In *Phenomenology of Perception* there are two distinct claims concerning the indeterminacy of perception. I’ve contributed to confusion on this subject by stressing type one indeterminacy while Sean was stressing type two.

1. The claim that in perception the body schema seeks to get the richest and most determinate grip on the object one is concerned with. What counts as the optimal grip in any particular case is relative to the cultural background and to the task at hand, but there is always also a general tendency to get the best possible perception of the color, shape, texture, and size of the object. We move so as to get a better and better grip and so reduce the indeterminacy of our experience of the perceived object, and we can arrive at the optimal. But objects are infinitely rich, so, even when we achieve an optimal grip, we cannot arrive at the fully determinate object posited by objective thought.

2. More importantly, according to Merleau-Ponty there is a kind of indeterminacy we can’t even reduce. That is, he holds that the perceptual object is *essentially* indeterminate. Although he does not explicitly distinguish them, Merleau-Ponty seems to hold that this essentially indeterminacy is manifest in at least four different ways. (a) We can never perceive an object from everywhere at once so we never get a final experience of all its properties. (b) The aspects we do perceive are always situational, like this shade of yellow in the shadow, and this way the color looks is not the color of any determinate color chip. This is certainly true for everyday, engaged perception and may be true of detached perceptual experiences too. (On this point, Merleau-Ponty, Sean and I differ with Alva.) (c) Sean stresses that Merleau-Ponty’s most important and original point is that the "true color" of the object, like all its aspects and indeed like the “real object” itself, is a norm that guides us in our attempt to get a better grip on the object, but the norm itself is never given as a determinate property. (d) Our body schema allows us to grasp characteristics of the object in a way that can’t be objectified. We can, for example, have a feel for the size of a room in terms of how hard or easy it is to get a grip on, without having a concept of its objective size.