Nature filling its vacuum). Not, that is, to rewrite
Cinderella, but instead to find a more feasible model for contemporary female
behavior. Perhaps even to acknowledge that there can be no models except
those we embrace through personal experience.

Absence is something more than its frail partner “presence” – a location for
the political, for what is challenging for societies and social conditions, for what
must not be looked at, not seen, not noted, not touched. Not “presented.” Ab-
sence is dangerous. To locate absence is to chart life, history, sociology, in a
specific way. The Cinderella story presents an array of questionable absences,
textually unanswered because unquestioned. This discussion does not pre-
tend to provide closure, but rather to enjoin readers to ask questions of their
own. Unlike other ways of seeing, this strategy does not limit or eliminate the
text, but it does subvert it. By examining our essential stories, those we en-
countered at the knee, and those we “teach” to children, we begin to see in
other ways, to discover culture as a tool for moral education, sexual regulation
and female containment, and to locate female absence very close to home.

Notes

1I do not wish to repeat the excellent extensive historical scholarship on Cinderella’s
origins here. Cinderella’s lengthy and interesting histories, irrelevant in this discussion,
can be found in the following brief bibliography: Bruno Betelheim, The Uses of Enchant-
ment: the Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales (New York: Knopf, 1976); Alan Dundes, ed., Cinderelle: A Folklore Casebook (New York: Garland Pub., 1982); Walt Disney, Cinderella [Videorecording], (Burbank: Walt Disney, 1949); Nai-Tung Ting, The Cinderella Cycle in China and Indo-China (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1974).


3 Rodgers and Hammerstein’s music backed a movie produced as a musical in the same year: Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein, Cinderella [Videorecording] (Hollywood: Samuel Goldwyn Company, 1964).


5 It would be difficult to ascertain where the fable had its first expression, as scholars trace it to Germany, France and even China: a student tells me of the Hungarian version, in which the young woman is named “Hamupipoke,” and her shoes, curiously enough, are made of white diamonds. The symbolism could not be clearer. On form and structure, see also Vladimir Propp, The Morphology of the Folktale. Translated by Laurence Scott (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968).

6 This is given greater consideration in my article “Travesty, Peterhood, & The Flight of a Lost Girl,” New England Review, forthcoming (August 1988). James M. Barrie also wrote a play named Cinderella – not very surprising in view of the fairytale quality of Peter Pan and many of his other writings.

7 One of the few exceptions is Mary Poppins, who is also depicted as an aberrant, desexualized creature. For one thing, she is a woman without children of her own, who literally takes, and seduces, other people’s children. Here again is a magical woman, a witch, dressed in black, like a widow; appropriately, her boyfriend is also a witch of sorts, having the “luck” of the chimneysweeps. Does it not seem curious to anyone that he is able to impart good fortune through physical contact – and is this not somehow frightening? (As parents wouldn’t you tell your children, “Just say no?”) Mary’s relationship with Bert does not stray from what we expect, even demand, of her class – her “boyfriend” (neither is married, nor do they discuss it, at least onscreen) is also a working-class Victorian London stiff (which is to say that he is also poor), with the robust happiness we need to ascribe to poor people, as well as a tendency to copulate below stairs: still we never see or are even permitted to imagine the content of their romantic holidays, interrupted by a song or some bit of magic. Because of her magic, and an understanding of what children really need that surpasses the ordinary, Mary is cleverly depicted as being able to breach the class zone: here her magic characteristics are essential for an explanation of this otherwise scandalous, and (in terms of class distinctions) uncomfortable flexibility. She doesn’t know her place – the moral that the children’s father ends in teaching, as he “rescues” his children from the unsavoriness of their relationship with this queerly unmarried woman and her odd friend. Mary’s ability to tread between classes, however, elevates her even from Bert’s league: we know that she will leave him too, and are secretly satisfied. He is, for one thing, truly from the lowest class, as his mangled Cockney accent tells us, while Mary’s impossibly perfect speech distinguishes her as
something quite different (though this is never really acknowledged); Bert is also, if only figuratively, black, while Mary is, however trenchantly, white.

*The modern movie Ace Ventura, Pet Detective contains a wonderful quotation of a scene from Disney's Snow White. Actor Jim Carrey stands in the center of a room and the animals fly, run, walk, creep and slither to him as he belts out a high note.

I have re-rendered the parenthetical phrase (only), which Ned Lukacher translates as "that's the only thing he loves," because of its (increased) ambiguity in the context of a feminist reading.

In her book Cinderella on the Ball: Fairytales for Feminists (Dublin: Attic Press, 1991), editor Margaret Neylon offers re-readings of the classic folktales. In the Cinderella story, it is the two sisters who emerge supreme: ugliness is a cover for intelligence and political feminism.

**Works Cited**


Werner, Jane, adaptor. 1950. *Walt Disney's Cinderella*. Adapted from the Walt Disney Motion Picture Cinderella. New York: Golden Press.


Cinderella Undisciplined: A Response to “After the Ball is Over: Bringing Cinderella Home.”

Rob Baum’s examination of Cinderella is inventive in the way retellings of tales can be, looking between the lines of the “heard Cinderella, . . . the authoritative edition.” She offers us as one alternative a “practical, plodding story, which might bring us to furious tears rather than ecstasy,” in the form of a transcript assembled by a caseworker at a women’s shelter. Baum’s Cinderella, like Virginia Woolf’s Shakespeare’s sister, is undisciplined, transgressing behavioral boundaries not only of gender (What do women do?) but also of textual genre and academic expectation (What do folklorists do? Literary critics? Cultural historians?) Like Woolf, Baum raises questions about the (im)proper exercise of imagination in a critical/analytical/theoretical context (such as this journal affords). To whatever point one is willing to follow her lead (and I for one enjoyed following her to the end), Baum, by speaking as Cinderella’s case worker, reminds of the innumerable ways this tale can be and has been constructed, deconstructed, reconstructed, and reframed.

Because of the extraordinary popularity of Cinderella, Baum observes that it has moved beyond folktale, its heroine having been elevated to mythic proportions. The entertainment industry (and mass media generally) has so emphasized the Cinderella story that it has become an influential guidebook for the training of girls and the control of women. Indeed, Cinderella has “escaped from the bounds of her own story.” To look at the situation another way, the tale has become a kind of virtual reality that invites us to enter, play the role, and try on the costume. We can test this proposition by looking at advertisements directed at women of products from panty-liners to credit cards: Cinderella is evoked metonymically by her glass slippers or through the slenderest shards of plot. Like the two dots and upward-turning semi-circle that we are able to read as a smiley face, Cinderella (and by extension her narrative) can be recognized by means of the barest details.

Reflecting on what the story teaches, Baum comments that it directs women “to hate and compete with other females, suffer in silence, and seek rapport with males through the mysteries of flirtation, fashion, and marital fitness,” these (in)activities all somehow promoting, leading to, or leading from the virtuous duties of housekeeping and nurturing. Ultimately, according to Baum’s argument, “woman herself at last disappears from view.” Is this disappearance the consequence of silence, bondage, self-abnegation, self-hatred, or is it (as Baum’s enumeration of women’s lessons suggests) rather a heaping up of contradictions that ultimately fuse into a great blankness? I offer this as an alternative interpretation of women’s disappearance, my own path for arriving at the locus of Baum’s conclusion— for her article has gaps. Following her lead, however, the reader is encouraged to construct bridges.

Along with the contradictions, we have the superabundance of Cinderella tales to contend with – perhaps particularly in the form of “modern extensions,” whose origins are frequently obscure (unknown or forgotten, but we can be pretty sure that Disney looms large among them). Since at least one modern extension exists in the mind of everyone who has experienced the tale, Baum can reasonably grant herself the liberty of offering her own versions. We can, she reminds us, each rewrite our own Cinderella, giving it a focus of our own choosing; we needn’t put up with the story we started out with.

As an undisciplined reader, I’m prompted to look more closely at the pumpkin, which even transformed into a coach retains its cozy rotundity, providing a warm conveyance that bears and births Cinderella into a brave new world. The pumpkin’s disenchantment, however, signals the practical problem of relative magnitude – one of the dilemmas of growing up. The child grows; the mother’s womb no longer accommodates; it’s just a pumpkin. In such ways Cinderella’s story marks points of no return.

The transformed animals also offer a focus of interest for a child reader. Baum connects them to a child’s nightmare fears by suggesting that the animals might become the observers of a speculatively naked Cinderella: “For a child to imag-
ine being naked in public is terrible; so what if only the animals can see?” Since her article concerns “ways of seeing, particularly ways of seeing what others are not looking at,” let’s take a closer look at those observing animals, watching naked Cinderella in this fragment of a retelling. What would invest those animals with the qualities or the status of observers? In their transformed state as servants, they are not expected to look at the people whom they serve; moreover, as Baum points out, they are supposed to disappear when their jobs are done. Yet when we reinvest them with their animal status, we assume their lack of interest in our nakedness. But isn’t this what adults tell children about (certain ostensibly “safe”) humans who might see them naked? “Oh, Uncle John doesn’t care. He’s seen naked bottoms before!” For a child, the point may not be whether animals, or human adults, “care” whether one is naked but being allowed some meager measure of privacy.

If these remarks about Cinderella’s potential nakedness seem digressive, Baum’s own approach invites such digression. She observes that “Somewhere behind the story sits another story, the one we are not meant to hear.” Since “the story” itself is, by her own argument, not singular but a web of retellings, whereby the (female) listeners/(re)tellers become complicit in their own indoctrination, one wonders who guards the entry to that other realm, the realm of the forbidden story, or stories? Who tells those stories? What might we learn from them? We might, for instance, gain a radically different perspective on issues of class, and on the distribution, the uses, and the misuses of resources, including “human resources,” a direly expressive term.

One of the “hidden features” that Baum encourages us to question is nature. Accepting that invitation, let’s start from the notion, employed in Cinderella, of borrowing from nature to create an illusion of wealth, of material prosperity, of gracious living. The pumpkin, plucked from its vine, makes a coach for a night. And then what happens to it? No bread for the cinder-wench? Let her eat pie. Or perhaps it goes to the compost heap, or into the plastic trash-bag. More striking yet, the story rests on a presumption that animals (and others who perform “service functions”?) can be removed, redesigned to fit a particular service, and then returned, disenchanted, to the ground of their being. These borrowed beings, as instruments in the service of the greater good, are assigned uses that are narrowly functional, yet paradoxically their assignment to roles is based on appearance rather than capability, on homological rather than rational (much less ethical or moral) considerations. Paradoxical, yet hardly unusual in the “service sector.”

By escaping from the discipline of disciplines, Rob Baum’s article reminds us both directly and by example of “ways of seeing what others are not looking at.” Even working across disciplines, we find ourselves bridging gaps. To get at what lies between, what resources have we? The guidance of one’s child-self (if she had the foresight to leave enduring markers for us to follow)? The sisters we confront unexpectedly, encamped in doorways or muttering on street-corners? Baum’s article suggests that these undisciplined ones may help us locate the absence(s) she finds in the authorized, authoritative versions of Cinderella.

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Empty Slippers, Empty Heads

Winnifred the Woebegone, heroine of Mary Rodgers’ 1959 musical, Once Upon a Mattress, sings her envy of all the other princesses who find ways to live “Happily Ever After,” and, with the patented croaking indignation of Carol Burnett, interpolates the ultimate protest — “Cinderella had outside help!” What is all this stuff with fairy godmothers? Winnifred has to face her secret test (the pea hidden under piles of featherbeds) with nary a prior clue or hint, much less a set of metamorphosed helping animals or even much hope of being the object of a
post-terpsichorean quest. Winnifred has to make her own opportunities (and might even stop to wonder if the potential rewards are worth all the trouble, after all—the potential mother-in-law is a fast-talking monster and the prince is, at best, a guy that only his mother aspires to love).

But more. What a shocking charge—“outside help” with all its distressing connotations. Peeking at the neighboring kid’s geometry quiz; paying the girl with glasses to write her paper on Angela Carter; discreetly palming the answers to the questions, provided by a leering intern, before the quiz show starts; depending on the kindness of strangers who represent “special interests”; possibly concealing a non-native housekeeper with no green card—and neglecting to pay social security taxes for her; allowing a soft-money PAC to go negative at a crucial moment in the campaign. This Cinderella, Winnifred tells us, lacks the character of a true Olympic athlete in the game of life (and probably depends on steroids to keep those delicate toes in shape; no chance she could pass a urine test!). What’s a normal princess to do when confronted with such a negative role-model? Sing louder, it would seem, and forge ahead toward that female identity.

But this is not exactly what Rob K. Baum tells us about Cinderella (so perhaps Winnifred was caught in one of those timewarps or historical eddies and missed the full impact of Disney’s fascistic clutch—who’s to know?). Unlike Winnifred, Cinderella knew how to work the system, at least in Mary Rodgers’ world. But Baum gives us a somewhat more familiar version of that overworked myth of a kid—the exploitive role-model who convinces young girls of the importance of simpering prettily, obeying patiently, and collaborating in the forces of erasure that leave them bodiless bodies, mindless minds, personless personalities. Cipher me no ciphers, says Baum, but Cinderella’s powers will have it so (or the patriarchal powers that really be, so to speak, will have it so and make our sweet little urchin participate in the process), and absence will be the space provided for disappearance, leaving the fonder heart to coo over the empty and invisible glass slipper, emblem of the place provided (as we know from the history of lotus feet among traditional Chinese women) for the replacement object of the prince’s affections—his own self-stimulated phallus, which just might assert its presence when it gets around to noticing her absence. Or so we might imagine. What is an empty shoe to do in response to unwelcome advances?

The evils men do with their poppets (hand-jive?)—Cinderella or, as Baum also mentions, Barbie, just to cement the contemporary context (but what was the point of that somewhat garbled stuff about the Grimms and the Perraults?)—may not be confined to the interiors of glass slippers. (But how about those shoes! Velours? Vair? Verre? Folk tradition colonizes space by refusing tired restrictions and picky proofreading, so we get a whole Papagallo catalogue if we don’t care to trek the mall, and who but the prince would find the varieties so intriguing?) To some extent, Baum’s focus on relationships of power (class, gender) and regulation (sexual, moral) helps to clarify the somewhat muddied connections (really, that girl has to lift those skirts crossing the courtyard or get someone to carry her) among the Cinderella of folk tradition, the Cinderella of courtly contes, the Cinderella of Jungian construction, the Cinderella of Disney, the Cinderella of Hollywood (contiguous with Disney, but not congruent), the Cinderella of my Saturday morning radio world, “Let’s Pretend,” and all those Little Golden Books. One assumes it is all, but also none, of the above that we are dealing with here; the Cinderella of Baum’s discourse has in common with Carter’s Sadeian woman the intriguing “universalism” of the pornographic mythic mono-woman, object of the affections of the mono-man who has a hard time telling his elbow from a shoehorn, but knows a seductive vacuum when it signals its come-on-up-and-see-me-sometime. But just as such universalism is rebuked in Carter’s explorations, in Baum’s the procedure is a stripping away of all the complexities of the story (an un-tease blamed on the patriarchal popular cultural expropriation of only the characteristics that serve to reinforce absence and valorize emptiness—presumably to make space for the deposit) in order to critique the absence of complexities. In other words, we must re-tell the story in skeletal-universal terms in order to assert its value to the other side, but in the process, we create what
we condemn rather than re-dressing what is still present to refute and rebuke the celebration of absence. If we say the tale can be reduced to a myth that is then reduced to a tool for creating absence, do we deprive the tale of its potential for renewal. If in Lerner-land the king tells the prince “how to handle a woman,” (which denies her humanity but acknowledges her desirability), over in Sondheim-land, the Baker’s Wife (who is, at the moment, dead and invisible except to those who are by convention not “present” – that is, the audience) claims that “no one is alone” – so if no one is alone, then someone is presumably in the presence of someone or something but not of no one. But of course that is not the point – if no one is alone it is because, with all the force of the cliche, all ones have some ones – even Cinderella, unless the tella is a pornografella.

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REVIEWS


In 1949 Albert Bates Lord defended a dissertation entitled “The Singer of Tales” before the Department of Comparative Literature at Harvard University. The title came from the few surviving pages of a study planned by his mentor Milman Parry before the latter’s untimely death in 1935, but the result was a significant extension of that blueprint. Although it would still be eleven years before the thesis saw print in 1960, it sparked the introduction of the so-called “Oral Theory” of Parry and steered Lord to Old English poetry via a 1953 article entitled “The Oral-Formulaic Character of Anglo-Saxon Narrative Poetry” authored by one of Lord’s dissertation advisors, Francis P. Magoun, Jr.

This is but one example (as far as I know the earliest) of the prodigious influence exerted on world literature studies by The Singer of Tales, which by any measure must be recognized as one of the twentieth century’s most enduring works of research and scholarship in the humanities. The initiative began with Parry’s groundbreaking analyses of the texts of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, and with his deduction that their repetitive, formulaic phraseology was symptomatic of their traditional heritage and their transmission by a long series of bards over many centuries. His hypothesis of traditional heritage soon evolved into a double hypothesis of tradition linked with oral performance, as Parry began to re-create what he believed to be not just the character but the actual presentational medium of the Iliad and Odyssey.

Not content with these bold but textually derived hypotheses, Parry then sought to prove them by analogy in the living laboratory of South Slavic oral epic, to which his own mentor Antoine Meillet and the Slavic philologist Matija Murko had alerted him. The next step entailed a fieldwork project in the former Yugoslavia, undertaken with the assistance of Lord and Nikola Vujnovic in the mid-1930’s, during which they recorded acoustically and by dictation dozens of mostly preliterate guslari (bards) who sang epics that often reached thousands of lines in length. Parry and Lord returned from the former Yugoslavia in 1935 with a “half-ton of epic” on large aluminum disks and in notebooks, an invaluable and unmatched cache of oral epic that became the basis of the Milman Parry Collection of Oral Literature (MPCOL) at Harvard as well as the prima materia for the comparative development of the Oral Theory. Lord was to return to the field in the 1950’s and 1960’s to augment that already rich archive of living oral epic. Before the end of the century, Lord’s masterwork, Singer, was to stimulate activity in more than 150 separate language areas as well as across a wide spectrum of disciplines – anthropology, folklore, history, linguistics, literary studies, music, philosophy, psychology, and religious studies, to name only the most prominent ones.

Now Singer enters the new millennium in a modernized edition complete with a superb, focused introduction by Stephen Mitchell and Gregory Nagy and an audio-video CD that opens a window to the excitement and immediacy of Lord’s comparative method. The new edition promises to broaden and deepen
the already remarkable interdisciplinary effect of this book among scholars, as well as to make its contents even more intriguing for both undergraduate and graduate students. I do not make this assessment of its pedagogical value lightly. One of the major contributions of Singer has been its long reign as a mainstay of folklore, literature, and numerous other courses across the United States and abroad. A national survey of college and university offerings on oral tradition, completed in 1997, established its centrality in widely divergent curricula (see Lynn C. Lewis and Lori Peterson, “The National Curriculum and the Teaching of Oral Traditions” and “Course Descriptions and Syllabi,” in Teaching Oral Traditions, ed. John Miles Foley [New York: Modern Language Association, 1998], pp. 403-22, 445-64). Now scholars, instructors, and students alike can actually listen to the guslari sing the selections of South Slavic epic quoted in Singer, and even watch Avdo Medjedovic, the most Homeric of guslari, perform. It should be emphasized that the CD included with the new edition will play on any audio CD device, and the video sections are similarly easy to access (Windows/PC or PowerMac, in either case with 32 MB RAM and 600 x 480 video resolution). The overall presentation is both creative and genuinely thoughtful.

The Introduction to the Second Edition by Mitchell and Nagy is likewise a tour de force that will enormously benefit the many different sectors of Singer’s audience, again no mean feat. The editors succinctly frame the core issues from the initial discoveries onward, with particular attention to the discussion that has ensued since Lord’s first edition of 1960. Especially helpful in understanding the genesis and early stages of the Oral Theory are their quotations from heretofore unpublished documents, such as Parry’s project reports on the fieldwork (pages ix-x, x-xi, xxii) and Lord’s typewritten manuscript preserved in the MPCOL (xii-xiii). They cite a judicious sample of the voluminous related research and scholarship on dozens of traditions, work that builds on Singer and the Oral Theory. Indeed, it is perhaps Lord’s most important and durable legacy that this book has inspired pathbreaking studies in French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, Hebrew, Irish, Welsh, Chinese, Japanese, and literally dozens more traditions, not to mention religious studies and a plethora of African and Indian languages. From the ancient world through the medieval period and on into modern traditions, with a deep and lasting effect on verbal art from six continents, Singer has had a truly revolutionary effect. If this reviewer has one regret about the Introduction, it is only that widely available writings on the origin and development of the Parry-Lord theory (Foley, The Theory of Oral Composition: History and Methodology [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, rpt. 1992]) and on the South Slavic oral tradition itself (Foley, Traditional Oral Epic: The Odyssey, Beowulf, and the Serbo-Croatian Return Song [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, rpt. 1993]; Immanent Art: From Structure to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991]; The Singer of Tales in Performance [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995]; and Homer’s Traditional Art [University Park: Penn State University Press, 1999]) go unmentioned.

Thanks are thus due to Stephen Mitchell and Gregory Nagy, and to the producers and programmers of the CD – Matthew Kay, Thomas Jenkins, Ivan Andouin, and Alexander Parker – for a heroic new performance of a well-known and much-cherished scholarly song. Singer 2000 makes it ever more evident that Lord’s book lies at the epicenter of the still-expanding field of studies in oral tradition. We may, and we should, continue to evolve newer and better methods for such studies, and inevitably such progress will lead to revision or perhaps outright dismissal of earlier theories and practices. That is the nature of a healthy
field of intellectual inquiry. Indeed, we see some of this evolution in Lord’s own later books: *Epic Singers and Oral Tradition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) and *The Singer Resumes the Tale*, edited by Mary Louise Lord (Ithaca: Cornell United Press, 1995); for a listing of all his writings through 1990, see “Albert Bates Lord (1912-1991),” *Journal of American Folklore*, 105 (1992):61-5. But Singer will always remain a cornerstone of whatever edifice we seek to erect. As the guslari whom Albert Lord knew so well and respected so deeply said of another hero so accomplished that we couldn’t just do without him, “Tamo bez njeg’ hoda neimade,” “There’s just no journey there without him.”

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Rosemary Coombe begins this important study with an extended description of a walk she takes down Toronto’s Queen Street. It is a walk during which she encounters a panoply of corporate symbols and other proprietary insignia of global capital, whether in their “pure” forms or subverted by the interventionist practice of *bricoleurs*. She also sees products that are intended to be read as designating specific cultural identities, both those she treats with ambivalence (generic Canadian-ness, for example) and ones she implicitly lauds as authentic (such as products in a First Nations crafts outlet). The material seen on the walk echoes the major themes of the book, which Coombe neatly summarizes as: “[the] constitutive role of intellectual properties in commercial and popular culture; the forms of cultural power the law affords holders of copyright, trademark, and publicity rights; the significance of celebrity images in alternative imaginations of gender; the commodification of citizenship and the negotiation of national belonging on commercial terrain; the appropriations, reappropriations, and rumors that continually reactivate and reanimate commodity/signs to make them speak to local needs; the colonial categorical cartographies that underlie our legal regimes; and the postcolonial struggles of indigenous peoples to eliminate commodified representations of their alterity” (5).

It will be clear from this that Coombe analyses a wide range of materials in support of her central thesis. I take this to be the fundamental clash between the active engagement with and production of meaning in contemporary culture through the shifting and creative opportunities of intertextuality and the competing use of intellectual property law as a means both of regulating “infringing” use and generating a potentially dominating intellectual paradigm that creates an environment hostile to the transgressive possibilities of quotation and appropriation. In broad terms this involves a rehearsal of one of the central tensions of Anglo-American intellectual property rights – the demand for an incentive-based regime that encourages production by offering authors and owners protection of their proprietary interests in intellectual property – and one that does not unnecessarily curtail freedom of expression for everyone else.

In positioning herself within this debate, Coombe advocates an open and discursive approach to “transformative” or “free creative” use that clearly supports basic principles of intertextuality and meanings altered through appropria-
tion. Moreover, she presents a protectionist intellectual property regime as necessarily defending the interests of property owners to control aspects of knowledge and communication as such, not just the use of images, symbols or signs they claim to own. She sees this as particularly affecting those communities that occupy more marginal positions within society. Coombe situates their uses of sometimes protected material as charting an effective and important form of resistance to a dominant hegemonic order that repeatedly seeks to constrain unauthorized use so as to maintain control not only over symbols but also over modes of generating new intellectual and cultural material. She presents this as anathema to the development of cultural expression and argues that restrictions on the use of trademarks, celebrity identities, character merchandising or other copyrighted material represent an undesirable restraint on the human ability both to generate new meanings for pre-existing texts and create new texts by appropriative use.

The content of the text is very broad and the inclusion of a truly extensive bibliography (47 pages in small point size) serves to reinforce this apprehension. An unexpected result, though, is that absentees seem all the more inexplicable. For example, in a book concerned in no small part with alterity the absence of any mention of Emmanuel Levinas’ writing is surprising. Of course, it may be a moot point as to whether his focus on the primacy of “Otherness” may assist strategies of resistance to the hegemonic control of intellectual property, but there is at least an intuitive connection that might have warranted comment. It might have been useful, too, to have raised Roland Barthes’ analysis of images in the section dealing with Sikh Mounties and the nationalistic/racist response to their Canadian-ness. Barthes’ discussion of the black soldier saluting the “tricolour” seems to me a useful example of a punctum in photographic imagery in relation to desires of nationalist uniformity that might have generated interesting discussion in this book. Of course, such absentees would not be disguised were it not for the extent of the bibliography, which, when scrutinized closely, risks becoming a rod for the author’s back.

Similarly, there are times where discussions seem curtailed (an apprehension mitigated by the length of the buttonholing footnotes). For example, Coombe notes how indigenous peoples’ responses to corporate trademarking of indigenous insignia, celebrity or language is “complex, multifaceted, and far from unanimous” (187) but doesn’t afford ambivalent or positive stances the same level of analytical scrutiny as she grants to a generic hostility to such use. While I agree with her conclusions that such use has serious ramifications for indigenous peoples and their self-determination, the text would, nevertheless, have benefited from more in-depth discussion of the contrary view. There is more to this question than a split identification of signs of indigeneity (business use as both offensive and complimentary), as the activity of indigenous entrepreneurs working with and without community backing suggests. Why is it, for example, that indigenous peoples enter into negotiations with business for the licensing of indigenous signifiers? What is gained by such a relationship, what is threatened by it? How does business respond to this shift in demand?

Cultural quotation in art and business operates on a plane where two axes intersect: an authorized-unauthorized use axis and a commercial-creative use axis. In part, such quotation reflects a tension in the fundamental premise of greater intellectual freedom offered by intertextuality. For indigenous peoples this can provide new avenues of their own cultural expression but can just as often be a cunning ruse by which culturally significant material is made available for
continued appropriation by non-indigenous people or companies, sometimes justified by flash theoretical arguments that cloak the residual capital and imperial imperatives in operation. The text refuses a position of unfettered access to or absolute prohibition of the use of signifiers (298) but this runs a little hollow when, for example, the indigenous case for free use of indigenous material is not fully made out. In the same way that Coombe repeats Annie Coombes’ argument that hybridity is no guarantee of postcolonial self-determination (215), discussion of an emergent political-cultural-legal narrative such as the ambivalence of some indigenous responses to the law/culture interface would serve the text well.

I suspect my reading of the arguments involving indigenous cultural material is haunted by a moment in Coombe’s Queen Street walk when “exquisite [Native] beadwork sits abandoned on dusty sheets of pegboard” (4). I have no doubt that this is factually true but in its retelling it ambivalently re-positions the author. On one hand she is both connoisseur (“exquisite”) and sensitive observer (“abandoned”) but there are shades of a nostalgic lament here that are a little discomfitting (silkscreened tee-shirts are unlikely to be “exquisite”; a commercial product of another maker more likely to be “unsold” than “abandoned”). This discomfort reveals for me the risk with a study of this type that it comes across as being overly procrustean – venal commerce set beside creative intertextual appropriation. Nevertheless, Coombe counters this very argument when, for example, she points to the failure of both the demonized capital-based and Rabelaisian consumer carnivalesque schools of cultural studies to address the logic of the commodity as applied to cultural forms (134).

It remains her contention that intellectual property law enables such commodification because it is revealed not as an objective determiner of dispute but as an active force in the generation of signs and symbols with which the power-relationships of difference are constituted and given meaning. This is a contention argued forcefully and with considerable insight and subtlety throughout. Coombe makes an effective and provocative case against the assumed monologism of the normative positions of intellectual property regulation. At the same time, there is the implication that her commitment to dialogism is strong; strong enough to invite the sorts of questioning interventions such as those noted above – interventions that in no way diminish the text but are more like questions provoked in the reader’s mind by it. This, it seems to me, makes this book an active player in discussions of intertextuality not simply a passive commentary. These qualities mark the text as a significant, indeed, groundbreaking contribution to revisionist and inter-disciplinary studies of intellectual property.

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Shirley R. Steinberg and Joe L. Kincheloe have brought together a strong collection of essays detailing the ways in which “kinderculture,” that is, popular culture materials created by corporate America for consumption by children, impact the
everyday lives of kids. Fundamental to the project of this book is the need to understand kinderculture, to take it and its impact on society seriously, and the corresponding desire to use that understanding to rethink childhood education at many different sites of cultural pedagogy. The authors, who are sociology, education, and cultural studies scholars, make this collection even stronger by addressing, not just the top-down forces of kinderculture, but also the complex set of social and cultural interactions with that culture, engaged in by children and adults.

In their introduction, the editors note that:

"[s]uch an effort [as this book] falls under the umbrella term cultural pedagogy, which refers to the idea that education takes place in a variety of social sites including but not limited to schooling. Pedagogical sites are those places where power is organized and deployed, including libraries, TV, movies, newspapers, magazines, toys, advertisements, video games, books, sports, and so on. Our work as education scholars, we believe, demands that we examine both in-school and cultural pedagogy if we are to make sense of the educational process in the late twentieth century (3-4)."

Kinderculture is made not by children, but for children. Notions of just what a child is, and what an ideal childhood should be, are embedded in the products and processes of kinderculture. The distinction between kinderculture and children’s culture is structurally and conceptually similar to that made by Peter and Iona Opie in differentiating nursery rhymes from children’s rhymes (Lore and Language of Schoolchildren, Oxford University Press, 1967, 1). The former are created and passed on by adults for children, while the latter are the products of kids’ interactions with one another, often subversive in their take on the adult world that surrounds them. In Kinderculture, the authors note the presence of children’s culture within kinderculture, pointing out that corporations can and do use antithetical aspects of kids’ play as a part of their marketing strategies. Corporations appropriate at least the form, if not always the content, of children’s culture in their attempts to make their kinderculture constructions, and the products they are trying to sell through those constructions, more attractive to their target customers.

Because the editors take social and cultural construction of traditional childhood as a starting point, they see discussions of the contemporary “crisis of childhood” not as an attack on a natural state, but as a transformation through social and cultural forces (including political and economic ones) of a social construct not much more than 150-years old. Several of the authors in this collection also consider the class and racial inequities that informed traditional notions of childhood (i.e., a privileged and protected state of being held primarily by white, upper- and middle-class children in Western Europe and North America), and which continue to inform corporate-produced kinderculture.

The collection of essays is bookended by two from Kincheloe. He leads with his essay analyzing the (thinly veiled) subtexts of the “Home Alone” movie series, and the “central but unspoken theme [that] involves the hurt and pain that accompany children and their families in postmodern America (31).” The book concludes with his discussion of Ray Kroc’s McDonald’s empire, with a particular focus on its public relations campaign, and the extent to which that presentation of McDonald’s public face affects American culture, and kinderculture. Henry A. Giroux takes on Disney once again, asking “Are Disney Movies Good for your Kids?” He calls for taking all of Disney’s corporate productions, including, but not
limited to, movies, very seriously. Giroux’s call is not to censor or ignore Disney, but to enable analysis, not just by academics, but also by consumers, including kids. Eleanor Blair Hilty similarly questions just how educational is Educational TV, as epitomized by “Sesame Street” and “Barney and Friends.” Douglas Kellner’s nuanced and complex analysis of Mike Judge’s “Beavis and Butthead” series (and, of course, merchandise); Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr.’s discussion of contemporary interactive (and increasingly tied in to other forms of media, such as TV and movies) video games; Peter McLaren and Janet Morris’s consideration of the “Mighty Morphin Power Rangers;” Aaron David Gresson III’s confrontation of the images and messages in professional wrestling (past and present); Murry R. Nelson and Shirley R. Steinberg’s history and discussion of trading cards; Steinberg’s thoughtful catalog of Barbie, “The Bitch who has Everything;” and Jeanne Brady’s analysis of the kinds of history presented by the American Girl doll collection, are all excellent case studies of various forms and impacts of kinderculture.

Some of the essays take a slightly different angle on kinderculture, in that they see the agency that is available in children’s consumption as well as the potential for top-down socialization. In “Mom, It’s Not Real!” Linda K. Christian-Smith and Jean I. Erdman begin by laying out the corporate forces behind the Goosebumps series of books. They go on to address parental anxieties about horror fiction and the “dumbing down” of literacy (including the elitist notions inherent in the latter), and, importantly, include the voices of at least two boys who see a real use for the Goosebumps books. For example, the son of one of the authors uses the books to find a comfort zone in the often uncomfortable manifestations of masculinity found on American primary school grounds. Alan A. Block, in “Reading Children’s Magazines” sounds a cautionary note, expressing his concern that too much adult coaching in critical media literacy will destroy the pleasure that kids find in pop culture (including kinderculture). Adults allow themselves to enjoy “trashy” pop culture; why shouldn’t kids have the same opportunity? How does one balance wanting to raise media-savvy kids with the risk of making them completely jaded and unable to connect in any constructive way with the culture around them? And in “Anything You Want: Women and Children in Popular Culture,” Jan Jipson and Ursi Reynolds give an ethnographic portrait of what it is like to educate teachers in media literacy, a case study in what kinds of strategies educators can take to make sure that kids are being taught by people who recognize the seriousness of kinderculture, and who will engage with it in the classroom.

The central message of all of these essays is that the constructions of childhood, and depictions of gender, age, racial, ethnic, and class roles found in corporate productions such as movies, television, and advertising, need to be taken seriously. It is not enough to write such entities off as “only” popular culture, not enough to disparage popular books like those in the Goosebumps series as “not real literature,” thereby implying that the only impact they can have on children’s lives is either negative, or fleeting. Elitist approaches (or lack of approach) to popular, corporate productions do not allow for the importance of these materials in the everyday lives of people, do not permit any increase in understanding why and how they can impact not just current but future generations’ notions of self and other. In attempting to understand popular materials, in making the processes that produce them more (if never completely) transparent, we can begin to see how kids accept, reject, and otherwise manipulate the notions given to them in kinderculture. Thus Beavis and Butthead are not simply
the endpoint of the “downward spiral of the living white male” (Newsweek as quoted by Kellner, 86), but also have the potential to be seen as satirical characters reflecting very real problems in contemporary American society.

The subtle (and not-so-subtle) manipulations of corporate constructions of childhood are themselves manipulated, and in recognizing this two-way street, the authors in Kinderculture do the study of children and childhood a great service. They avoid the pitfall of constructing kids as empty vessels waiting to be filled. They acknowledge kids as people, with responses, needs, and desires that are their own, and may or may not correspond to preconceived notions held by advertisers, educators, or researchers. The interventionist approach advocated throughout this volume adds to the impression that one can do more than merely identify these processes of manipulation. Teachers, parents and other concerned adults can interact with kinderculture alongside kids in ways that can reveal alternate modes of thinking about the world. But to do so one must take kinderculture seriously, not just hope that if ignored, it will go away.

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The trope of the rapacious, murderous, cannibalistic ogre holds a long-standing place in both folklore and popular imagination. Its contemporary incarnation, the serial killer – the white, middle-class, sexual predator who roams at large and whose victims are young, white and female – can claim a lineage that includes Bluebeard, the vigilante gunslinger of the Western, and, more recently, the murderer of the “slasher” film and urban legends such as “The Hook” and “The Roommate’s Death.” With each instance of actual serial murder, heavily and disproportionately covered by the press, fiction and reality meet and blur, and the narratives build and constitute each other.

Today’s stereotypical serial killer – the white everyman – has become fully integrated into popular culture. Daytime talk shows are devoted to such killers, as are comic books, trading cards, fan clubs, crime novels, news specials (often employing “dramatic re-enactments” in an obvious, yet confused, display of fact and fiction), and main-stream movies such as the Oscar-winning Silence of the Lambs (1991, dir. Jonathan Demme). With the phenomenon of serial killers so heavily evoked in various forms of popular culture, it follows that research and analysis on the subject would most obviously be located in Cultural Studies, as indeed are the two books that are the subject of the present review.

The questions raised by the critical analyses of the nominal subjects of the books under review – serial killers and the serial killer/cannibal/necrophiliac par excellence – are reminiscent of those posed by William Arens in his controversial work The Man Eating Myth (1979, N.Y.: Oxford). That is, what are the interwoven discourses that connect anthropology and anthropophagy: cannibalism and
colonialism? For folklorists, by extension, why is the subject of folklore so often the monstrous, and why is the object of folkloristics and folklorists so often the “Other,” whose markedness as other is determined by our own notions of monstrousness? These books provide some possible answers, illustrating the fascinating relays between both folklore and popular culture, and folklore and forces in contemporary political and social life in the United States.

Tithecott’s *Of Men and Monsters*, a social constructionist approach to the case of Jeffrey Dahmer, perhaps the most sensational and widely-covered serial killer of the 1990s, locates our social construction of the serial killer at the intersection of contemporary ideologies of gender, race, and class. The “celebrity” of contemporary serial killers, seen as motivated by both fear and fascination, is mapped by Tithecott along the dual axes of denial and desire in the two parts of his book – “Policing the Serial Killer,” and “Dreaming the Serial Killer” – offering first a social constructionist, and then a psychoanalytical perspective on the Dahmer story.

Social constructionist analyses of moral panics illustrate not only how a symbolic reality that is increasingly mediated and standardized through news, infotainment, and popular culture tends to unite a very wide sector of the general population, but also how the fears generated by such a reality are almost completely based on events not witnessed or experienced but believed to be true based on input from media. These mediated perceptions are shaped by claims makers (both liberal and conservative) in order to advance particular agendas and effect policy decisions. The social construction of the category of “deviant” hinges on a pervasive fear of the threat of random and “meaningless” harm. The generalized fear of random violence now made incarnate in the persona of the serial killer is a powerful rhetorical image, and the commonly held fears and perceptions that are the result of such a construction have led to specific policies that focus on serial killing as a growing “epidemic.” Tithecott’s study reveals how the mythologizing of the individual, intelligent, and “sane” serial killer was accompanied by a parallel mystification of the serial killer’s nemesis – the FBI profiler (from the FBI National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes [NCAVC], est. 1984) – the lone hero who fights such evils using nearly super-human intuition. These FBI agents have been elevated to a special, extra-legal, elite status in popular perception, and, as “mind hunters,” employ both psychology and intuition to understand and thus apprehend the killer. Engaging in intense one-on-one psychological battles, both hero and anti-hero have been “mystified” (29) and incorporated into popular consciousness as types. Both figures are also shown to have emerged as social phenomena in an intensely conservative political period during which the serial killer became the most extreme example of a class of “deviants” who were held responsible for the breakdown of social order. According to this logic, restoration of social order was to be achieved not only by a series of punitive laws (“Three-Strikes”), but through the efforts of super-human, heroic individuals. Official discourse on the serial killer expanded to include such varied “types” as drug abusers, pornographers, abusive parents, and even single, working mothers as social ills to be contained by policy, reform, and incarceration. Lesser ills were made more urgent by their association with spectacular violence, and all were linked in their socially corrosive potential. In a closed circle of select information heavily laden with ideological overtones and clearly positioned on the side of “family values,” FBI profilers became “experts” for breaking news stories of contemporary murder sprees as well as expert witnesses for Congressional Hearings on serial killers, and helped to make
the connection between serial killing and “abnormal” families explicit. Take, for example, the following quote from an FBI officer in answer to questioning from the House Commission, “In our research with serial murderers, we found that, for example, the backgrounds, without exception, everyone had a chaotic early childhood, a lot of mobility, a lot of transientness in their family, abusive parents, absent parents...” (42).

The FBI Behavioral Unit at Quantico, however, contrary to the Hollywood depiction and popularization, has never solved a case of serial murder, but has, rather, composed a typology of profiles from data amassed after the fact, often through interviews with incarcerated serial killers. In addition, serial killings represent only a tiny percentage of the number of homicides yearly in the United States. Tithecott repeatedly draws out such inconsistencies between perception/construction and reality and in so doing illustrates the important relays between popular media, the portrayal of symbolic reality, individual perceptions, and policy. Clearly, the public engagement with the serial killer is disproportionate to his social menace, and Dahmer’s spectacular and spectacularized case – with allegations of cannibalism, body parts in the refrigerator, necrophilia, and the fact that his victims were mostly both gay and non-white – leads Tithecott to suggest a “correspondence between the meanings we give to serial killing and the meaning of masculinity and of whiteness in modern America” (4), which serves to illuminate the serial killer’s social presence. The analysis of the Jeffrey Dahmer case attempts to expose that which the rhetoric effaces – not only that the focus on such rare (but sensational) phenomena directs concern away from other forms of more widespread violence which are anything but “random” and which have social origins that perhaps more problematically suggest social responsibility and action, but also that the insistent claims of random, motiveless violence “indicate a refusal to make sense of such violence in a way which would associate serial killing with some of society’s dominant values” (5). Tithecott thus suggests that the constructed serial killer ironically both destroys and derives from middle America, simultaneously threatening and upholding the space that middle America has defined as its own and has rigidly defined in terms of family, race, gender, sexuality, class, and domesticity.

In part II, “Dreaming the Serial Killer,” Tithecott tries to come to grips with what he sees as an increasing “surfacing” of the “underground” value of violence into the public sphere (91), represented by our fascination with our construction of the serial killer. Here Tithecott relies less on the constructionist framework used so effectively in the first part, and ventures into the realm of pop-psychology, suggesting that the fascination we find in the serial killer is a fascination with ourselves, or at least with our darker, unexplored fantasies. Echoing Freud’s interpretation of the “uncanny,” Tithecott claims that “the idea of the serial killer seems to be increasingly important to the way we perceive our world” (3), and suggests that if we look too long at the serial killer’s image, “[i]t is ourselves we see” (6) looking back. This cliché of vernacularized Freudian psychology has entered into mainstream acceptance, and has now become a rather unquestioned premise, effacing the radical split between fantasy and enactment. It also misses the point that we are fascinated by the representation of Dahmer and others, and that representation is a mediated presentation of events that may be aligned with fantasy.

In Serial Killers: Death and Life in America’s Wound Culture, Mark Seltzer explores the themes of representation, reproduction, and their technologies as key elements in a social addiction to seriality itself, providing subtle and complex
insights into the importance of the serial killer in the public imagination. Serial killing, for Seltzer, “has its place in a public culture in which addictive violence has become not merely a collective spectacle but one of the crucial sites where private desire and public fantasy cross” (1). Seltzer situates the serial killer at the intersection of what he refers to as America’s “wound culture” (“the public fascination with torn and open bodies and torn and open persons, a collective gathering around shock, trauma, and the wound” [1]), and machine culture (the technologizing of the body, and the “naturalizing” of the machine). Seltzer traces the relays between “murder and machine culture; the intersecting logics of seriality, prosthesis, and primary mediation (dense materializations and corporealizations of writing, reproduction, representation, and symbolization [fn. 17, 176]) that structure cases of addictive violence” (105), seeking to understand the processes by which the serial killer has emerged as a “species of person,” and why this particular individual has become a “flashpoint in contemporary society” (2).

Seltzer only partially relies on a constructionist view to investigate the cultural and social relationship between the serial killer and his audience. For Seltzer, the serial killer’s construction is multi-directional; the media information technologies, the FBI who utilize them and who structure profiles of serial killers “more along the lines of crime fiction rather than crime fact” (159), and the serial killer who fashions himself according to FBI profiles (“how-to-manuals”) and whose own authority is based on the fact that it “reflects the commonplaces of the culture” (126), all ramify each other. But Seltzer sees this as empty and endless circularity (115), which, in detouring around analysis, explains nothing at all (127). “The point is not then that the serial killer problem is a ‘social construction,’ nor that the malady called the serial killer is ‘socially constructed,’ nor quite that the serial killer is a terminal instance of the self-made or self-constructed man. All these are elements in serial killing. But these intricated notions of construction – social construction and self-construction and the relations between them – indicate something more” (115).

One of Seltzer’s main focuses is the meaning of “seriality” itself, playing with the notion that the “serial” of serial murder refers both to the redundancy and reduplication of victims as well as to the typological, reduplicatable murderers themselves, all of which, in their representations and media duplications have become statistical, substitutable persons and types generated in the mass-mediated public consumer sphere. Thus, for Seltzer, serial killing “cannot be separated from the general forms of seriality, collection, and counting conspicuous in consumer society (Stewart), and the forms of fetishism – the collecting of things and representations, persons and person-things like bodies – that traverse it (Baudrillard)” (64).

Seltzer clearly makes the claim that seriality is an underlying motivation, in fact an addiction, in the machine age, and links serial consumption with serial violence (cf. Marx’s metaphor of the capitalist as vampire). The compulsion for seriality is compelling and enlightening. Social addiction to seriality enjoins the serial killer and the serial viewer in the cycle of reproduction, substitution, collection, categorizing, representation and repetition. The redundancy itself fractures the reality of the terror, spectacularizing as it distances and anesthetizes it, co-joining us through mechanical and technological reproduction in the spectacle of wounded bodies and wounded psyches. Here, obviously, is my intentional linking of the sociocultural underpinnings of such phenomena with the enterprise of folkloristics. One of Seltzer’s contentions is that there is, now, a rupture
of the private into the public in the spectacle of the publicized pornography of
serial killing and in the literalness of mutilation which exteriorizes that which had
been interior. Is this not the folklore collection, which not only makes the private
public, but which makes it generic and de-personalized?

One of the effects of reading both Of Men and Monsters and Serial Killers
together is that the widely invoked and seldom questioned fear/fantasy com-
plex is productively uncoupled. This expands their individual meanings and al-

dows us to investigate the particular functions and consequences of both fear
and fascination as separate phenomena. In our fear of the threat of violence, we
ourselves are the hypothetical victims, the objects of violence. Fascination with
the serial killer, on the other hand, can be seen as related not to the potential for
danger, but to the effect of violence, and it is in this context that Seltzer’s articula-
tion of “America’s wound culture” is the most persuasive. Our voyeuristic in-
volvement with the effects of the crimes themselves depersonalizes the victims,
highlighting instead the particular, and in many cases increasingly macabre, de-
tails of the crime, repeating and recounting the tally, distancing and anesthetizing
the gore in its mechanical reproduction. In this way the crimes of serial killers are
linked not only to the spectacle of mass murder (cf. coverage of the Columbine
High School shootings), but to the spectacle of death, dishonor, and disgrace of
public figures (linking the coverage and reaction to the deaths of Princess Diana
and of John F. Kennedy, Jr., and the “exposition” of the details of the Clinton-
Lewinsky scandal). The perverse distancing that such replicated exteriorizing of
interiors effects allows us to engage in a cathartic “public grieving” for public
figures whom we have never met, to vicariously participate in intimate contact
with interior states of strangers in an alienated, post-industrial consumer society.

Both of these books are provocative and somewhat fresh in their approaches
and at the very least are valuable in their demonstration of the entangled web of
consumer, industrial, institutional, social, and personal information that is con-
tinuously playing before us in an endlessly mediated loop. Tithecott’s most com-
pelling statement is that the serial killer construction is a fantasy of American
dominant culture and that his construction is dependent on the relays, linkages,
and slippage between various forms of popular culture and the killers’ imaging
and presentation of themselves, institutional agencies, and public perception.
Seltzer reads repetitive male violence as evidence of a tendency to translate the
difference between self and other into the basic difference between male and
female (67), and suggests that these crimes are not unrelated to the tension
between “possessive individualism and market culture, on the one side, and
disciplinary individualism and machine culture, on the other” (72). Here, per-
haps, we can begin to see cultural and ideological linkages between the anti-
female mechanical reproduction of the “self-made man” (who is both general
and individual) and the anti-female violence of the serial killer – linkages that may
provide some insight in to this figure’s resonance in contemporary society. Both
books, in focusing on the serial killer, interrogate the clearly bounded categories
of “self” and “other,” “normality” and “perversion,” which find expression in the
figure of the serial killer himself: outwardly ordinary, inwardly monstrous. As
with many studies in folklore today, these analyses of the serial killer probe the
instability of identity in late-capitalist society and provide fresh insights for all in
the field.

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